The agriculture-water interface : policy integration and the environment by Williams, Sarah Elizabeth
THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL
The agriculture-water interface: Policy integration and the environment
being a thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the University of Hull
by
Sarah Elizabeth Williams B.A (ions)
December 1997
The agriculture-water interface: Policy integration and the environment
54
55
61
88
106
112
113
Contents
Page
Contents	 iii
List of figures	 V
List of tables	 vi
Abbreviations and acronyms	 vii
Acknowledgements	 viii
Summary	 ix
Chapter 1	 Regulation and the agriculture-water interface: the key dimensions of the
problem
1.1	 The agricultural-water interface: defining the problem 	 2
1.2	 Disentangling the problem: conceptualising regulation 	 11
1.3	 The agricultural-water interface: the research objectives	 18
and questions
1.4	 Conclusion	 19
Chapter 2
2.1
2.2
2.3
Chapter 3
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
Chapter 4
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
Conceptualising the agriculture-water interface: alternative
frameworks of analysis
The key dimensions of the nature-society relationship
Competing conceptualisations of the nature-society relationship
The way forward: a theoretical framework of analysis for the
agricultural-water interface
The interface network methodology and empirical strategy
The interface network methodology
The conflict catchment methodology: choice of research areas
Empirical strategy
The analysis and presentation of data
Conclusion
State intervention at the agriculture-water interface: the
institutional context
The organisational framework governing water regulation in the UK
The future direction of policy: balancing water supply and demand
The application of demand management principles in the agricultural sector
Conclusion
21
22
24
48
114
132
140
149
Chapter 5	 The food network and quality: tracing the impact of market	 151
forces of regulation on irrigation use and the water environment
5.1	 The 13K potato and root vegetable market: the national picture 	 152
5.2	 The structure of the potato and root vegetable network 	 161
5.3	 Networks of quality: implications for the use and management 	 173
HI
5.4
Chapter 6
6.1
6.2
6.3
Chapter 7
7.1
7.2
Appendix A
Appendix B
of irrigation water
Water demand management and the food network: barriers to change
Negotiating the agricultural-water interface: farmers' individual
and collective response
Negotiating quality at the farm level
Negotiating access to reliable supplies of irrigation water: farmers' individual
and collective response
Conclusion
Regulating the agricultural-water interface: the way ahead
The agricultural-water interface: the theoretical contribution
The agricultural-water interface: implications for environmental
policy and practice
References
Interview schedule phase one
Method for the calculation of the value in use
193
205
206
254
267
269
269
273
282
298
302
Iv
List of figures
Page
1.1
	
The key forces of regulatory dissonance at the agricultural-water interface 	 9
2.1	 The central inter-relationships at the agricultural-water interface	 52
3.1	 Average annual rainfall, effective rainfall and drought effective rainfall 	 62
3.2	 Effective rainfall and licensed abstraction	 64
3.3	 The present surplus (Present regional average water supply surplus as a 	 65
percentage of 1991 demand)
3.4	 The growth scenario's (Increase in average public water supply demand in 2021 71
under a range of demand scenario's as a percentage of 1991 demand)
3.5	 The top 40 over abstracted catchments in the UK	 73
3.6	 The catchment study areas	 76
3.7	 The Thet-Little Ouse catchment	 78
3.8	 The Lark catchment	 82
3.9	 The Bain-Witham catchment	 85
3.10	 National distribution of irrigated crops 	 95
3.11	 The network of social relations traced in the empirical analysis of the	 111
agricultural-water interface
5.1	 The changing geographical pattern of potato production in the UK. The	 154
proportion of the national potato area by county
5.2	 Increase in the proportion of the main crop potato area receiving irrigation 	 156
5.3	 The network of inter-firm linkages in the fresh and processing potato networks 163
V
List of tables
Page
	
3.1	 Part A Regional licensed abstraction spray irrigation 	 67
Part B Regional actual abstraction spray irrigation 	 68
	
3.2	 Predicted irrigated volume 1996-2021
	 69
	
3.3	 Licensed water abstraction	 70
	
3.4	 Available groundwater resources in the three catchment study areas 	 79
	
3.5	 Historical licensed abstraction in the three catchment study areas	 80
	
3.6	 Phase one sample frame and completed interviews 	 91
	
3.7	 Total licensed quantity allocated to the farm sample 	 94
	
3.8	 Licensed and actual abstraction in the farm sample 	 96
	
3.9	 Farm licence details	 97
	
3.10	 Farm size and total irrigated area in the farm sample 	 99
	
3.11	 Land tenure and land allocation in the farm sample 	 100
	
3.12	 Crop allocation in the farm sample	 101
	
3.13	 Phase two sample frame and completed interviews	 104
	
4.1	 Regional abstraction charges 	 120
	
4.2	 Demand management options in the agricultural sector
	 141
	
4.3	 Direct re-use of treated effluent. Overseas evidence	 142
	
4.4	 Break down of the un-used and un-traceable licences in the three catchment
	 144
study areas
	
5.1	 Potato production in England and Wales	 153
	
5.2	 Consumption of potatoes in the UK
	
155
	5.3	 Estimated tonnage of raw potatoes used in processing in the UK
	
158
	
5.4	 General characteristics of the companies interviewed
	
160
	
5.5	 Central dimensions of potato quality 	 175
	
6.1	 Short term gross margin losses	 210
	
6.2	 Long term gross margin losses (7% real cost of capital) 	 213
	
6.3	 The long run gross margin response incorporating the alternative LMC
	
243
price of abstraction water
vi
Abbreviations and Acronyms
ANOB	 Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty
CLA	 Country Landowners Association
DG	 Director General of Water Services
DoE	 Department of Environment
EA
ESA
1DB
LMC
MAF
MAFF
MMC
NFU
NRA'
NSA
NVZ
OFWAT
PMB
RFO
RWA
SMD
SSSI
Wc
WCA
WSA
Environment Agency
Environmentally Sensitive Area
Internal Drainage Board
Long run marginal cost pricing
Minimal Acceptable Flow
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
Monopolies and Mergers Commission
National Fanners Union
National Rivers Authority
Nitrate Sensitive Area
Nitrate Vulnerable Zone
Office of Water Services
Potato Marketing Board
River Flow Objective
Regional Water Authorities
Soil Moisture Deficit Level
Site of Special Scientific Interest
Water Companies
Water Companies Association
Water Services Association
MgI/pa	 Megalitres per aimum
Mgl/d	 Megalitres per day
Tema	 Thousand cubic meters per year
Tcmd	 Thousand cubic meters per day
1 megalitre	 220,000 gallons
1 megalitre	 4.546 tcmd
10000 gallons	 4.546 m3
t1ha	 tonnes per hectare
'During the period of this research the NRA merged with HMIP, to form the Environment Agency, in operation from the 1
April 1996.
vu
Acknowledgements
This study of the agricultural-water interface would not have proved feasible without the co-
operation of numerous NRA officials; farmers; farmer representative groups; environmental groups;
national and international food processing, manufacturing and retail firms. The empirical work
presented here was collected during interviews and I would like to extend my thanks to all those
concerned for giving up their time freely and for their positive response. In particular, I would like
to thank David Evans, Cameron Thomas, Gill Welbmy, Gordon Hargreaves and Juile Barker from
NRA Anglian Region who provided invaluable assistance, responding to my numerous requests for
information.
I also wish to extend thanks to my supervisors Professor Judith Rees and Professor Teriy Marsden,
who have both provided stimulating advice, guidance and encouragement through all stages of this
work. Staff and post-graduate students at the School of Geography and Earth Resources University
of Hull have provided various support and practical help throughout this work, and in particular I'd
like to thank Keith Scuff in the drawing office.
This thesis could not have been completed without the financial support of the Economic and Social
Research Council under their studentship scheme, and the additional fieldwork expenses provided
by the School of Geography and Earth Resources, University of Hull. Finally, I owe special thanks
to my family for their continuing support and encouragement.
vu'
Summary of Thesis submitted for Doctor of Philosophy Degree
by
Sarah Elizabeth Williams
on
The agriculture-water interface: Policy integration and the environment
Although current environmental policies may prove successful against narrowly defined criteria of
economic, social or environmental sustainability, it is by no means certain that the sustainability of
inter-dependent economic and environmental systems will be assured. In fact, policy intervention
may result in the displacement of environmental problems to other media, times or places.
Farmers are the focus for divergent forces of state, market and social regulation and in consequence
their response, or more importantly non-response, to environmental policies cannot be assessed in
isolation. This thesis explores these complex issues through analysis of the agriculture-water
interface, focusing on the allocation and regulation of abstraction water for use as spray irrigation
by farmers in the eastern counties of England.
Adopting an interface-network methodology, the analysis traces the network of social relations
which directly and indirectly influence the use and management of irrigation water and potential
response to demand management policies, encompassing farmers' interaction with the NRA, food
processing, manufacturing and retail firms as well as farmer representative groups. Risk and
uncertainty play a central role shaping interaction not only between firms, but between finns and
farmers as they attempt to reallocate the financial, production, legal and environmental risks
associated with production. The analysis demonstrates how farmers' incorporation into the "quality
projects" of the downstream food network critically distorts their response to demand management
policies. This perpetuates a highly intensive system of agricultural production, contributing to the
loss of landscape and wildlife habitat and diffuse pollution of ground and surface water sources.
The analysis concludes by outlining an alternative agenda of action for the Environment Agency
which focuses on promoting synergy between state and market forces of regulation. Only through
addressing these issues will the integration of the environment and economy prove successful at the
agriculture-water interface.
CHAPTER ONE
REGULATION AND THE AGRICULTURE-WATER INTERFACE: THE KEY
DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
One of the central problems confronting both policy makers and analysts in the quest for
sustainable development, is the complex and intricate inter-dependencies which underpin
interaction between the environment and economy. There is a danger the current debate will
simpliFy or dilute these complexities to such an extent that it will culminate in policies which focus
solely on discrete problems in specific environmental media. Although these initiatives may prove
successful within very narrowly defmed terms of reference, and conform to the principles of
economic, social or environmental sustainability, it is by no means certain the sustainable
development of inter-dependent economic and environmental systems will be assured (Rees and
Williams 1993). In fact, intervention may result in the dynamic displacement of environmental
problems from one media, time or place to another, creating far more complex environmental
problems for future peoples in distant places to deal with (Weale 1992; Janicke 1990).
Consequently, it is vital to the success of the sustainable development project to address these
intricate inter-sectoral dynamics and bring to an end the perpetual cross media transfer of
environmental problems.
The analysis presented here will directly address these complex and dynamic processes through
detailed scrutiny of the agriculture-water interface. This chapter will set out the key dimensions of
the problem confronting policy makers at the agriculture-water interface, and will identify the
central research questions. The first section of this chapter will concentrate on defining the critical
features of the agriculture-water interface, and will reveal the plethora of competing and conflicting
policies which directly and indirectly shape the use and management of irrigation water at the farm
level. The second section will attempt to disentangle the complex processes at work, through
developing a conceptualisation of regulation which encompasses the multiple layers of direct and
indirect state, market and social forces of regulation. The final section will conclude by drawing
together these various strands of analysis, identifying the primaiy research objectives and questions
addressed in the remainder of the thesis.
1.1: The a2riculture-water interface: definin2 the problem.
Water is a vital resource, not only to the sustenance of human life itself but as an input into
agricultural and industrial systems. It is also a vital element of the British landscape, with a rich
diversity of dependent flora and fauna living in river corridors and wetlands. Water is in many
ways a quite unique resource, as it is naturally renewable and reusable. New supplies of water
become available each year through the natural water cycle, which can be supplemented by
recycling and waste water renovation to increase supplies of 'second hand' water. In addition
temporal and spatial imbalances can readily be adjusted through water storage and transport
facilities, notwithstanding the potential which desalination offers for tapping the massive resources
of the sea (Rees and Williams 1993). Nevertheless, the ability to directly intervene in the natural
water cycle and artificially supplement supplies of water should not detract from the vital
environmental processes which underpin the natural water cycle. The intricate interdependencies
which link ground and surface water in a finely balanced relationship are vital to the maintenance of
not only water quality and quantity, but also to wetlands and their ecosystems. Ground water
naturally feeds surface water through springs and base flow to rivers, and in consequence, removal
or even diversion of ground water can critically affect total river flow. A reduction in either the
quality or quantity of the contributing ground water can also significantly influence the
achievement of surface water quality standards (NRA 1992a). Surface water management also
exerts a powerful influence over ground water. In particular the rate of surface water abstraction can
damage environmental features such as wetlands, through depletion of the ground water base flow
and maintenance of surface water flows is also vital to the protection of in situ flora and fauna
and the dilution of pollution.
2
Water is a multiple use resource encompassing economic, social and environmental processes; vital
to human life and as an input into industrial and agricultural systems, as well as supporting in s/lu
dependent flora and fauna and pollution dilution processes. It is a complex and dynamic web of
inter-dependencies which poses a number of complex questions for management, as changes in one
sphere have a direct or indirect impact further downstream on the other users and uses of water.
This is reflected in the integrated approach to the management of water resources, whereby the
inter-dependence between ground and surface water, water quality and quantity is placed at the
heart of policy, to ensure changes in one sphere do not have a negative impact on the other users
and uses of water (O.E.C.D 1989; Mitchell 1990; NRA 1992a). This integrated management
approach provides the starting point for instigating the sustainable development of water
resources.
To date the academic and policy debate on sustainable water resource management has developed
in a piecemeal way. Water quality and quantity have either been treated as separate and distinctive
areas of policy, with little attempt to develop an integrated approach to water resource
management (Postel 1992; Hanley 1993), or analysts have assessed policy against very narrowly
defined criteria of economic efficiency (Dubourg 1993, 1995) and failed to assess the wider social
or environmental impact. The most far reaching analysis, put forward by Rees and Williams (1993),
suggests the sustainable management of water in the UK should not simply focus on the
conservation of water today to ensure future supply availability. They argue this is meaningless as
new supplies of water are continually being made available through the natural water cycle (Rees
and Williams 1993). Instead, the critical question should focus on ensuring that the human use of
water conforms to economic, social and environmental criteria of sustainability, encompassing the
concepts of economic efficiency', social equity2 and distributive justice. Critically, these authors
Economic efficiency of water use implies the optimal allocation of available supplies between competing users and uses to
insure the maximisation of total welfare derived from the resource; secondly, economic efficiency demands the
development of least cost supply ethancement schemes only when the benefits derived from the additional supply exceed
the costs involved.
2 Social equity and distribution relate to the ability of customers to pay for water to meet their basic needs.
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also recognise that intervention in the water sector should not undermine the sustainability of
interdependent economic and environmental systems.
Agricultural systems are no less complicated, as agricultural policies evolve in response to specific
economic, social, political and institutional forces of change (Marsden eta! 1993). The land base
on which agricultural production is so dependent is comprised of continually evolving
environmental sub-systems. Intricate geo-chemical and geo-physical processes are central to the
maintenance of the soil, breakdown of these delicate systems leads to erosion and leaching of soils
for example, which in turn critically influences the productivity of agriculture (Conway and Pretty
1991). This economic and environmental system is closely inter-twined and subject to dynamic
forces of change, with social change impacting on the ecological system and vice versa (Norgaard
1994). In fact, these ecological processes have been progressively harnessed and supplemented by
human intervention, through the use of chemical inputs and mechanisation, resulting in the
intensification of agricultural production systems. This process has had a significant impact on the
natural environment, contributing to the loss of landscape, wildlife habitat, and dependent flora and
fauna, as well as the pollution of ground and surface water sources (RSPB 1988, 1990; Conway and
Pretty 1991). To date the debate on the sustainable development of agricultural systems has
focused on the de-intensification of production to ensure the protection of the environment, through
reform of the system of price support, introduction of alternative environmental taxes and
subsidies, and the use of organic production methods (Hodge 1991). Nevertheless, it is recognised
that the objective of environmental sustamability must be balanced against the economic and social
sustainability of the rural economy, in which agriculture plays a vital role as a source of
employment and income (Bowers 1995; Murdoch et a! 1992).
Hitherto policy in the water and agricultural sectors has evolved quite separately with little
consideration of the impact of social or ecological changes for inter-dependent economic or
environmental systems. Nevertheless, the agricultural and water sectors are closely inter twined,
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both economically and environmentally, as problems are displaced from one media to another. This
is revealed most vividly in the case of diffuse pollution of ground and surface water sources. The
agricultural price support system has resulted in the intensification of production with heavy
reliance on chemical inputs. Inappropriate or over use of these chemicals results in leaching,
whereby chemicals percolate through soil and rock strata and ultimately enter surface and ground
water sources. This contributes to the decline of surface and ground water quality and thereby
undermines the protection of in situ dependent flora and fauna. Agricultural policy is not directly
concerned with these externalities of production, and responsibility for the resolution of these
problems is shifted to other sectors of the economy, leaving unchallenged the system of incentives
which underpins agricultural production. In consequence, Water Companies are in the process of
investing millions in order to ensure water quality complies with EU Directives on drinking water
quality (OFWAT 1992; 1993). A second example relates to improvements in the quality of UK
rivers and coastal waters, which resulted from increased investment in sewage plant technology by
the Water Companies (NRA 1995a; 1995b). Although these schemes have proved successful in
improving the quality of water, secondary pollution problems have developed as a consequence
which focus on the disposal of sewage sludge, with concerns developing over the safety of disposal
methods to land sites and the sea (Davis 1993). Given these complex economic and environmental
interdependencies it is vital to trace the impact of policy changes in agriculture on the water sector
and vice versa to ensure unintended consequences and side effects do not perpetuate unsustainable
practices, nor lead to more complex secondary environmental problems.
The analysis presented here will focus on one specific dimension of the agriculture-water interface,
namely the allocation and regulation of abstraction water for use as spray irrigation by famiers. This
reflects an emerging arena of conflict as farmers, primarily in the eastern counties of England,
demand greater access to and use of reliable supplies of water for use as irrigation in the aftermath
of the drought of 1989-92 (NRA 1994a, 1994b; Weatherhead et a! 1994). Nevertheless, this is not
a simple nor uncontested process as the Environment Agency, has to balance these demands against
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the available supplies of water, the requirements of domestic and industrial water consumers, as
well as maintaining flows to ensure protection of the in situ water environment and pollution
dilution processes. The conflicts and contradictions inherent in the allocation and regulation of
abstraction water between these competing users and uses, are becoming more sharply focused as
existing supply sources become fully committed and potential new resource development sites are
severely limited (NRA 1 994a; NRA 1 994b). Added to this, there is uncertainty over the impact of
climate change on water resources, in terms of the effect on both the availability and demand for
water (DoE 1996b; Pany and Duncan 1995).
In light of this, the Environment Agency has shifted the emphasis of policy to embrace the
principles of demand management, which focus on improving the efficiency of existing water use
patterns and reducing wastage. In theory, the implementation of demand management policies in
the agricultural sector should confonn to the economic, social and environmental criteria of
sustainable water resource development. Nevertheless, there are a number of potential problems
with such an approach. Firstly, the response of farmers to these policy measures is by no means
certain, as demand management policies fail to take account of the wider regulatory forces
influencing irrigation decision making. Thus, the response of farmers may be distorted,
undermining the efficiency and efficacy of the chosen regulatory tool, leading to unintended
environmental consequences and side effects which require further regulation. Secondly, although
specific policy tools may succeed in shifting the use and management of irrigation water along a
sustainable pathway, it is also possible they will perpetuate unsustainable agricultural practices
(Rees and Williams 1993). Consequently, it is vital to explore the complex inter-sectoral dynamics
shaping the agriculture -water interface, in order to expose and ameliorate the key forces
perpetuating the dynamic cross media displacement of environmental problems.
Tracing the impact of environmental policy initiatives on inter-dependent economic and
environmental systems, although vital, is by no means a simple task. A purely sectoral approach is
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deeply ingrained within policy communities, as environmental policies are primarily geared to
meeting specific environmental standards in specific sectors of the economy (Weale 1992; Majone
1989). Thus, policies are evaluated against very narrowly defined criteria and no consideration is
given, in the pre- or post- implementation phase, to the direct or indirect impact on inter-dependent
economic and environmental systems. Little consideration is given to the wider regulatory context
within which the regulated are situated, and policy makers are therefore surprised when the target
population fails to respond in the theoretically optimal manner (Jacobs 1994; Redclift 1992). In
reality, specific environmental policy signals may be undermined or distorted by other direct and
indirect regulatory signals, such as banking policies, EU subsidy programmes, local planning
policies or national employment agreements. These direct and indirect forces of regulation impinge
on and distort the formation of specific management responses to specific environmental
regulations, and potentially undermine the efficiency and efficacy of the chosen regulatory tool.
This is demonstrated in the case of the UK sewage discharge scheme, where a 400% increase in
discharge fees over a five year period failed to induce any change in the behaviour of firms, despite
the availability of technologies which would reduce discharges with a pay back period of one year
(Pearson and Smith 1990). This economic signal failed, even though the fees were raised, because
discharge costs were a small percentage of the finn's total costs and management time was therefore
spent on achieving other savings.
An inter-sectoral approach cannot simply be confmed to tracing the impact of policies on inter-
dependent economic and environmental systems. This provides only a partial insight into the
complex and dynamic processes at work, and leaves unchallenged the key forces which perpetuate
the cross media transfer of environmental problems. Consequently, it is vital to adopt a broader
approach, which exposes the combination of direct and indirect regulatory forces which together
undermine and distort the response of the regulated to specific environmental policies and
contribute to the dynamic displacement of environmental problems.
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Central to this approach is the conceptualisation of the interface, which provides a key mechanism
for linking together the complex and dynamic processes at work. Drawing on the work of Long
(1989), the interface is defmed as
"..a critical point of intersection or linkage between different social systems, fields or levels
of social order where structural discontinuities, based upon differences of normative value
or social impact, are most likely to be found. The concept implies some kind of face to face
encounter between individuals, or units representing different interests and backed by
different resources" (p1)
In light of this conceptualisation, the agriculture-water interface is clearly much more than simply
the inter-section between divergent water and agricultural policies. Although these policy signals
represent contradictory tendencies, they are also representative of different interests and values. The
signals are the outcome of complex processes of interaction within and between institutions
involved in directly and indirectly regulating the agriculture-water interface. Thus, the conflicts and
contradictions which emerge reflect the interaction between different actors, asserting different
values and drawing on different resources, in order to influence and shape the direction of change at
the farm level in line with their own particular interests. Consequently, this analysis will not focus
merely on the optimal design and implementation of demand management policies in the
agricultural sector but also expose the conflict of interests and values which underpin the direct
and indirect forces of regulation which impinge on farmers' irrigation decision making. This is
revealed in figure 1.1 which explicitly identifies the principal forces of direct and indirect
regulation emanating from the agriculture-water interfitce, encompassing not only the most
obvious agencies such as the Environment Agency and MAFF but also supermarkets, the PMB,
specialist irrigation equipment manufacturers and irrigation advisers.
Firstly, the restructuring of the organisational framework of the water industry, with the creation of
the private Water Companies and a new environmental regulator, the Environment Agency,
created a new agency with responsibility for the regulation of agriculture. The EA falls outside the
8
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traditional structure of state involvement in agriculture, which is primarily channelled through
MAFF and represents a new threat, as its policy remit directly challenges the status quo by
focusing on the protection of the environment. Secondly, competition for access to and use of
reliable supplies of water between the different users and uses is increasing, with limited new
supplies available to meet this demand. Although the Environment Agency is actively examining
the scope for alternative water supply sources, including the construction of new reservoirs and
development of ground water sources, policy has shifted to embrace the principles of demand
management. Demand management techniques target the existing pattern of water use and attempt
to reduce wastage and improve the efficiency of water use. Central to this policy approach is the
use of economic incentive measures (NRA 1994a, 1994b), which increase the cost of water and
should in theory encourage conservation. This represents the third major change in policy in the
water sector which will have a profound impact on farmers' use and management of irrigation
water. Finally, the EU also plays a direct role, most obviously through the Directive on Drinking
Water Quality, and the proposed Directive on water resource management will play a major role
shaping the future direction of Government and Environment Agency policy.
In the agricultural sector, regulatoiy restructuring has also led to significant changes. The 1993
GAIT agreement led to significant reform of the CAP, and culminated in the price support system
shifting the emphasis away from production per Se, to the protection of farm incomes and the
environment. In consequence, a number of new initiatives has been developed under both MAFF
and the EU which attempt to encourage diversification schemes on the farm, as well as specific
schemes to protect the environment such as the Environmentally Sensitive Area and Countryside
Stewardship schemes. Nevertheless, state regulatory agencies are not the sole influence on farm
management as firms from the up and downstream food system play a significant role, indirectly
penetrating on-farm production decision making. Input suppliers such as chemical and seed
manufacturers play a key role channelling technological change at the farm level (Hawkins 1991),
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while food manufacturers and processors exert a powerful influence ensuring the quality of
produce. Of increasing significance is the role of the supermarkets in regulating on-farm production
(Flynn et a! 1994), as they capitalise on their position of power within the food system to
manipulate the production and processing of food to conform to their own quality standards. Thus,
a plethora of public and private, national and international agencies potentially exerts a powerful
influence over on-farm irrigation decision making. Exposing the form and function of these
influences is critical, in order to understand the response, and more importantly non response, of
farmers to demand management policies, and the unintended consequences and side effects which
result.
1.2: Disentan2lin the problem: conceptualism! re2ulation.
A number of divergent national and international, public and private sector agencies all play some
part in regulating farmers at the local level, and it is therefore vital to explicitly identify the key
processes at work. The first step in disentangling this complex web of inter-dependencies is the
development of a coherent conceptualisation of regulation, in order to link together the multiple
layers of direct and indirect regulation which in combination shape and influence the use and
management of irrigation water.
Regulation is in many ways a quite elusive concept to defme precisely. Definitions reflect not only
the inherently ideological nature of the concept which demarcates the role of the state and market in
society, but can also incorporate precise definitions which focus on policy instruments and legal
rules (Hancher and Moran 1989). In consequence there is a plethora of competing definitions and
it is almost impossible to pin down a precise definition as it is a metaphor for a number of social
practices (Leyshon 1992). This is further complicated by the process of de-reregulation which
critically reshaped the form and function of state intervention throughout the 1980s and early 1990s.
The dual processes of deregulation and privatisation were instigated by the Thatcher Government in
an attempt to divest the state of key areas of responsibility and ensure the operation of the free
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market. Nevertheless, despite the rhetoric, the process of deregulation was in practice, a much more
complex process than initially implied. The conceptualisation of deregulation as the mirror image of
regulation implies the removal or relaxation of previous rules and legal guidelines. This, however, is
too simplistic and fails to grasp the complexity of the process, as Cerny (1991) reveals how
deregulation is in fact accompanied by a dual process of re-regulation, whereby existing state
regulations are replaced by new legal rules or regulatory instruments. In the UK this has led to the
legitimisation of regulatory forms which blur the distinction between the public and private sectors
(Lowe et al 1994), with the state divesting itself of key responsibilities to private sector
organisations. This process is evident in the food sector, where the state has succeeded in partially
disengaging from the direct regulation of food safety and quality with responsibility shifted to the
food retailers (Flynn et a! 1994), and their position within the food system has been formally
sanctioned and legitimated by the State.
The process of de-reregulation has succeeded at the national level in shifting responsibility for key
areas of state regulation to private sector organisations. Running in tandem to this process, the state
has also been superseded by international systems of regulation, which are encroaching on
traditional areas of state responsibility. In particular, the European Union is an increasingly
significant player in domestic policy, with new Directives and Agreements emanating on social,
economic and environmental issues. These policies are legally binding and over-ride existing state
policies, which in turn are leading to massive investment by Government and industry to ensure
compliance (see OFWAT 1992, 1993 for example). These agreements nevertheless, are only the tip
of the iceberg, as the state is a signatory to a wide number of international agreements; for example
the new GATI agreement signed in 1993 and the Rio Declaration of 1992. These agreements have
profound implications for Government policy at both the national and international level; the
GATE Agreement sets out the key areas of reform to ensure free trade, while the Rio Declaration
sets out the timetable for the achievement of key environmental targets. At the national level these
agreements have been translated into a plethora of new rules and regulations which have contributed
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to the increasing complexity which characterises the regulatoiy process. Thus, it is too simplistic to
conceive of deregulation as the removal of existing rules and legal guidelines, as the deregulatory
process has shifted responsibility for key areas of policy either down to the private sector or
upwards to international organisations. In consequence, the 1980s and 1990s have not witnessed an
end to regulation, but a significant restructuring of its form and function. As Ayres and Braithwaite
(1992) argue
"We have not, and are not, experiencing an era of deregulation so much as an era of
regulatory flux - an era where dramatic regulatory, deregulatory and re-regulatory shifts are
occurring simultaneously" (J)7)
This process of regulatoiy flux or restructuring poses clear problems for the regulated, as they are
increasingly caught up in a regulatory network which is undergoing a process of change. Competing
and conflicting signals are emanating from various national and international, public and private
sector agencies which are pushing and pulling them in different directions. In consequence, the
formation of a specific response to a state policy initiative by the target population is no simple
task, as this signal may be distorted by other direct and indirect forces of regulation. In fact, these
forces of regulation may over-ride a specific state policy, and consequently the regulated will fail to
respond in the expected manner, leading to unintended consequences and side effects.
The process of regulatory restructuring exposes the disjunctures between national and international,
public and private forces of regulation. This is translated at the local level into increased levels of
dissonance, as the signals relayed by specific state regulatory tools in one policy field conflict with
or contradict the signals transmitted by other direct and indirect forces of regulation. This is
illustrated in the agricultural sector, where the breakdown of the agricultural productivist model,
reflected in the reform of the CAP, as well as the restructuring of rural areas in general, means that
farmers stand at the apex of divergent processes of change. On the one hand these forces are
encouraging specialisation and farm concentration, while on the other encouraging diversification
and pluriactivity. These dual processes in combination are providing opportunities for increasing
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amounts of dissonance between nation states and between policy makers and farmers (Marsden el
a! 1992; Marsden and Murdoch 1990). Hence, it is critical to avoid conceptualising regulation
merely as the preserve of either the state market, as this confines analysis to a vety limited set of
questions which diminish the importance of the other critical social, political and market forces
which together play an important role in all stages of the regulatory process. As Grabo sky (1996)
argues
"The fact that state regulatory agencies do not exist in vacuo , but rather in a
framework of mutually constitutive interaction with non-governmental institutions and
actors, suggests that to focus on a single institution, in what ever sector, gives one a
very limited perspective on the regulatory process" (p202)
Adopting a broad conception of regulation to include public and private sector actors goes some
way towards unpacking the complexity which characterises the process of regulation. Implicit in
this approach is the recognition that regulation is an inherently social practice (Clark 1992) which
draws together analyses from the sociological and political economy traditions (Lowe el a! 1994) to
enable recognition of the multiple layers of state, market and social regulation within which the
regulated are situated.
1. Market forces of regulation.
Market forces of regulation exert a powerful influence, directly and indirectly shaping the
production and consumption decision making of consumers by price and quality information, as
well as through the images portrayed in advertising campaigns. Companies also exert considerable
power and influence over each others behaviour (Grabosky 1996), as they are also significant
purchasers of goods and services in their own right. Thus, the interchange between buyers and
suppliers in the market place is a significant force of regulation as finns exert considerable pressure
on each other in the quest to maintain market position (Levacic 1991; Krizner 1991). Contracts of
agreement with suppliers enable the purchasing firm to stipulate the product specification, quality
criteria and delivery date, as well as negotiate the price level. This serves to regulate production as
the supplier must ensure production meets the buyers' specification.
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Economic theory identifies the mechanisms through which firms organise production in order to
maximise efficiency under pressure from shareholders, creditors and consumers to ensure the
minimisation of production costs (Ogus 1994; Demsetz 1988; Eggertsson 1990). Companies can
instigate measures to improve their efficiency such as inventory, price and employment practices.
These internal processes of regulation serve to influence, channel or redefine the position of the firm
in the market place and thus influence the behaviour of those who populate the firm's market (Balch
and Wu 1974). Large retailers command significant positions of power as they are able to exploit
their purchasing power in order to dictate the quality, price and delivery date for produce. Suppliers
to large retailers and manufacturers are subject to intensive scrutiny of their production and
manufacturing processes to ensure buyers are not tainted by the suppliers' questionable production
process (Grabosky 1996). In fact, (irabosky (1996) documents how large retailers are instigating
programmes which scrutinise products from the cradle to the grave, to evaluate the environmental
costs of the product. This process of product assessment is critical as it sends important signals to
the market place. If companies deFy these signals or fail to meet the requisite standards they run the
risk of losing their competitive edge and, by implication, their market position.
2. Social forces of regulation.
The regulated are by no means passive recipients of change; through membership of interest groups
they actively influence all stages of the regulatory process. Spontaneous campaigns against
particular state policies or business practices can lead to radical actions by a range of social
groupings, the most recent example being the campaign against live animal exports in 1995. Apart
from these direct action campaigns, which have very limited involvement or engagement with
Governments at the national and international levels, other more established producer and consumer
groups have a direct line of communication to government. Representative bodies such as the
National Farmers Union (NFU), Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and British Retail
Consortium have a direct influence over the design and implementation of Government policies.
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The success of these orgamsations in negotiations and representations to Government is dependent
on the degree to which they involve themselves in the self regulation and discipline of their own
constituency (Cox et a! 1985). These relationships have been dubbed "corporatist" by
commentators which is defmed as
"..a mode of policy formation, in which formally designated interest associations are
incorporated within the process of authoritative decision making and implementation"
(Schmitter 1981, p295).
The relationship of the NFU with Government has been cited as the classic example of corporatism
(Cox eta! 1985; Grant 1983) as agricultural producer interests are entrenched in all stages of the
policy process; from the definition of a policy problem, to the design and implementation of policy
tools. Nevertheless, in the post-productivist period the position of the NFU is under stress, as
consumer and environmental interests dominate the political agenda (Lowe et a! 1994). As Flynn et
a! (1994) argue this process of change is re-defining the relationship of the NFU with Government,
as other consumer interests, primarily food retailers, are incorporated into the policy process,
giving rise to new forms of micro-corporatism. Interest groups are key actors in the regulatory
process as they mediate between Government and their own members acting as a channel of
communication. These groups play a pivotal role as they succeed in not only (re)educating
Government of their supporters' problems, but also play a key role in educating and policing their
own constituency.
3. State forces of regulation.
The role of the state in the process of regulation has dominated academic and policy discourse
(Cerny 1990; Hahn and Stavins 1991; Yandle 1989) with an emphasis on the design of the optimal
tools and instruments of state intervention. The state can harness direct and indirect mechanisms to
regulate social and economic development through direct state ownership and planning, direct state
regulation through command and control style standard setting, indirect use of economic incentives
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such as taxes and pricing schemes, and fmally indirect measures of social regulation which involve
the use of mfonnation, education and persuasion to change value systems and behaviour (Rees
1992). These mechanisms are by no means mutually exclusive and a combination of tools may be
used in a specific regulatory space (Eckersley 1996; Jacobs 1996).
The implementation of state regulatory tools rarely conforms to the theoretically optimal schemes
designed by policy analysts (Majone 1989). Political and institutional constraints critically influence
and colour the design and implementation of state regulatory tools, as alternative regulatory
instruments critically alter the position and power of various policy actors within state institutions.
Thus the design and implementation of state regulations are rarely uncontested or neutral processes,
with conflicts of interest and values occurring within state institutions. In consequence, as Clark
(1992) argues in his analysis of 'real' regulation, it is critical to focus on the actual administrative
manner, style and logic through which the state regulates society. By re-focusing analysis on the
actual institutions of state regulation, it is possible to identify the real conflicts of interest and
values which evolve in all stages of the regulatory process; not only within the state institutions but
also in the interaction between state, market and social forces of regulation.
This conceptualisation of regulation ensures movement away from simple one-dimensional
analyses of the design of state regulations or role of interest groups, which are replaced by an
alternative, broad based approach which emphasises the interaction and interdependence between
direct and indirect state, market, and social forces of regulation. l'hrough recognising that regulation
does not occur in a vacuum, but is linked to an inherited set of social norms and practices, it is
possible to open up to analysis the multiple layers of regulation which directly and indirectly
influence the behaviour of the regulated, and contribute to the dynamic displacement of
environmental problems.
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1.3 The aariculture-water interface: the research objectives.
The conceptualisation of regulation provides a critical point of entry into understanding the coinpiex
and dynamic processes shaping the agriculture-water interface. Distinguishing the direct and indirect
forces of state, market and social regulation ensures the transparency of the combination of
processes which together influence irrigation decision making, and the unintended consequences
and side effects which result. It enables analysis to move beyond simply focusing on one specific
dimension of state or market intervention and instead to emphasize the dynamic interaction between
these divergent forces of regulation. Consequently, this analysis sets out with the overall aim of
exposing the combination of regulatory forces which together undermine and distort the
management and use of irrigation water. Four specific objectives are identified, and focus on the
multiple layers of state, market and social regulation at the agriculture-water interface.
• What are the key influences shaping the form and function of state intervention at the
agriculture-water interface? What constraints do the policy makers work within, and how
does this influence the policy process, from the conception of the problem, through to the
design and implementation of the policy tools?
• What are the principal forms and functions of market forces of regulation at the agriculture
-water interface? How do off-farm firms directly and indirectly shape and influence
farmers' irrigation decision making, and what are the implications not only for the on-farm
use and management of irrigation water but also for the introduction of demand
management policies?
• How influential have farmers and their representative organisations been in shaping water
abstraction policy? How did they respond to the drought of 1989-92, and what can this tell
us about the ability of the NFU and CLA to deal with new and emerging environmental
problems?
What is the impact of this regulatory dissonance on farmers' irrigation decision making?
How do farmers trade off and reconcile these competing and conflicting signals in order to
formulate effective farm management strategies?
These research objectives address different facets of the agriculture-water interface problem, and
should enable the analysis to expose the combination of processes which together contribute to the
unintended environmental consequences and side effects which result from policy intervention.
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1.4 Conclusion
This chapter has established the key parameters of the agriculture-water interface problem and in the
succeeding chapters of this thesis the analysis will explore its multiple dimensions. The chapters are
organised to ensure the transparency of the combination of state, market and social forces of
regulation shaping the agriculture-water interface. Two levels of analysis are differentiated.:
1. relating to the form and function of state, market and social forces of regulation at the
agriculture-water interface, and the mechanisms through which these regulatory forces
shape and influence irrigation decision making at the farm level.
2. focusing on how farmers themselves respond to these competing regulatory signals, and
the implications not only for their use and management of irrigation water but also their
potential response to demand management policies.
The analysis of the complex and dynamic set of inter-relations which characterise the agriculture-
water interface poses a number of complex analytical and methodological questions, which are
directly addressed in Chapters Two and Three. Drawing together the literatures from economics,
politics, sociology and geography, Chapter Two examines the alternative theoretical
conceptualisations of the nature-society relationship. The review concludes that no single
disciplinary perspective provides an overarching theoretical framework for analysis, and in reality
elements from each of the different perspectives are potentially useflil. Six theoretical postulates
form the basis of an alternative theoretical framework of analysis. Chapter Three concentrates on
methodological questions focusing in particular on the interface-network approach. This forms the
basis of the empirical strategy which is outlined in detail, and the chapter finally concludes with a
brief examination of the methodological issues raised in the analysis of the empirical material.
The state and social forces of regulation governing the water and agricultural sectors are examined
in Chapter Four, where the analysis concentrates on the detailed exploration of the political,
institutional and administrative factors shaping the design and implementation of state policy at the
agriculture-water interface. Detailed scrutiny of the institutional framework governing the allocation
and regulation of water in the UK will explore the past and present role of vested interests in
19
shaping the direction of water abstraction policy. The analysis identifies the critical constraints
within which the water regulators operate, which serve to undermine their powers to effectively
protect the environment. The shift in emphasis away from supply towards demand management
policy is explored, and the analysis outlines in detail the specific implications for the use and
management of irrigation water.
Chapters Five and Six concentrate on the presentation of the empirical analysis, with Chapter Five
focusing on the network of market forces of regulation which directly and indirectly influence
farmers' use and management of abstraction water. The analysis documents the organisational
structure of the network of relations which link supermarkets with the producers of fresh fruit and
vegetables, and the forces of direct and indirect regulation which enable them to control production
at the farm level. The impact of these regulatojy forces on both the on-farm use and management
of irrigation water and the introduction of demand management policies are clearly documented.
The chapter concludes by outlining the central role of the downstream food network in
implementing demand management policies in the agricultural sector.
Chapter Six draws together the analysis of the state, market and social forces of regulation by
focusing on farmers' interaction and engagement with these divergent regulatory forces,. The
analysis explores how farmers, both individually and collectively, respond to these divergent forces
of state and market regulation, in the context of their management and use of irrigation water. By
focusing on farmer's interaction with both the EA and the downstream food network, it is possible
to identifj the key forces influencing irrigation decision making and the implications for the design
and implementation of demand management policies. Chapter Seven, the final chapter, will attempt
to pinpoint the central conclusions, not only for the theoretical debate on the integration of the
environment and economy, but also the key issues for environmental policy and practice. The
analysis will identify the implications for the future regulation of the agriculture-water interface, and
suggest an alternative agenda of action for the Environment Agency.
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CHAPTER TWO
CONCEPTUALISING THE AGRICULTURE-WATER INTERFACE:
ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS OF ANALYSIS
The conceptualisation of the agriculture-water interface developed in Chapter One accentuates the
dynamic interaction between two inter-dependent economic and environmental systems, and
pinpoints the problems which these processes pose for environmental policy and the quest for
sustainable development. The primary aim of this chapter is to set out an analytical framework
which links together the combination of processes which directly and indirectly shapes and
influences the integration of the environment and economy, to reveal the unintended environmental
consequences and side effects which result.
This chapter is divided into three sections and the first section will concentrate on refinement of the
research objectives. The analysis will underline the central dimensions of the nature-society
relationship, which are central to analysis of the agriculture-water interface. Drawing on the
environmental policy and management literatures, the analysis will reveal the failure of these
approaches to directly address the key inter-sectoral dynamics shaping the agriculture-water
interface. This establishes the foundation stone for the second section, which will examine the
relevance of key alternative theoretical approaches found in sociology, politics, economics and
geography to understanding these complex and dynamic inter-relations. Analysis of these
competing conceptualisations reveals that on their own they provide only partial insights into the
dynamic processes at work, underlining the need for a new, alternative approach. The final section
concentrates on the development of this alternative analytical framework. Avoiding the confines of
specific models, theories and disciplinary perspectives, the analysis will identify six theoretical
postulates, which together address different dimensions of the agriculture-water interface problem.
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2.1: The key dimensions of the nature-society relationship.
The characterisation of the agriculture-water interface developed in Chapter One underlines the vital
importance of adopting an inter-sectoral approach to environmental policy and analysis. Such an
approach ensures not only the transparency of the combination of processes influencing the
response of the regulated to specific environmental policies, but also reveals the dynamic processes
underpinning the displacement of environmental problems from one media, time or place to
another. To date policy discourse has focused purely on the design, implementation and assessment
of environmental regulations within specific sectors of the economy and ignored the impact on
interdependent economic and environmental systems. This failure reflects the simple, technocratic
model which has dominated environmental policy making since the 1970s (O'Riordan 1976),
where the environment is conceived as a static system, in which there are no dynamic inter-
linkages between key environmental sub-systems. In consequence, policy develops in an ad hoc
fashion dealing with the symptoms of environmental pollution or degradation as they arise in
specific environmental media (O'Riordan 1976; Majone 1989; Weale 1992; Janicke 1990). This
largely reactive strategy fails to develop a clear understanding of the underlying causes of the
environmental problem and consequently focuses on technical, end-of-pipe policy solutions.
The problems associated with such an approach are clearly distinguishable in the classic example of
air pollution control, where policy in the UK was directed to the construction of high smoke stacks
to resolve the problem of fog and smog in industrial areas. This policy development, while
resolving the particular problem in the UK, also resulted in the displacement of problems to other
media, times and places (Janicke 1990; Weale 1992). Hence Germany and Scandinavia suffered
extreme problems as a consequence of sulphur deposition or acid rain, with destruction of forests,
pollution of lakes and loss of wildlife becoming increasingly prevalent from the early 1970's (see
Newbeiy 1990; Park 1987). The short term technical fix approach to environmental policy in this
field only provided a partial resolution of the problem, while in turn creating far more complex
cross-media environmental problems. As Weale (1992) recognises, cross-media transfers are an
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intrinsic feature of any pollution control system, as resolution of one issue creates significant
secondary problems which require further regulation. Thus, the technocratic model which dominates
policy in fact perpetuates and increases the complexity of environmental problems. Failure to
address the complex and dynamic inter-dependencies and interactions not only between
environmental sub-systems but also between the environment and economy, leads to a self-
perpetuating cycle of incremental policy refonm
Environmental policy analysis has itself replicated this technocratic approach and left unchallenged
some of the key assumptions of the model. Majone (1989) argues that policy analysts in the
environmental field have focused purely on technical issues, such as the optimal design of
regulatory tools to achieve specific environmental objectives (Tietenberg 1991; Hanley 1993; Hahn
and Noll 1982; Hahn and Hester 1989); or the assessment of environmental regulations against
narrowly defmed criteria of efficiency or equity (Auld 1985; Baumol and Oates 1975; Johnson
1990). Although specific environmental regulations within specific sectors of the economy may
prove successful in achieving narrowly defmed targets, assessment will not reveal the secondary
problems which also develop (Weale 1992). Thus policy analysts largely ignore the implications of
specific environmental regulations on inter-dependent economic and environmental systems, and
the dynamic displacement of problems to other media, times or places.
It is vital to break away from this technocratic approach and develop an alternative perspective for
analysis of the agriculture-water interface, which does not simplify or marginalise the complex and
contradictory processes at work. Analysis must shift, to address the combination of processes which
together undermine and distort the integration of the environment and economy. Central to this
approach is the conceptualisation of regulation developed in Chapter One. Explicitly identifying the
multiple layers of state, market and social regulation enables analysis to expose not only the key
processes shaping the form and function of intervention within these institutions, but also the key
forces distorting interaction between them. This approach also ensures the transparency of the key
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forces shaping the behaviour of the regulated, providing critical insight into understanding their
response or more importantly non response to specific environmental policy signals, and the
unintended consequences and side effects which result. Thus, the analytical framework must focus
on five different levels, which include:
(i) farmer interaction with state, market and social forces of regulation and the implications
for irrigation decision making;
(ii) the key processes shaping the design and implementation of state water and agricultural
policy;
(iii) the form and function of market forces of regulation and the implications for the use
and management of irrigation water and the water environment;
(iv) the influence of social forces of regulation over both the use and management of
irrigation water at the farm level, and the design and implementation of water policy,
(v) the dynamic processes of interaction and inter-linkage between these different forces
of regulation, and the implications for the integration of the environment and economy.
These different levels of analysis address different dimensions of the agriculture-water interface
problem and form the foundation stone for the theoretical framework. In order to progress, it is
vital to examine alternative conceptualisations of the nature-society relationship found in
geography, sociology, politics and economics, to evaluate their relevance and applicability in
understanding the form and function of these complex and dynamic inter-relations and the
implications for the integration of the environment and economy.
2.2: Competing conceptualisations of the nature-society relationship.
There are a plethora of alternative frameworks of analysis from economics, politics, sociology and
geography which offer competing conceptualisations of the role and significance of nature and
society in development Drawing on alternative market and state failure theories, different
economic, social, political and institutional processes are variously emphasised in explaining the
decision making and behaviour of individuals, firms and Governments towards the environment.
These frameworks draw on competing ethical principles concerning how, and to what extent,
environmental costs should be avoided and/or allocated to current and future generations across
different geographical scales (Eckersley 1996).
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This section will critically evaluate the relevance of these different approaches to understanding the
complex and dynamic inter-relations shaping the agriculture-water interface. Six different
approaches or frameworks of analysis are explored. The neo-classical welfare economics approach,
which dominates environmental policy discourse, is the starting point for this analysis. The
following sections then concentrate on the political science perspective, including the theoty of
state failure, the behaviourist approach to decision making, and the political economy and political
ecology traditions, with their emphasis on the dynamic relations of power and dependence, which
enable and constrain the behaviour of individuals, firms and Governments.
2.2.1: The neo-classical, welfare economic approach to the environment.
Economists have played a critical role in recent policy and academic debates on the integration of
the environment and economy and the quest for sustainable development. Although the central
arguments were developed in the scarcity debates of the 1 960s, environmental economics has been
reinvigorated especially since the influential Pearce Report in 1989. The policy debate has been
largely dominated by the neo-classical welfare economics approach, but new resource and
ecological economists have also developed alternative, radical critiques (see for example Daly
1992; Baden and Stroup 1981; Simmons and Baden 1984; Anderson 1986). These approaches,
however, have had limited impact in the UK, with the new resource economics approach largely
confmed to a small number of right wing research institutes in the USA.
The application of the principles of welfare economics to the environment does not differ
markedly, in its approach or theoretical assumptions, to those used in the analysis of other
economic policy problems. In line with standard welfare economics theory, markets 'fail' to take
into account the full environmental costs and benefits of economic activity, as environmental goods
and services are not properly valued. Hence, the environment is considered a 'free good' and is not
properly incorporated into the decision making framework of firms and individuals, thus leading to
its over exploitation and degradation. In order to resolve this problem, welfare economists suggest
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that Governments directly intervene to correct market failure through imposing taxes or charges,
forcing individuals and firms to internalise the full environmental costs of their production and
consumption decision making.
Welfare economists attempt to turn the environment into a commodity which in turn can be
analysed in exactly the same way as other commodities traded in the market. Nevertheless, this is
not a simple nor unproblematic process, and is underpinned by a number of key theoretical
assumptions. Explicitly outlining these assumptions provides critical insight into the way in which
the nature-society relationship is conceptualised and, in consequence, highlights the limitations of
the approach. Methodological individualism is the cornerstone of the welfare economics approach,
in which economic activity is conceived solely in terms of individual behaviour. Thus, the
environment is broken down into its constituent goods and services in order to ensure consumption
by individuals. These individuals, so called 'rational economic persons', are assumed to behave in a
self-interested and consistent manner in order to maximise their utility. It is then assumed that
individuals operate in competitive markets, where they are able to exercise free choice. The role of
markets are critical as they are assumed to tend towards an equilibrium point which enables the
"optimal" or most efficient allocation of resources for society as a whole. Technology, however is
conceived as exogenous to the economic system, and is therefore not the object of analysis. In
combination with the equilibrium assumption, this creates an essentially static conceptualisation of
the nature - society relationship where the world is perceived as reversible.
This theoretical framework provides the justification for the two main areas of analysis by welfare
economists (Jacobs 1994). The first area of analysis focuses on the construction of supply and
demand curves to determine the appropriate level of environmental protection. The supply curve is
relatively simple to construct and requires information on the direct and indirect costs of
environmental protection and the opportunity costs of economic activity foregone. The demand
curve, in contrast, proves more difficult, as estimates must indicate consumers' 'willingness to pay'
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for various environmental commodities. As no real markets exist for these commodities it is
necessaiy to mpute the prices, through hedonic pricing' or contingent valuation 2 techniques. There
are a number of methodological and ethical problems associated with these techniques (see Sagoff
1988; Gower 1992; Blaikie 1995 for a full account), bringing into question the validity of the
results which are used to indicate the optimal level of environmental protection.
The second group of analysts in contrast, focus on the most appropriate tools for achieving the pre-
defined level of environmental protection. Although this links into the work of the first group of
analysts, it can in fact stand alone as not all welfare economists agree economic techniques are the
most appropriate way of determining environmental protection levels (Jacobs 1994). The analysts
focus purely on the most efficient measures for ensuring the optimal level of environmental
protection including the use of green taxes, pollution charges, tradable permits and incentive
pricing techniques. These alternative regulatory tools are used to internalise environmental costs into
individuals' and firms' decision making processes.
The environmental economics framework provides only a partial representation of the complex
nature-society relationship. Notwithstanding the largely ethical and moral questions posed by
commodifjing the environment, two fundamental criticisms are levelled against the welfare
economics approach which are particularly relevant to analysis of the agriculture-water interface.
Firstly, the assumption of rational economic person does not provide an adequate or rigorous
conceptualisation of individual decision making processes (Jacobs 1994). Real world decision
making rarely conforms to this rational ideal and in consequence it fails to adequately explain the
conflicting and contradictory responses of individuals to environmental policies. In fact, the social,
'Individuals willingness to pay for environmental goods are revealed through their demand for goods which in some way
are associated with the specific environmental service in question. For example, the demand for a beautiful landscape is
revealed through calculating the costs individuals incur travelling to look at it.
2 Inthviduals are asked through a survey, to place a value on a specific environmental commodity by revealing their
willingness to pay, or willingness to accept compensation for, protection or loss of specific environmental goods and
services. For example the willingness to pay for the protection of the Blue Whale.
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cultural, political and institutional context within which individuals are located is largely ignored,
but as chapter one argued, these factors are critical as they all impinge on and distort the reaction of
individuals to environmental policy signals.
The second point of criticism questions the relevance, to real world environmental conflicts, of the
reversible equilibrium postulate. This static conceptualisation of society ignores the role and impact
of changing technologies and values on the way in which individuals behave in markets and towards
the environment. The fact that these processes change over time, prevents movement towards the so
called optimal equilibrium position as dynamic social and economic changes constantly shift the
equilibrium point. The extension of welfare economic analysis to environmental conflicts also
replicates this mistake, by conceiving of the environment as a static system. Environmental
systems rarely reach equilibrium positions and changes which occur are often irreversible (Redclift
1988; Jacobs 1994). In fact environmental systems represent highly complex and dynamic
interacting sub-systems, interconnected by complicated geo-chemical and geo-physical processes,
as Redclift (1988) argues
"..the properties of ecological systems run counter to those of what Norgaard (1985)
terms the 'atomistic - mechanical' world view of neo-classical economics.
Economics is not adapted to consider total changes. Resting as it does on the concept
of the margin, it is epistemologically predisposed towards a reductionist view of resources
and their utility" (p55).
Thus by focusing on the division of the environment into its constituent goods and services, welfare
economists rarely examine the dynamic interaction and inter-dependence between environmental
sub-systems. Analysis is forced to examine discrete problems in specific environmental media and
in consequence prevents the development of an holistic approach which traces the dynamic
displacement of problems to other media, times or places. Although this problem is partially
addressed in the emerging field of ecological economics (see Daly 1992) it still fails to provide a
convincing framework of analysis, as the welfare economic approach provides little insight into the
key dimensions of the agriculture-water interface problem identified in section 2.2.
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2.2.2. The tragedy of the commons approach on the environment.
The tragedy of the commons model is recognised as one of the central themes of environmental
studies (O'Riordan and Turner 1983; Godwin and Shepard 1979) and epitomises the public choice
perspective on property rights and externalities. Hardin's seminal article in 1968 drew heavily on
the work of Coase (1960) and the theoly of externalities (Demsetz 1967) and consequently the
limitations of these approaches are replicated in the tragedy of the commons model.
The tragedy of the commons model conceives of resources as appraised by atomistic individuals
constrained in their choice by the dominant property right institution. Using the example of
common land used by herdsmen, Hardin (1968) argued
"Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try and keep
as many cattle as possible on the commons. As a rational being each herdsman seeks
to maximise his gain" (p1244).
He goes on to argue that even when the carrying capacity of the common land is exceeded, each
herdsman will continue to add stock because he receives all the gains from the sale of the additional
animals but shares only a fraction of the costs of the resulting over-grazing. Thus he argues for the
pnvatisation of common ownership to force individuals to internalise the full cost of their resource
use. Property rights are perceived as the central relationship defining the role of the state, market
and individual, in the allocation of scarce resources. Drawing on the public choice perspective, the
commons model focuses on the proposal that all environmental decisions should be made through
bargains struck between actors in the market place, removing the need for state intervention
through taxes or charges to correct market 'failure'. Thus, property rights to the environment must
be properly defined and enforceable, ensuring external costs and benefits, pecuniary and non-
pecuniary externalities, are internalised or incorporated into the decision making framework of
individuals, thereby conforming to the optimal and efficient allocation of resources. This article
provoked a protracted debate on the relative costs and benefits of private as opposed to public or
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common ownership (see Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop 1975; Dahlman 1980; McKay and Acheson
1988 for example). The theoretical and empirical limitations of the model have been well
documented (see for example Dasgupta 1982; Bromley 1991) and cite the strong social institutions
in force at the local level which regulate access to and use of the commons, successfully preventing
their over use and degradation.
The tragedy of the commons models provide only a vety limited insight into the complex and
dynamic processes underpinning the displacement of environmental problems to inter dependent
economic and environmental systems. Focusing analysis solely on the role of state and market
institutions in regulating behaviour, these approaches fail to recognise the critical role of social
forces of regulation in managing access to and use of environmental resources. Evidence indicates
that collective systems of management ensure protection of key environmental resources with
established rules and procedures to minimise conflict. The undue emphasis on 'rational' decision
making ignores the interaction and interdependence between collective and individual responses to
environmental-resource conflicts, and the way in which other objectives and goals influence the
management system.
While not disputing the fact that a number of problems at the agriculture-water interface result from
poorly defined and enforced property rights, this response on its own is insufficient to rectify
particular environmental problems. Reform of the property rights system does not represent a once-
and-for-all setting of access rights, as dynamic social and ecological processes will in combination
ensure that, over time, the system will produce externalities or unintended consequences which
require further state intervention. In fact by failing to take into account the other state, market and
social forces of regulation which directly and indirectly impinge on individual decision making
processes, analysts ignore how the specific environmental and economic signals reflected in the
property rights may be distorted.
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2.2.3: The political science approach to the environment.
The dominant economic approaches to the environment offer only veiy limited understanding of
contemporary environmental - resource conflicts and the problems posed by the integration of the
market and environment (Jacobs 1994). By focusing exclusively on the design and implementation
of the optimal tools of environmental regulation, economists ignore the wider social, political and
institutional context within which environmental policy operates. In the real world green taxes,
charges and subsidies rarely conform to the ideal or optimal schemes described in the text books, as
these policy tools are often distorted in the design and implementation process. The choice of
regulatoty tools is not simply a technical issue, nor an ideologically neutral process, but raises
critical social, political, institutional and moral questions which are ultimately resolved by political
measures (Majone 1989; Andersen 1994).
The political science literature provides key insights into the processes which influence and distort
the integration of the market and environment, with its emphasis on the role of state institutions,
policy styles, political bargaining processes and interest group intermediation (Schnaiberg 1980;
Vogel 1986; Richardson and Jordan 1979; Lowe and Goyder 1983). Central to these analyses is
the rejection of the notion of the state as a unitary body, working in a rational, ordered way to serve
consistent, clear, public interest objectives. Instead policy outcomes are conceptualised as the
product of interdepartmental power politics, where regulators are susceptible to manipulation and
capture by powerful vested interests. Drawing on these different schools of analysis enables
examination of the role of the state, and its institutions, in fostering or impeding the integration of
the economy and environment, and is vital in understanding the forces of state and social regulation
which directly and indirectly shape the agriculture-water interface.
The first key area of analysis focuses on the role of interest groups, where there is an established
body of literature on interest group intermediation with the state (Cawson 1977; Schmitter 1981;
Marsh 1986) and the development of corporatist relationships. Interest groups do not participate in
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the decision making process on equal terms, as some are placed in a better position than others as a
consequence of better access to the decision makers, bargaining skills, links to the media, money
and access to information to manipulate the course of events around them (Rees 1990). The
development of corporatist relationships between state institutions and interest groups enables some
groups to gain easy access to the decision making apparatus, where they are consulted on the form
and function of policy, while others are excluded from direct involvement. The power and
influence of interest groups will vary depending on their legitimacy, the resources which they
command in terms of people, money and information, and the degree to which they control their
own constituency (Cox eta! 1985; Cox eta! 1987). This asymmetrical bargaining power is critical
in shaping the policy discourse, as certain groups are able to capitalise on their position and exert
considerable influence to ensure the protection of their interests.
External interest groups are not the sole force working to influence and shape the policy process;
policy makers themselves are not neutral or benign decision makers. Work dating from the I 950s
reveals the key processes which influence the decision making process, focusing in particular on the
actual power and influence of actors within state institutions (Simon 1947, 1955; Lindblom 1959;
Downs 1967; Perlman 1976). Perlman (1976) suggests individuals become focused on maintaining
or enhancing the organisation as a whole by increasing its budget or size, while Downs (1967)
argues individuals need to enhance or protect their position within the organisation. Thus, they
become caught up in scoring points over other bureaucracies in order to ensure their own long term
survival, and the development of their own organisation's prestige and influence. Organisations also
attempt to retain a monopoly over information and its use, to ensure their own interests are
protected and consequently, through the selective use and dissemination of information, decision
makers attempt to manipulate public opinion and the decision making of Ministers. Majone (1989)
recognises alternative tools of enviromnental regulation will critically affect the position and
power of policy actors in markedly different ways, by altering the relative importance of the
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resources they command. Thus, withm the policy process, policy makers themselves will favour
certain options over others as these maintain or enhance their position within the institution.
The structure and administrative procedures of the institution also play a critical role (O'Riordan
1976). The flow of information within institutions is often distorted by the organisational structure,
as the division of responsibilities and roles across a number of separate departments, inhibits the
development of an integrated approach and the preparation of comprehensive policy reviews. The
established rules and procedures of day to day management, as well as the legacy of the past system
of regulation, may also prove problematic promoting routine, standardised responses which create
tension and conflict when confronted by new environmental problems, or new environmental
pressure groups (O'Riordan 1976). As Weale (1992) recognises the natural response of policy
makers to new environmental problems is to adapt existing legislation or policy procedures to save
time and money. Nevertheless, this approach prevents a full scale analysis of the problem and the
range of alternative policy responses. In fact by relying on past procedures, policy makers may
perpetuate the displacement of problems to other media, times or places by replicating the mistakes
of the past.
Analysis of the political, institutional and organisational context within which environmental
policy develops is critical, providing key insight into the conflicts and contradictions which emerge
over the form and function of environment-economy integration. These various political science
perspectives provide key insights into the dynamic processes which together influence and shape
the form and function of state intervention at the agriculture-water interface. The organisational,
institutional and political constraints within which the regulators of water and agriculture operate
could, in combination, perpetuate the displacement of environmental problems to other media,
times or places. These various analyses have developed in a piece-meal fashion focusing on
discrete portions of the policy process, the role of interest groups for example or the organisational
structure of environment agencies, and failed to establish the connections between these various
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elements in an integrated analysis of all stages of the environmental policy process. This gap is
addressed in the state failure thesis.
In contrast to the market and bureaucratic failure theories put forward by welfare economists and
public choice analysts, a number of political theorists (Dryzek 1987; Janicke 1990; Weale 1992;
Andersen 1994) have developed a radically different theory to explain the failure of integration
between the environment and economy. Drawing on the bureaucratic failure theory of the public
choice school, this group of analysts radically rework the central tenets of this approach to
develop an over-arching theory of state failure. This theory is based on the premise that state
intervention itself is not a problem, rather inappropriate state intervention creates difficulties which
compound rather than alleviate problems. The approach recognises that the failure of state
intervention is not simply the result of bureaucratic behaviour or inefficient administrative
regulations, but instead the result of unfavourable interaction between market and state institutions
(Andersen 1994).
Environmental policy reflects the failure of State intervention with a number of problems the direct
result of inappropriate Government intervention (Andersen 1994). The state failure thesis recognises
that Government action, or more appropriately inaction, is a significant force generating many of
the world's environmental problems. By failing to adopt a preventative approach to pollution
control, and environmental policy in general, the state perpetuates an incremental process of policy
reform which only succeeds in shifting the problems from one media, time or place to another.
Nevertheless, breaking this mode of policy making is no easy task as a powerful set of vested
interests have built up around the environmental policy domain. The progressive increase in the
budget of state environmental agencies has contributed to the evolution of an eco-industrial
complex (Andersen 1994). State agencies continually search for technical solutions which do not
question the existing pattern of production and consumption; while industries concentrate on
producing standardised end-of-pipe technologies which are available en masse. This process,
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according to Janicke (1990) produces technocratic iatrogenesis 3 , whereby as more money is spent
by the state on end-of-pipe technologies, less attention is directed to preventative approaches.
Jndustiy follows this lead, and as subsidies are paid to encourage up take of end-of-pipe
technologies, industry itself directs less attention to innovations within the production process
which prevent pollution and environmental damage. This failure to instigate preventative action is
deeply ingrained, and according to Janicke (1990) is a structuring problem of policy rather than a
failure to produce environmental goods and services. The origins of this failure lie in the original
construction and definition of environmental 'problems' by policy makers as alternative theories
are put forward to explain a problem, which in turn critically shape and determine the policy
approach (Weale 1992).
The state failure thesis provides critical insight into the key processes shaping state intervention at
the agriculture-water interface. In particular, the emphasis on how inappropriate Government
intervention in fact perpetuates the dynamic displacement of environmental problems, marks an
important contribution, revealing how state intervention created many environmental problems in
the water sector. It also reveals the importance of vested interests in shaping the inter-relationship
between civil servants and the water industry, which potentially prevents an alternative pro-active
approach to the protection of the water environment. Despite these important contributions, the
various political science perspectives provide only a partial insight into the dynamic processes at
work by providing only limited insight into the decision making behaviour of the regulated.
Focusing solely on the decision making of state institutions and their interaction with interest
groups, provides only a limited understanding of the diverse ways in which the regulated behave
towards, and in, the environment.
tm This is the phenomenon whereby a disease is induced by a doctor.
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2.2.4: Behaviourist approaches to the environment.
The political science perspective on environmental/resource conflicts clearly identifies the political
and institutional constraints within which policy makers operate. This emphasis on the actual
behaviour of policy makers and interest groups enables recognition of the processes which together
influence and distort the design, implementation and assessment of environmental policy.
Nevertheless, this perspective provides only limited insight into the behaviour of the regulated, as
targets of specific environmental policy tools. The failure of the regulated to behave in the 'rational'
maimer prescribed in economic theory is demonstrated in a number of empirical studies (Rees
1992; Jackson and Jacobs 1991; Jacobs 1994; Rees and Williams 1993). Lack of information,
constraints of time, capital restrictions and the organisational structure of the company contribute to
the failure of firms and individuals to respond to economic incentives in the prescribed manner.
The perception, knowledge and understanding of the environmental policy signal is critical in
influencing the response of the individual or finn, and brings to the forefront of analysis the process
of individual decision making. These processes are largely ignored in both economic and political
science approaches to the environment, or are subsumed within the black box of "decision making"
which fail to explicitly identify the combination of processes which together influence and shape
the response of the regulated to specific environmental policies.
Decision making processes have been the central focus of a number of approaches in geography
and sociology where analysts have attempted to shift attention away from Homo economicus to
Homo socioliogis. However, these approaches have been subject to intensive criticism, primarily
from Marxist and neo-marxist analysts for ignoring the relations of power and dependence within
which individuals are located (Watts 1983). Although it is accepted that these processes critically
undermine or constrain the behaviour of the individual, this gap does not devalue completely the
contribution of behaviourist approaches to understanding the response of individuals and firms to
alternative environmental policies.
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Within geography, there has been a long tradition of analysis focusing on the perception, attitudes
and values motivating the behaviour of individuals and firms in relation to natural hazards (Burton
eta! 1978; White 1945, 1974, 1954; Kates 1985, 1962). The central thesis of the classic work of
Burton eta! (1978) argues that human response to hazards is in fact related to people's perception
of the phenomena and their knowledge of alternative adjustment options. A 'tree' of alternative
responses is possible, involving short and long run adjustments by individuals, groups or
institutions, which in turn, alter their capacity to absorb the effects of extreme environmental
fluctuations. The choice of adjustment pathway is purely subjective and will depend on the degree
of risk individuals, groups and institutions are willing to bear which Burton et a! (1978), drawing on
Simon (1957), describe in terms of bounded rationality or satisficing behaviour. There are inter-
personal and inter- collective differences in the perception of hazards, knowledge of adjustments
and methods of evaluating decision criteria. Four factors are identified by Burton et a! (1978)
which critically influence the choice of adjustments. Firstly, prior experience of the hazard, in
terms of the level of severity of the risk and the length of exposure to its consequences, critically
influence and colour the perception and understanding of the hazard and in turn influence the type
and number of adjustments made. Secondly, the wealth of the individual will influence the degree to
which they willingly take risks, and in consequence the type of adjustment pattern they adopt. The
third factor influencing the adjustment choice are personality traits, especially in response to severe,
intensive events. Finally, the social role of the individual in a group or institution is also identified
as influential.
Burton et al's (1978) analysis has been highly influential in both academic and policy discourse and
has been applied to a wide range of empirical phenomena. Nevertheless, the approach has been
subject to intensive criticism on three levels. Firstly, the approach is criticised on the grounds of its
positivist orientation, primarily reflected in its failure to address the political - economic and
institutional processes which directly and indirectly impinge on and distort individual decision
making (Watts 1983). Individual and collective decision making is not simply an either or choice
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between competing alternatives. There is a whole series of dynamic forces of change which directly
and indirectly influence the decision making process. These processes both constrain and enable
particular courses of action and are critical in directing individuals along particular pathways. The
second point of criticism focuses on the exclusive analysis of extreme geophysical events such as
drought or tornadoes which detract attention away from eveiyday or common place events which
pose just as many risks and uncertainties for individual and collective decision making (Ernel and
Peet 1989). Failure to address the combination of extreme and evezyday occurrences in analysis,
leads to a very limited understanding of the dynamic processes of change which together alter the
perception, knowledge and evaluation of the relative risks and uncertainties posed by a particular
event or course of events. As the literatures from sociology and psychology reveal, risks are not
merely linked to hazardous events (Beck 1992; Renn 1992; Royal Society 1992; Gerrard 1995;
Lash and Wynn 1992). The final point of criticism focuses on the failure of the behaviourist
approach to examine the source of individual and collective values and beliefs which affect
behaviour in or on the environment, and the processes through which belief systems are maintained
(Emel and Peet 1989). Failure to address the wider set of social values which influence the
perception and evaluation of hazardous events leads to a very limited understanding of the
processes at work.
A number of factors shape the response of the regulated to specific environmental policy signals,
not least the morass of other direct and indirect state, market and social forces of regulation which
are pushing and pulling the regulated in different directions. Nevertheless, the literature on
environmental hazards offers very limited insight into the complex trade offs calculated in decision
making, and it is therefore vital to draw on a number of theoretical and conceptual themes from
other fields of analysis, primarily the literature on the theory of the firm and decision making under
conditions of risk and uncertainty, which although not directly focused on the environment could
potentially prove useful.
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The literature on decision making under risk and uncertainty provides a number of key insights into
the processes which together influence and distort the assessment and formulation of management
strategies by individuals and firms. The literature on risk has firmly moved away from the
conceptualisation of risk and risk perception as a simple mathematical measure. The emphasis is
now placed on risk as an inherently multi-dimensional process (Royal Society 1992) encompassing
social, political, economic, physical and institutional dimensions which mean different things to
different people in different contexts. Thus, a specific enviromnental policy signal will pose social,
financial, political, environmental and institutional risks and uncertainties for the regulated. The
formulation of management strategies in response to a particular risk is not simply based on the
individual's perception and assessment of the relative costs and benefits of alternative courses of
action. Complex factors such as the individual's knowledge and experience of particular risk
dimensions will critically influence the response (Dasgupta 1982). In addition, the response to a
particular risk will be conditioned or constrained by management strategies developed in response
to other direct and indirect forces of regulation, which themselves pose distinctly different risks and
uncertainties. Thus individuals and firms are involved in a complex decision making process,
calculating irade-offs between competing risk dimensions in order to formulate a coherent
management strategy.
A largely unacknowledged dynamic underlying risk management strategies, is the process of risk
reallocation (Arrow 1971; Beck 1992) which is defined by Baich and Wu (1974) as
"By way of reducing uncertainties that attend to their own environments, risk averse
actors often succeed in shifting the risk for others to bear" (p20)
The most obvious and simplest example of risk reallocation is the operation of insurance markets,
where individuals and finns purchase insurance against a range of uncertain future events such as
fire, death and accidents. It is deemed inefficient for individuals to allocate their own capital
resources to protect against uncertain future events. Thus they shift the cost of future events by
payment of a small amount of money now, payable contingent upon the occurrence of certain
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defined events (Arrow 1971). Government intervention also seeks to reallocate risk through direct
regulations establishing liability for risk events, or through indirect regulatory mechanisms such as
information campaigns (Segerson 1992).
Mechanisms operating at the individual firm level also attempt to reallocate the risks associated with
production in order to avoid uncertainty and exert control over their production environment (Cyert
and March 1963; Crew 1975; Galbraith 1967). The principal means of achieving this is through
forward contracts or vertical integration (Baich and Wu 1974) where economic and production risk
is reallocated either backwards onto input suppliers or forwards onto product output users. Thus,
forward contracts reduce the level of economic risk and uncertainty associated with production as
the firm is guaranteed a market and hence payment for goods. The purchasing firm also reduces
production and economic risk as they are guaranteed a specific, quality product at a specific price
without incurring any of the fmancial risks associated with production such as machineiy break
down or employee problems. Firms also exert control over uncertainty through inventory,
employment and price policies which aim to influence, channel or redefine the behaviour of those
who populate their market in order to ensure the optimal organisation of production (Balch and
Wu 1974). Reorganisation of the structure of the firm through scale enlargement and diversification
also aims to intemalise the intrinsic production and market uncertainties. Risk pooling, risk
spreading and risk insurance strategies play a key role for firms operating under conditions of
uncertainty (Arrow 1971; Balch and Wu 1974; Segerson 1992).
This literature focuses, unsurprisingly, on the economic dimension of risk, where strategies are
assumed to mitigate the financial impact of risk over both the long and short term in line with the
utility maximisation thesis. This perspective ignores the fact however, that social, political and
environmental risks are also reallocated within this process for others in society to bear now, and in
the future. Analysis of risk and uncertainty and the implications for decision making processes
provide key insights into the complex trade-offs calculated between alternative management
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strategies, which potentially influence behaviour towards and in the environment. The fact that
individuals and firms attempt to shift the risks of production and consumption for others to bear,
potentially enlightens analysis of the process of problem displacement, linking the dynamic
processes influencing decision making strategies to clear environmental outcomes.
The theory of the firm also provides key insights into the decision making processes of firms and
individuals, particularly its critique of the profit maximisation postulate of neo-classical economics
and is useful to analysis of environmental-resource conflicts. The neo-classical model of perfect
competition and monopoly implies decisions are taken by individuals or entrepreneurs whose sole
objective is profit maxirnisation. Nevertheless, a considerable body of evidence now questions the
assumptions of this model, in particular the notion of rationality and the contention that a firm's
main objective is the maximisation of profits over the short and long term (Scitovsky 1943; Lesler
1949; Nettle 1957; McGuire 1964). The separation of ownership from managerial control in most
modern firms, creates a situation whereby the key decisions are taken by employed managers
whose perspective and objectives are markedly different to those of the shareholders (Berle and
Means 1932; Man-is 1964; Galbraith 1974). Thus, profit maxiniisation may not be the sole
criterion influencing decision making, with a number of other goals and objectives such as power,
control, prestige and the desire for a 'quiet life' influencing the manager's decision (Papandreon
1952; Williamson 1964). In small firms the over riding objectives are the maintenance of
autonomy, independence and survival above financial profit (Boswell 1973; Stanworth and Curi-an
1973; Storey 1982). While not denying profits are important, analysts suggest that utility
maximisation will include a number of key criteria including personal as well as business
objectives. This conforms to the principle of bounded rationality where individuals are conceived as
'satisficing' rather than optimising (Simon 1957), and develop strategies which are in line with the
individual's own scale of values, perceptions and subjective view of the situation.
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The second key line of criticism in the literature on the theory of the firm focuses on the role of the
entrepreneur, which was largely disregarded in early economic theory (Baumol 1968). The lack of
rigorous theoretical conceptualisation regarding the role and significance of the entrepreneur reflects
the problems encountered defming what an entrepreneur actually is. Schumpeter (1934) emphasises
the role as an innovator who starts new firms, while Marshall (1961) emphasises the entrepreneur's
risk taking rather than innovating behaviour. Casson (1982) builds on this work and argues
entrepreneurs behave differently because they have different perceptions of the situation which
arise from unequal access to information or variable interpretations of it. Access to and use of
information is a critical input into the decision making process. Nevertheless, the separation of
decision making responsibilities into discrete units ensures managers do not always have full
information, as the relevant facts are dispersed across a number of different departments, thus
preventing the optimal or most rational response. The internal organisation of the firm, and the
division of responsibilities among managers critically influence the firm's response to alternative
policy signals, and is revealed in a number of empirical analyses (Rees et al 1993; Pearson and
Smith 1990; Jacobs 1994). The conception of the finn as a collection of sectional interests with
competing aims and objectives, and unequal access to power and information, provides key insight
into understanding the nature of inter-firm relationships which in turn shape the form and function
of market forces of regulation.
Understanding the complex and dynamic decision making processes which shape the behaviour of
individuals and firms towards and in the environment must draw on a multiplicity of perspectives to
address the range of processes which are occurring simultaneously. Response cannot simply be
reduced to an either/or choice between alternative strategies, but is often influenced by a range of
factors. These include not only the individuals subjective values, perceptions and experience of the
environment emphasised by the literature on hazards but also the evaluation by individuals and
firms of the relative risks and uncertainties posed by particular courses of action, which are
addressed in the literature on risk and uncertainty. The theory of the firm also provides key insights,
42
emphasising how access to information and the internal organisation of the company can
potentially distort the response of individuals and firms to environmental policies. These various
strands of analysis provide a key insight into the complex and dynamic decision making processes
of firms and individuals and could potentially enlighten analysis of not only the decision making
processes of farmers, but also understanding of the market forces of regulation. These literatures in
combination highlight the complex and dynamic processes which influence decision making at the
local, regional and national levels.
2.2.5: The political economy approach to the environment.
The Marxist schools in both geography and sociology remained largely silent on the question of
nature throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Fitzsinimons 1989), and only in the 1980s did the radical
left start to seriously exaniine the nature - society relationship, with Smith (1984) developing the
production of nature thesis.
The conceptualisation has been highly influential, particularly in its application to the analysis of
social and physical space where it addresses the process of spatial restructuring in rural and urban
areas in both industrialised and "third" world countries (Marsden et a! 1987; Watts 1989). This
however, has diverted attention away from the production of nature thesis, which has received
limited theoretical analysis in the literature (but see Roberts and Emel (1992) for one of the first
applications of the thesis to contemporary environmental conflicts) and left unchallenged some of
the basic assumptions of the thesis. In fact, the production of nature thesis provides only a partial
representation of the complexity which characterises environmental conflicts and there is a danger
that this perspective overemphasises the social dimension, creating a highly socialised nature, where
environmental problems are only produced through human intervention. This is not the case, as the
environment is not simply reducible to the social relations of production (Benton 1994; Whatmore
and Boucher 1993); environmental systems themselves represent highly dynamic and complex
processes which have evolved across time and space. In fact, the environment represents the
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ultimate structural constraint on human development as resources are not only physically finite, but
also the ability of ecosystems to absorb waste products is limited. Recognition of this material
dimension has been neglected in Marxist analyses of the nature -society relationship, and so
consequently a static conceptualisation predominates, where society "does things" to nature
(Dickens 1992), and the interaction and interdependence between these two highly dynamic and
complex economic and environmental systems is neglected.
The Marxist and neo-marxist conceptualisations of the nature-society relationship offer only a
limited understanding of the complex and dynamic inter-relationships which characterise the
agriculture-water interface. The emphasis on the structural dynamic of the capitalist system of
production implies environmental problems are an inevitable consequence of commodity
production. In consequence, this perspective focuses analysis on the social, political and economic
processes of production and consumption which together produce environmental problems.
Through highlighting the relations of power and dependence which underpin interaction between
the state and individuals, firms and individuals, and individuals themselves, this framework traces
the dynamic social relations which shape and influence behaviour towards the environment.
Despite this important contribution however, the approach ignores the dynamic ecological processes
which interact with, and influence, social systems and vice versa.
This approach provides only limited understanding of the behaviour of the regulated, who are not
passive recipients of change, but are actively involved in, and shape, their own behaviour towards
the environment. The political economy approach provides little insight into the complex decision
making processes of individuals, firms and Governments, as it focuses solely on the processes of
interaction between these different actors, rather than the internal relationships which critically
colour and shape their response to specific environmental policy initiatives. These are critical
failings which are partially addressed in the political ecology framework of analysis.
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2.2.6: The political ecology approach to the environment.
The political ecology framework of analysis, emerging in geography and sociology, draws on the
neo-marxist approach and attempts to
"..combine the concerns of ecology with a broadly defined political economy. Together
this encompasses the constantly shifting dialectic between society and land based
resources, and also within classes and groups within society itself' (Blaikie and
Brookfield 1987. pl'7).
The approach focuses on the diverse interplay between dynamic social, political, economic and
institutional processes and the relationship of these forces to environmental change at the local
level. The point of entry into understanding the complex and dynamic processes of socio-economic
and ecological change is the resource manager at the local level. This so called "bottom up"
approach (Blaikie and Brookfleld 1987) focuses on the opportunities and constraints operating at
the household level and how these influence the perception, valuation and use of resources. The
approach then traces the economic, political, social and institutional constraints operating at the
local, regional, national and even international level which impinge on and distort household
resource decision making.
To date, the most sophisticated applications of this approach have focused on Third World
environmental problems, with Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) applying this framework to land
degradation problems in Africa and Nepal. They argue the legacy of the distinctive social,
economic, political and institutional changes instigated in the colonial period have major impacts on
the way in which resource managers at the local level value and use their resources today. Only
reform and change in these spheres in conjunction with soil conservation programmes will alleviate
the problems of land degradation.
The political ecology framework is also critically influencing the research agenda of those working
on the environment in advanced agricultures (see for example Clark and Lowe 1992; Ward and
Munton 1992; Whatmore and Boucher 1993). In particular Ward (1994a,b) successfully locates the
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dynamic of agricultural pesticide pollution in the intersection between the up-stieam food system
fuelling farm level adoption of pesticides, and the changing emphasis of the scientific and policy
communities on environmental pollution in the countiyside. This analysis does not conceive of
pesticide pollution as a purely environmental problem, but as a by -product of the socially
constructed technological treadmill. In consequence, pesticide pollution is conceptualised as the
outcome of specific social, political, economic, institutional and ecological processes which
together contribute to the framing of pesticide use as a problem, which is clearly contested amongst
competing interests, who attempt to influence the direction and pace of regulatory change.
Despite providing an holistic framework for analysis of enviromnental conflicts, Bryant (1992)
warns those working on the political ecology approach, particularly in "Third World" countries,
against falling into the trap of economic reductionism. In fact he identifies three key areas where
economic reductionism creeps into analysis. Firstly, reductionism fails to attribute sufficient
explanatory significance to ecological processes. Neglecting the highly dynamic processes of
ecological change creates a highly socialised nature, where ecological processes are marginalised
in the analysis. Secondly, important sources of environmental change are neglected by ignoring the
role and significance of state and inter-state interaction. These processes are critical to
understanding the often differentiated and contradictory ways in which responses to environmental
change develop. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Bryant argues that the political ecology
approach often neglects the central question of power from analysis. The role of those "without"
power and the most socially disadvantaged is critical to understanding the causes and consequences
of environmental change. The political ecology approach replicates the mistakes of the Marxist and
neo-marxist perspectives on the environment; as Benton (1994) argues, the relationship between
nature and society cannot simply be reduced to the social relations of production. Dynamic
ecological processes of interaction and interdependence cannot be excluded to the margins of
analysis. This is reflected in the work of Ward (1994b) and Clarke and Lowe (1992) who emphasise
46
the dynamic social processes of change framing environmental pollution problems, but ignore or
sideline the critical ecological processes which also play a significant role.
The criticisms of Emel and Peet (1989) also have specific relevance to the analysis of the
agriculture-water interface as they identify the importance of the poorly developed
conceptualisation of resource decision making processes in the political ecology approach. The
'black box' approach to decision making fails to open up the complex and contradictory trade-offs
which are calculated by fanners at the local level. Responses do not simply materialise out of
nowhere, but reflect a combination of influences, perceptions and experiences which critically shape
the development of management strategies. While Blaikie and Brookfield (1989) emphasise the
importance of examining the way in which state, market and social forces of regulation influence
decision making, they fail to examine the complex trade-offs which are calculated between these
competing signals and the implications for behaviour towards, and in, the environment. The
development of management strategies is influenced by individual perception, past experience,
access to information on alternative options and evaluation of the relative risks and uncertainties
posed by particular courses of action. These decision making processes are critical but are,
nevertheless ignored in the political ecology approach, which fails to address the complex and
dynamic internal and external relations of production and consumption which in combination
influence decision making at the local level.
The political ecology framework of analysis potentially provides significant insights into the
dynamic processes at work at the agriculture-water interface. The assertion by Blaikie and
Brookfield (1987) that the framework ties ecology to a broadly defined political economy, linking
local level resource decision making to the regional, national and international forces of regulation,
offers a way of breaking down and assessing the combination of forces which together shape and
distort the management and use of irrigation water. Nevertheless, there are a number of critical gaps
which undermine its theoretical coherence and ability to reveal and understand the complex and
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dynamic processes at work. Most significantly the political ecology framework provides little
insight into the actual decision making processes of farmers. It is ceniral to the analysis to explicitly
identify the way in which farmers' knowledge, perception and assessment of the water environment
influence their use and management of irrigation water. How are these processes shaped and
distorted by management strategies developed in response to the other direct and indirect state,
market and social forces of regulation? The failure of the political ecology approach to directly
address the decision making of actors within state institutions is also of critical importance to this
analysis. The state is not a benign or neutral force; competing interests within the state critically
shape and distort the environmental policy process. Policy makers within the agricultural and water
sectors have distinctly different interests in, and perceptions of, environmental regulation which is
potentially translated into conflict over the form and function of state intervention. These conflicts
and contradictions lie at the centre of the agriculture-water interface and the political ecology
framework provides only partial insight into these dynamic processes.
2.3 The way forward: a theoretical framework of anal ysis for the a2riculture-water interface.
These alternative conceptualisations of the nature-society relationship emphasise competing market
and state failure theories in explaining contemporary environmental - resource conflicts. The brief
review of the key parameters of these various approaches highlights their relevance and applicability
in understanding the complex and dynamic inter-relationships which characterise the agriculture-
water interface. Apart from the state failure thesis developed by Janicke (1990), none of the other
political, economic or social approaches directly addresses the dynamic displacement of
environmental problems from one media, time or place to another. The dynamism which is inherent
in both ecological and social systems is only alluded to, and rarely incorporated directly into
analysis.
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The simplification of the environment-society relationship prevents clear identification and analysis
of the complex and contradictory processes which together contribute to contemporary
environmental/resource conificts. Political scientists, economists, sociologists and geographers
focus on the environment-society relationship from the confmes of their own discipline and, in
consequence, direct attention solely on the political bargaining processes, institutional decision
making, the defmition and allocation of property rights to the environment, and estimates of the
appropriate or most efficient level of environmental protection. While not denying the importance
or significance of these processes, on their own they provide only partial insight into the complex
and dynamic processes which shape and distort the agriculture-water interface. Consequently, in
conceptualising the agriculture-water interface there is no over-arching theoretical framework which
explicitly addresses the central dimensions of the nature-society relationship identified in section
2.1. No one approach can be used exclusively to understand the processes at work (Rees 1990;
Weale 1992) as the simple one dimensional analyses of the nature - society relationship provide
only a partial insight into the complex and dynamic processes of interaction. Thus, there is a need
for a new, alternative approach which avoids the confmes of specific models, theories and
disciplinary perspectives in order to reveal the complex processes which together underpin the
nature-society relationship. This demands an inter-disciplinary perspective which draws on various
theories from economics, politics, geography and sociology to reveal the complex, multi-
dimensional processes at work.
The development of an inter-disciplinary framework of analysis however is no simple task, and
there is a danger that it merely reverts to a sweeping, all embracing approach typified in the
political ecology literature. This approach pre-determines at the outset that economic, political,
institutional, administrative, social and environmental processes contribute to the specific
environmental-resource conifict under analysis. This presupposes that these processes are
involved and thus they are all accorded equal weight and significance in the analysis. However, as
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Weale (1992) recognises, some theories or models will in fact prove more useful to the analysis of
environmental problems than others, as he himself argues
"..we need to combine idioms, or at least recognise that not all parts of the story can
be told in the same voice. Does this mean that it is entirely a matter of personal whim
and predilection which idiom we choose to work with? Not so, I conjecture, for whereas
some idioms may be essential when accounting for the context of policy, others may be
essential in accounting for its logic. Or, to change the metaphor, one or two voices may give
us the melody line, leaving only the accompaniment for other voices" (p214).
In light of these criticisms, this analysis develops an alternative approach which identifies six
theoretical postulates, drawn from a number of disciplinary perspectives, which may potentially
enlighten analysis of the agriculture-water interface. The specification of these multiple and
conditional hypotheses ensures the transparency of the complex processes at work and addresses
the five key levels of analysis identified at the end of section 2.2. A critical distinction is drawn
between the relationships of interaction between farmers, off-farm firms, state agencies and fanner
representative groups, and the internal relationships which critically shape not only farmers decision
making but also the form and function of state, market and social forces of regulation. These
complex inter-relationships are represented in figure 2.1, which pinpoints the dynamic processes of
interaction not only between farmers and state, market and social forces of regulation, but also the
key points of inter-linkage between these different forces of regulation themselves.
The six postulates encompass the theory of state failure; the political economy tradition with its
emphasis on the relations of power and dependence; the process of risk reallocation; the theory of
the firm; the role of risk and uncertainty on decision making; and finally the institutional and
administrative constraints of environmental policy makers. In order to reveal the explanatory value
and significance of these various models and theories, it is vital to specify more precisely, through
multiple hypotheses, the complex processes of interaction they attempt to expose.
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• The state failure thesis argues that inappropriate state intervention in fact perpetuates and
prolongs many of the world's environmental problems (Janicke 1990; Andersen 1994).
This framework will be drawn on to explore the contention that inappropriate Government
intervention in fact creates many of the environmental problems in the UK water sector,
preventing movement towards an integrated environmental policy. This framework focuses
on the inter-relations between policy makers and external interests, and will be drawn on
to explore the relative power and influence of different state and social forces of regulation
in shaping the integration of the environment into water and agricultural policy.
• The state failure thesis addresses the dynamic inter-relations between state and social forces
of regulation. Nevertheless, it does not expose the institutional and administrative
constraints which also play a significant role in shaping the form and function of state
intervention (O'Riordan 1976 ; Weale et al 1991). The political science critique of
environmental policy reveals how asymmetrical bargaining power, constraints over access
to information within the institution, standardised rules and procedures and the past system
of regulation are critical processes and could play a major role shaping the form and
function of state intervention at the agriculture-water interface.
• The theory of the firm focuses on the dynamic internal relationships which critically shape
and influence decision making, and is relevant to understanding the behaviour of farmers
and off-farm firms. The internal organisational factors which shape behaviour of firms,
such as the division of responsibilities between managers, constraints of capital and time
and lack of information could prove central to understanding the form and function of
market forces of regulation.
• Understanding of the dynamic forces of market regulation is potentially enhanced by the
literature on risk reallocation (Balch and Wu 1974). The contention that, as firms attempt
to reduce the risks and uncertainties attendant on their own production environment, they
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also succeed in reallocating risks for others to bear, provides critical insights into the form
and function of market forces of regulation. These risk averse strategies could critically
shape inter-finn relationships among the off-farm firms, which in turn could critically shape
the form and function of their inter-relationship with farmers at the local level.
The plethora of state, market and social forces of regulation relay conflicting signals to
farmers arid it is vital to expose the complex trade-offs they calculate in order to understand
their response, or more importantly non-response, to specific environmental policy signals.
The decision making processes of farmers are critical, and it is clear from the literature on
the theoiy of the firm, natural hazards and decision making under conditions of risk and
uncertainty, that a number of factors could play a central role. Access to information, past
experience and knowledge, all critically shape the perception and evaluation of alternative
management options. Other management objectives, constraints of capital and labour could
also play a vital role shaping their response. It is vital to move away from the conception of
the individual as "rational economic person", which predominates in economic analysis,
and recognise the central role of social and cultural values in shaping behaviour.
• Finally, the political economy tradition with its emphasis on the relations of power and
dependence could prove important in understanding the dynamic processes of interaction
between state, market and social forces of regulation and the inter-relations which tie
farmers with these forces of regulation at the agriculture-water interface, to reveal how they
directly and indirectly control and manipulate decision making.
Drawing on these six theoretical postulates, the analysis will address the combination of processes
which together shape and influence the agriculture-water interface. It will ensure the transparency of
the key processes underpinning the dynamic displacement of environmental problems from one
media, time or place to another and will thereby pinpoint the key factors distorting the integration of
the environment and economy.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE INTERFACE NETWORK METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
The conceptual approach outlined in Chapter Two opens up to analysis the complex and dynamic set
of inter-relations and inter-dependencies which shape the agriculture-water interface. Recognition that
no one model, theory or disciplinaty perspective provides an over arching theoretical framework of
analysis, shifts attention to the combination of economic, political, social, institutional and ecological
processes which together shape and distort integration of the environment and economy. Central to
this alternative approach is the identification of six theoretical postulates which address different
dimensions of the agriculture-water interface problem. In light of this conceptual approach, it is vital to
develop an empirical methodology which is capable of linking together and moving between these
multiple layers, to provide a coherent and cohesive framework in which to ground the empirical
analysis. The interface network concept is central to the development of this empirical strategy, as it is
not merely a useful analytical device but also an important methodological approach.
This chapter will concentrate on the detailed elaboration of the interface-network methodology, with
the objective of underlining its relevance and applicability to analysis of the agriculture-water interface.
The chapter is divided into four sections, with the first section focusing on the key methodological
issues confronted in the interface-network approach. Drawing on the work of Long (1989), Long and
Long (1992) and Hawkins (1991), the analysis will outline the value of this actor orientated approach
in exposing the network of social relations which directly and indirectly regulate the use and
management of irrigation at the farm level, and the unintended environmental consequences and side
effects which result. Having firmly established the broad methodological framework the analysis
shifts attention to the detailed development of the empirical strategy. Consequently, the second section
will focus on the choice of research area and will outline the central dimensions of the conflict
catchment methodology. The chapter will then move on to consider the empirical strategy focusing on
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the sample frame and research tools used in the field. The chapter will fmally conclude with a brief
examination of the methodological issues confronted in the analysis of the data.
3.1: The interface-network methodo1orv.
Hitherto, use of the interface concept in this analysis has focused solely on its importance as an
analytical device. Its application in Chapter One concentrated on highlighting the conflict of interests
and values encountered at the inter-section between two distinctive, but inter-dependent economic and
environmental systems. The concept revealed the complex and dynamic processes which underpin
integration of the environment into both water and agricultural policy, and the unintended
consequences and side effects which could potentially result. This section will build on this
conceptualisation to develop the interface-network methodology, which provides a key mechanism for
linking together the combination of processes which together shape and distort the agriculture-water
interface.
The six theoretical postulates identified in Chapter Two address different dimensions of the
agriculture-water interface problem, and reflect different methodological approaches incorporating
both behaviouralist and structuralist traditions. Consequently, it is vital to develop a methodological
approach which bridges the gap between these different perspectives, in order to ensure an integrated
and cohesive empirical strategy. It is also critical to ensure the methodological approach moves
between, and links together, the multiple layers of analysis to expose the complex and dynamic
processes of interaction, and thereby prevent the ad hoc examination of discrete portions of the
agriculture-water interface problem. The interface-network methodology, set out by Long (1989) and
Long and Long (1992), fulifis these objectives, as it stresses the importance of understanding the
dynamic and emergent nature of social change.
The divisions between wholly siructuralist or wholly behaviouralist perspectives on social change are
breaking down, as analysts recognise the central importance of examining the combination of structural
55
and behavioural forces which together contribute to the contradictory and conflicting outcomes of
development (Long 1989; Giddens 1984). The interface-network approach provides a critical means of
linking together these two traditions, by emphasising the dynamic interaction and inter-dependence
between the internal and external relations of production and consumption. Recognising the inter-
dependence between social agency and structure, the interface-network approach focuses on how social
actors' interact with, and respond to, the political-economic environment to provide key insight into
how structural forces shape and reshape their life worlds. As Long (1992) argues
".. it is theoretically unsatisfactory to base one's analysis on the concept of external
determination. All forms of external intervention necessarily enter the existing life-worlds
of the individuals and social groups affected, and in this way are mediated and transformed by
these same actors and structures. Also to the extent that large scale and 'remote' social forces
do alter the life chances and behaviour of individuals, they can only do so through shaping,
directly and indirectly, the everyday life experiences and perceptions of the individuals
concerned" (p21).
This alternative emphasis is critical to understanding the differential responses of actors to broadly
similar structural conditions, and shifts analysis away from the conceptualisation of planned
intervention as a linear, step by step process. Instead, it is exposed as an ongoing, socially constructed
and negotiated process with unintended consequences and side effects.
Central to this actor orientated approach is the examination of the network of social relations within
which individuals are embedded (Marsden and Murdoch 1990), to reveal how particular sets of
relations condition particular courses of action. The conceptualisation of social agency plays a pivotal
role in the interface-net-work approach, as it does not simply refer to the decision making capacity of
actors or their intentions in doing things. Instead, social agency is linked to the concept of interests
(Long 1992; Hindess 1986), which critically colour and shape the decision making process.
Consequently, analysis focuses on the strategies2
 which social actors develop in order to protect or
'Social actors have been characterised by Giddens (1984) as capable and knowledgeable beings, who process information,
monitor events around them, note the reactions of others to their behaviour and take account of various contingent
circumstances. Social actors include not only single individuals but also capitalist enterprises, state agencies, political parties
and church organisations, as they are all capable of reaching and acting on decisions. Social agency should not however, be
ascribed to collectivities, agglomerates or social categories such as class or gender which have no way of formulating or
cariying out decisions themselves (Hindess 1986).
2	 limitations associated with this concept are recognised, as debate has focused on what actually constitutes a strategy, and
Crow (1989) has highlighted the dangers of imputing objectives to actors which they themselves may not recognise.
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promote their particular social, political or economic interests from external intervention. In turn, this
will expose the network of social relations through which social actors pursue their interests and
interact with others to ensure their particular interests are served. This enables analysis to distinguish
and draw out the discontinuities and conflicts of interest and values which emerge as a consequence of
interaction, and the unintended side effects which result. Central to the analysis of these complex inter-
relationships are the alternative frameworks of knowledge which the different actors draw on in pursuit
of their interests, and the relations of power which enable certain 'ways of knowing' to take
precedence (Giddens 1979; Long 1992; Marsden et al 1993). As Long (1992) suggests
we take the view that we are dealing with 'multiple realities' potentially conflicting
social and normative interests, and diverse and discontinuous configurations of knowledge
then we must look closely at the issue of whose interpretations or models prevail over
those of other actors and under what conditions. Knowledge processes are embedded in
social processes that imply aspects of power, authority and legitimation, and they are just as
likely to reflect and contribute to the conflict between groups as they are to lead to the
establishment of common perceptions" (p26-27).
The key question therefore centres on how certain actors are able to impose their interests on others,
and what linkages tie these different actors in a network of social relations.
Focusing on the processes of negotiation3 and representation4 , or what Latour (1986; 1987) calls the
process of translation, it is possible to resolve these questions by tracing how specific networks of
social relations are established, extended and maintained. These complex processes of interaction are
critical, as they expose the relations of power 5 and dependence which underpin the enrolment of actors
into networks. In order to effectively enrol actors into networks, two things must occur
simultaneously; first others must be enrolled so that they participate in the network; second their
3 Negotiation attempts to open up and capture the process of mediation, or the manner in which actors interpret and internalise
the advice they receive from other, external actors (Ward 1994b; Long 1989)
4 Iepresentation refers to the ways in which actors seek to protect or promote their interests from external intervention. As
Marsden et al (1993) recognise the process of representation is subject to continual struggle and renegotiation, as competing
actors attempt to reshape the course of events around them to ensure that their specific interests are protected or promoted.
is not conceived as determined by the actors structural position in the class system, but as the outcome of collective
action. Power is understood as a socially negotiated process whereby other actors are enrolled in a network of social relations
where they work in unison towards a common goal (Latour 1986; 1987)
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behaviour must be controlled so that their actions are predictable (Callon 1986). Consequently, if a
strategically placed actor can convince others that a particular course of events will serve their
interests, it is possible to build up and control a network of social relations. According to CaIlon (1986)
four stages are discernible in this process. Firstly, an actor will make him/herself indispensable to
others through the strategic control of resources such as information, access to skills or capital and
then, through negotiations and representations, will convince others to join the network. Secondly, the
strategically placed actor will attempt to remove the discretion from the world of other actors, by
directly intervening in the alternative associations of these actors with others. In the third stage, the
role and identity of each actor and the nature of their relationships with others is defmed. Finally, the
initiating actor "represents" the others, and speaks on their behalf in negotiations with the outside
world. Thus power rests with those actors who are able to enrol and convince others to participate in
their specific "project" and consequently build up a network of social relations. The initiating actor is
able to closely regulate the network, through controlling the flow of information and capital and
thereby succeeds in manipulating the pace and direction of change at the local level.
The utility of the interface-network approach is demonstrated in the work of Marsden and Arce (1995),
Hawkins (1991) and Marsden el a! (1993), who use this methodology to explore the interaction of
farmers with off-farm firms and state agencies. Marsden and Arce (1995) in their analysis of agro-
export agriculture in Chile, concentrate on the ways in which produce quality criteria are incorporated
into the lifeworids of agro-export firms. By focusing in particular on the role of the initiating actors,
who in this case are multi-national companies, agricultural extension agencies and agricultural co-ops,
the analysis reveals how strict produce quality criteria are introduced into a local area and to a group of
individuals. This process critically influences and reshapes the relationship of the firm or co-op with its
own employees, who act as the quality assessors when picking and packaging produce. The inter-
relationship of these firms with other actors in the European market place are also redefmed, as firms
establish closer ties to guarantee quality and ensure against the possibility of produce rejection. The
use of the interface-network approach in this particular case, enables analysis to trace how local level
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agricultural production methods and employment practices are linked to national and international
processes of change, as local firms are gradually incorporated into the "quality projects" of their
overseas customers.
Hawkin's (1991) study of technological change on potato arid dairy farms in Cheshire uses the
interface network approach to explore the divergent interests and strategies pursued by farmers and
those who produce, sell or promote technology. Focusing in particular on the dissemination of new
technologies from manufacturers to individual farmers, the analysis exposes the differential resources
of knowledge and power drawn on by the different actors in the interface networks for milk and
potatoes. The study underlines the different strategies of engagement developed by farmers as they
negotiate the interface networks, to reveal how agribusinesses are never able to completely undermine
the independent decision making capacity of farmers.
The application of the interface-network methodology provides a critical means of exposing the
complex and dynamic web of inter-relationships which shape the use and management of irrigation
water and the water environment. Chapter One argued that farmers enmeshed at the agriculture-water
interface are the loci for a plethora of competing and conflicting signals, emanating from state, market
and social forces of regulation which are pushing and pulling them in different directions. Recognition
that the different actors from off the farm, as well as the farmers themselves, all have distinctly
different interests in irrigation and the water environment, enables analysis to trace the conflict of
interest and values which underpin the agriculture-water interface. Focusing on the alternative
frameworks of knowledge, and the processes of negotiation and representation, it is possible to trace
how the state, mnrket and social forces of regulation control and manipulate not only each others'
behaviour, but also that of farmers. This will enable analysis to build up a picture of the network of
social relations which directly and indirectly regulate irrigation use. The critical point of entry in
opening up this web of inter-dependencies is the fanners at the local level. Only through tracking their
interaction with different off-farm agencies, will it be possible to explore how these external agents
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actually control and manipulate irrigation decision making. The degree to which farmers internalise
these different "projects" into their own life worlds is critically important in understanding not only
their irrigation management, but also their response or non response to demand management policies.
Farmers involvement with actors from the EA, MAFF, food system, NFU and CLA are primarily face
to face encounters at the local level. Nevertheless, these different actors are themselves involved in
complex inter-relationships with other actors from higher levels of their institution or firm. For
example, EA officials at the local level, who are involved in the licensing and policing of irrigation
abstraction, are enforcing regionally and nationally agreed policies on water abstraction and protection
of the water environment. Thus they are the end point of a complex process of negotiation within the
EA itself and also between the EA, OFWAT, DoE, MAFF and the Water Companies over the form
and function of water policy. Firms involved in irrigated production, namely irrigation equipment
manufacturers, irrigation advisers and the marketing outlets for irrigated produce, are themselves all
part of the international food system through which firms directly and indirectly regulate each others
behaviour. Consequently, it is vital to trace the key inter-relationships which critically shape the
behaviour of these off-farm agencies, as this in turn critically shapes the form and function of their
interaction with farmers. Focusing on the alternative frameworks of knowledge and resources which
these different actors draw on, it is possible to track how they attempt to enrol and incorporate farmers
into their own particular networks. The processes of negotiation and representation will expose the
relations of power and dependence which enable these firms and organisations to directly and
indirectly control and manipulate decision making at the farm level. The dynamic nature of these
complex inter-relationships is critical, as farmers are progressively enrolled into the divergent
"projects" of these off-farm firms and state agencies. How farmers reconcile the demands of these
competing and contradictory projects and internalise them into their own management practices will
prove critical in understanding their response or non response to demand management policies.
60
3.2 The conflict catchment method olo y: choice of research areas
The interface network concept enables identification of the web of social relations within which
farmers aie embedded. Through tracking farmers' interaction with agents from off the farm, it is
possible to explore the way in which state, market and social forces of regulation from the regional,
national and international levels regulate the use and management of irrigation water and the
unintended consequences and side effects which result. In applying this approach it is critical to locate
these processes within particular places, to ensure the environmental dimension is closely integrated so
that analysis can trace the dynamic displacement of environmental problems from one media, time or
place to another. The forces influencing irrigation at the farm level may be national or international, but
the outcomes are localised and reflected in the conflicts over access to, and use of, reliable supplies of
irrigation water. The conflict catchment approach attempts to address these issues by explicitly
identifying and linking the research areas to the central dimensions of the agriculture- water resource
management conflict.
3.2.1: The national water supply and demand context in the UK.
It is impossible to divorce the allocation and regulation of water for use as spray irrigation from the
wider context, as industry, the environment and public supply companies directly compete for available
supplies of water. This is further complicated by the limited availability of new supply sources and
uncertainty over the impact of climate change on both the supply and demand for water (Party and
Duncan 1995; Herrington 1996). Hence, it is vital to establish at the outset a clear picture of the
national and regional supply and demand for water in the UK, as these competing pressures critically
influence the choice of the research study area. in one sense, the availability of water in the UK is in
fact not a problem, with high annual average rainfall levels an established feature of UK weather
patterns. Despite this, not all the water which falls as rainfall actually fmds its way into the rivers and
aquifers, and a significant proportion is lost through evapotranspiration. Hence, the average annual
effective rainfall figures represent the amount of water actually available to supply rivers and replenish
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aquifers. A significant proportion is lost through evapotranspiration, and less than 10% of this figure is
authorised for abstraction by water companies, industry and agriculture. Nevertheless, this perception
of plenty masks important regional differences, with a significant supply imbalance between the north
and west of the UK, where annual average rainfall and effective rainfall levels are high, and the south
and east which receive only a fraction of this figure (see figure 3.1). In fact, rainfall levels in the
eastern and southern counties of England are on a par with rainfall levels in the south of France, and in
the Anglian region the situation is particularly difficult with average annual rainfall figures of
595mm, of which 448mm are lost through evapotranspiration. This leaves 117mm for rivers and
aquifers; 16mm for human use which is returned to source and 14mm used by humans but not returned
to source (NRA 1993a). This picture is further complicated by the 1:50 year thought effective rainfall,
which represents the average amount of rainfall available under conditions which might be expected to
occur once eveiy 50 years. Regional differences in average annual effective rainfall are sharply
underlined in a drought situation, with the Anglian region suffering by far the lowest thought effective
rainfall, followed by Thames, Southern and Severn Trent regions (see figure 3.1). In fact Anglian
region is particularly vulnerable to relatively minor fluctuations in rainfall or evapotranspiration with
summer rainfall levels of 300mm of which 450mm are lost through evapotranspiration. In effect evely
summer is a thought! (NRA 1993a).
These differences in effective and thought effective rainfall levels however have a variable impact,
depending on the level of dependence on ground or surface water sources for abstraction supply.
Southern, Thames, Anglian and Severn Trent regions overlie major aquifer outcrops which provide
effective storage for water and in fact 30% of effective rainfall percolates through to these aquifers
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(NRA 1993 a). In contrast, western and northern regions are dependent on surface waters and man
made storage facilities, thus the impact of drought will be variable depending on the annual rainfall
pattern. Notwithstanding the problems of low effective and drought effective rainfall, the south and
east of England are also subject to very tight margins when comparing the 1:50 year drought effective
rainfall against licensed abstraction (see figure 3.2). The regions with greatest resource stress also
correspond with those regions with high, and increasing concentrations of population.
EA and water company calculations of the level of surplus resources suggest there are only limited
'new' supplies of water available for allocation. Water Company figures suggest surplus resources
range from 85% in Northumbria, primarily as a result of under utilisation of Kielder reservoir, to 13%
in Severn Trent and 26% in Anglian (see figure 3.3). These figures however may in fact under
represent the seriousness of the situation, as they do not take account of the need to allocate water for
the protection of the water environment. The availability of additional raw water for agricultural
abstraction is also severely constrained. In Anglian region, summer abstraction from surface water is
limited to those catchments where flows are augmented by the Ely-Ouse ground water scheme, the
Ely-Ouse-Essex transfer scheme and the river Trent transfer as well as by returning effluents. Only
winter abstraction, for storage, is permitted in all catchments. The availability of ground water is also
limited with only a nominal surplus available in 8 catchments to meet minor local abstractions for
minor local needs (NRA 1994a). This situation is replicated in the Southern, Thames, Severn Trent
and South West regions where the availability of water to meet new irrigation demand is severely
constrained (NRA 1995c; NRA 1993c; NRA l994c; NRA 1994d).
Against this background of restricted water supply availability, the demand for water is rising,
specifically in the agricultural sector for use as spray irrigation and public water supply companies.
Water companies represent by far the largest demand on resources, accounting for 51% of water
abstracted nationally from non-tidal and groundwater sources (NRA 1994b). The level of industrial
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and agricultural abstraction varies quite significantly across the regions with agricultural abstraction
for spray irrigation concentrated in the Anglian and Severn Trent regions while industrial abstraction is
concentrated in the North, Midlands and South Wales.
Licensed agricultural abstraction for spray irrigation has increased significantly, from a figure of
68m11d in 1971 to 365m1/d in 1991 (Henington 1996). In the Anglian region the rate of increase has
been quite dramatic over the 10 year period 1982-1992, with the level of licensed abstraction
increasing from 80,264 mI/pa in 1982 to 113,734 nil/pa in 1986 and 139,065 mI/pa in 1991 (see table
3.1 Part A); comparing these figures against the level of actual abstraction 1982-92 witnessed an
increase of 266% (see table 3.1 Part B). The yield benefits of irrigation, particularly in a drought year
provides a partial explanation for the rapid rate of increase. The drought of 1975-76 highlighted the
benefits of irrigation through improved yields, which in combination with irrigation investment grants
encouraged the expansion of irrigation in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Irrigation in this period
concentrated on potatoes, fruit crops, sugar beet and grass land with some irrigation of cereal crops in
exceptionally thy years (A.C.A.H.1980). Nevertheless, in the late 1980s a shift occurred away from
irrigation purely for yield, towards greater emphasis on the
year	 Anglian North	 Northu- Severn South	 Southern Thames Welsh Wesses Yorks
______ ______ West mbna Trent West ______ ______ ______ ______ ______
1982	 80264	 -	 -	 35958	 515	 -	 -	 -	 -	 10101
1983	 81870	 -	 227	 37604	 549	 -	 11060	 4380	 -	 10897
1984	 96871	 -	 357	 39946	 1132	 -	 11133	 -	 -	 11274
1985	 108077	 -	 439	 -	 1452	 -	 11461	 -	 7373	 11791
1986	 113734	 -	 526	 48657	 1495	 -	 11534	 -	 7300	 14416
1987	 119720	 -	 544	 49463	 1622	 -	 11644	 -	 7081	 15248
1988	 125195	 -	 572	 50142	 1651	 -	 11206	 -	 7227	 17756
1989	 128480	 -	 572	 -	 1663	 -	 10987	 -	 12629	 18370
1990	 132685	 -	 857	 -	 1701	 -	 10658	 6205	 12410	 18933
1991	 139065	 -	 857	 -	 1793	 -	 -	 -	 13578	 20380
1992	 -	 5517	 865	 58953	 2015	 25894 -	 7446	 -
Table 3.1 Part A: Reiona1 licensed absfraction spray irrigation (MI/pa)
(Source: Weatherhead et al 1994)
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Year Anglian North	 Northu- Sevens South	 Southern Thames Welsh 	 Wessex Yorks
______ ______ West
	
mbria Trent West ______ _____ _____ _____ _____
1982	 23433	 1058	 -	 9490	 -	 -	 -	 730	 -	 -
1983	 33690	 1314	 64	 12410	 -	 -	 3066	 730	 -	 2263
1984	 38727	 2117	 91	 -	 -	 -	 3504	 1460	 -	 -
1985	 20842	 913	 42	 6570	 -	 -	 1679	 730	 1460	 2482
1986	 32923	 913	 135	 13505	 -	 -	 2409	 730	 2190	 4380
1987	 15367	 474	 17	 9125	 -	 -	 1971	 730	 2190	 3468
1988	 20805	 547	 35	 9490	 -	 -	 1880	 4782	 2993	 4088
1989	 53035	 1241	 162	 26645	 -	 -	 3176	 2336	 3796	 7519
1990	 77855	 1431	 166	 24820	 -	 -	 3796	 2409	 4453	 8833
1991	 85775	 -	 118	 -	 -	 2931	 -	 2519	 2774	 9636
1992	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 2838	 -	 5475	 -	 -
Table 3.1 Part B: Re2ional actual abstraction spray irri2ation (MI/pa).
(Source: Weatherhead eta! 1994)
benefits for crop quality, particularly for high value crops such as potatoes, root vegetables and salad
crops (Weatherhead eta! 1994). Thus irrigation of sugar beet and cereal crops as well as grassland
declined.
Irrigation is becoming an essential element of total crop management in order to conform to the
changing demands of the agricultural market, and in consequence the demand for water for irrigation
is projected to increase nationally by 1.7% pa to the year 2001 arid then by 1% pa from 2001-2021
(Weatherhead et al 1994). These figures may appear small, but when examining them at the regional
level the projected demand for irrigation represents a significant increase. In Anglian region demand is
projected to increase by 60% in the year 2021; in Severn Trent by 38% and in Southern by 78% (see
table 3.2).
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Region	 1990	 1996	 2001	 2006	 2011	 2016	 2021
Anglian	 85641	 99375	 109267	 117058	 124088	 130619	 136681
North West	 1566	 1789	 1984	 2154	 2322	 2490	 2656
Northumbria	 201	 227	 241	 253	 264	 274	 283
Severn-Trent	 27302	 31257	 33326	 34781	 35952	 36946	 37776
South West	 2409	 2650	 2848	 3028	 3216	 3413	 3615
Southern	 11644	 12834	 14902	 16512	 18028	 19445	 20759
Thames	 5701	 5314	 5536	 5639	 5735	 5829	 5923
Welsh	 2650	 3034	 3379	 3670	 3949	 4219	 4477
Wessex	 4818	 4915	 5127	 5312	 5520	 5744	 5977
Yorks	 9700	 11484	 12422	 13193	 13882	 14520	 15095
Total	 151632	 172879	 189032	 201600	 212956	 223499	 233242
Table 3.2: Predicted irri2ation volume 1996-2021 (Mi/pa)
(Source: Weatherhead et a! 1994)
These projected demand increases will therefore have a significant impact, particularly given the
nature of the abstraction. Spray irrigation is concentrated in the summer and periods of exceptionally
low rainfall, and on a peak day can exceed the rate of public demand for supplies. In addition, it is a
wholly consumptive use of water with no return discharges to the river system. In consequence, the
demand for water for spray irrigation places severe stress on ground and surface water sources at a time
of the year when flow levels are at their lowest (NRA 1994b) and thus the potential for environmental
damage is high. In light of this, EA policy in the Anglian, Southern and Severn Trent regions
emphasise new licence applications for surface water can only be met through the construction of on-
farm reservoirs, as abstraction in the winter months reduces the stress placed on the environment and
ensures farmers have a reliable supply of water.
The primary component of demand in the public water supply sector is domestic consumption which
accounts for 8,120 ML/day (OFWAT 1 994a) and is largely unmetered (see table 3.3). Public water
supply has increased dramatically over the past 20 years with an increase from 14,806ML/d in 1973-74
to 17,Ol5Ml/d in 1994-95 (WSA 1995) and is partly explained by the increased use of washing
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machines, dish washers and the massive extension of garden watering (DoE 1996a+b; DoE 1992).
Nevertheless, the increased demand on resources in this sector is not wholly the result of changes in
domestic consumer behaviour. The level of distribution losses, or leakage levels, represents an
important component of public water supply demand accounting for on average, 3,517 ML/day
(OFWAT 1994a) or 22% of the water put into the supply system in 1994.
NRA	 PWS	 IN)USTRY	 SPRAY	 GENERAL	 ELECIRICITY
REGION	 ____ IRRIGATION AGRL	 ____ _____
OW SW GW SW GW SW GW SW OW SW
Anglian	 790	 970	 101	 42	 62	 82	 14	 0	 0	 7
Northumbria	 338	 1,892	 69	 487	 21	 7	 6	 -	 5	 249
and Yorks
North West
	
211	 1,560	 130	 399	 1	 2	 5	 -	 0	 477
Severn Trent	 966	 1,528	 90	 317	 27	 40	 5	 1	 3	 1135
Southern	 1,035	 324	 101	 41	 8	 9	 3	 -	 -	 0
South West
	
427	 927	 32	 128	 3	 103	 36	 32	 2	 1545
Thames	 1.361	 2,619	 61	 17	 7	 5	 7	 -	 -	 88
Welsh	 133	 1,654	 38	 552	 1	 6	 6	 -	 2	 4544
Total	 5,261	 11,474	 622	 1,983 129	 155	 83	 35	 13	 7956
Table 3.3: Licensed water abstraction (Million litres per day)
(Source: DOE 1996a)
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The public water supply companies are under sustained pressure from the EA, environmental groups
and the Labour Party to control leakage levels, and OFWAT (1994a) projects a reduction of 20.6% on
1994 leakage levels by the year 2014.
Notwithstanding these reductions, the level of demand for domestic water is forecast by EA, OFWAT
and the WCs themselves to increase over both the long and short tenn. EA regional calculations
suggest the demnnd increase will vaiy from between 18-37% for Anglian region or 3-28% for Severn
Trent depending on the demand scenarios (see figure 3.4). Comparing these figures against the present
levels of surplus resources (see figure 3.3) the margin is very tight, even when considering the low
growth scenario. Nevertheless, a great deal of caution should be exercised when using these figures as
recent history demonstrates the inadequacy of water demand projections (see Herrington 1996, for a
full discussion). Calculating demand increases over the next 10 years in itself proves difficult;
extrapolating these figures over thirty is definitely problematic and should provide only a bench mark
figure.
The agricultural sector is also in competitiion with the environment over access to and use of reliable
supplies of water. Allocation of water to safeguard the water environment has proved problematic,
with some catchments suffering, even under normal weather conditions, from over abstraction whereby
authonsed abstractions exceed natural water availability. These conditions are inevitably exacerbated in
drought periods, as demonstrated in 1988-92 with the complete drying out of rivers, such as the River
Darent in Kent and the dehydration of wetlands. In 1991 the NRA published, a list of the top 40 rivers
which were suffering from excessive abstraction (NRA 1993b). Twenty of these cases were scheduled
for immediate action (see figure 3.5), and in most cases water company abstraction was identified as
the primary factor contributing to over abstraction.
The catchments identified in the top 40 list represent only the tip of the ice-berg, with many more
catchments and wetland sites suffering due to up-stream or ground water abstraction. NRA South West
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region identified 109 sites where adverse environmental effects were occurring (NRA 1992d), while
Anglian region has identified a further 10 possible low flow rivers and wetlands (NRA 1994a). Severn
Trent region has identified 14 ground water units suffering from over licensed abstraction, with an
additional 12 over licensed but under abstracted units (NRA 1993c). These units represent significant
enviromnental problems, particularly if currently under-utilised licences are brought into use, thus
significantly upsetting the allocation of water to the environment and presenting a threat to the flow
levels. These assessments do not include the views of other environmental groups, such as English
Nature, the RSPB and the Wildlife Trusts whose own research presents a markedly worse situation.
The Anglian region Wildlife Trusts for example identify an additional 108 wetland Sites of Special
Scientific Interest and Wildlife Trust reserves under threat from dehydration (Beardall et a! 1992).
Research commissioned by English Nature underlines this with ground water abstraction identified as
contributing to changes in the plant communities at 26 spring and wetland sites in Norfolk, Suffolk and
Cambridgeshire (Wheeler and Shaw 1992). More recent work undertaken by English Nature in 1996
reports 89 out of 152 SSSIs investigated were at risk from over abstraction, now or in the future; while
the RSPB (1996) concludes a total of 354 wetlands and rivers are either affected by over abstraction,
or are at risk now or in the future.
It is evident that conflicts over access to, and use of reliable supplies of water are becoming an
increasingly critical issue, as the different users and uses of water compete for limited supplies of
water. The conflicts of interest and value inherent in the allocation and regulation of water are not
merely articulated at the institutional level, as the EA attempts to balance the different demands on
water. At the local level farmers, environmentalists, Water Companies and the general public are
becoming more acutely aware of the increased competition for water, particularly in the aflermath of
the 1989-92 drought. Hence, this analysis will attempt to draw out these discontinuities and conflicts,
particularly in relation to the allocation and regulation of water for use as spray irrigation. Three key
areas are defined as central to this agriculture-water resource conflict:
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(i) competition between water users over access to and use of reliable supplies of water.
Agricultural demand for water for spray irrigation competes with industiy, public water
supply companies and the environment over access to and use of water supplies.
(ii) introduction of stricter controls and regulatory measures to protect and/or enhance the in-
situ water environment. Agricultural abstraction licences for spray irrigation are subject to
stricter controls in order to protect specific environmental sites.
(iii) over-abstraction and low flow levels damaging the in situ water environment.
Insufficient water within the catchnient to protect the in situ water environment or meet the
demand for new supplies by industiy, agriculture and public water supply companies.
These conflicts are most clearly exposed in the Anglian region, which, as the analysis underlines,
combines the lowest annual average effective and drought effective rainfall levels in the UK with the
highest levels of abstraction for spray irrigation use. Nevertheless, constraints of both time and money
prevent a survey of all irrigation abstractors in the region, and in consequence the analysis will
concentrate instead on abstractors in specific river catchments in the Anglian region.
River catchment areas are defined on the basis of discrete geographical areas (Parker and Penning-
Rowsell 1980; Newson 1993). These administrative units are defmed on the basis of all or part of the
river basin system from its source to the sea, and include both surface and ground water systems.
Catchments are wholly administrative units used to manage in an integrated manner, water supply,
water quality, flood control, the water enviromnent, fisheries, and recreation. The inter-dependence
between these core functions of water resource management led the NRA to develop integrated
catchment management plans for 200 surface and ground water systems in the UK (Chandler 1994).
These plans adopt an holistic approach and attempt to outline in detail the current and projected
demands on the six core functions and reconcile the conflicts between
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Figure 3.6: The catchment stud y areas.
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them. The choice of catchment study areas was guided by secondary data sources and empirical
analysis conducted under a project entitled The economic of water resource management, funded by
the NRA6 . Full access to all the empirical material gathered under this project was granted and
provided an important input into the choice of research study areas, highlighting catchments suffering
particular water abstraction problems.
Under the guidance of NRA officials and supplemented by information gathered in the Economics of
water resource management project, four catchments were identified as possible research study areas:
the Lark Valley; Thet-Little Ouse; Slea, and Bain-Witham and all reflect the three dimensions of the
agriculture-water resource conflict. Irrigators in the Bain-Witham catchment were interviewed in the
1991-92 survey conducted by Rees et a! (1993). Re-interviewing these farmers would provide a
greater depth of understanding into the key processes influencing their use and management of
irrigation water, with the added advantage that the respondents already knew the interviewer, and were
therefore more likely to agree to a second interview. Further consultation with NRA staff and
examination of the catchment management plans reduced the number of catchments to three: the Lark
Valley in Suffolk, the Thet-Little Ouse in Norfolk and the Bain-Witham in Lincoinshire (see figure
3.6).
3.2.2: The Thet - Little Ouse Catchment.
The Thet-Little Ouse catchment is centred around the market town of Thetford in Norfolk ( see figure
3.7) and roughly corresponds with the boundaries of the Government designated Breckland
Environmentally Sensitive Area (ESA). The Breck heathiand is unique in the UK, with flat sand land
overlying a chalk aquifer with belts of Scots Pine and areas of heathland offering a rich diversity of
6 Rees, J., Williams, S., Atkins, J.P., Hammond, C., Trotter, S. (1993) The economics of water resource management, Bristol:
NRA. From July 1991 to December 1992, 1 was employed as a research assistant on this project. I was directly involved in
the design and implementation of surveys in the agricultural and industrial sectors on the use and management of abstraction
water. I was also responsible for the analysis of the data.
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FIgure 3.7: The met-Little Ouse catchment.
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flora and fauna. 47 SSSIs have been designated, of which 23 are wetland sites with an additional 50
wetlands managed by the Wildlife Trusts (English Nature 1992). The key dimensions of the water
conflict in this catchment centre on the protection of the water environment, in particular the Meres7
environment, while meeting increasing demand from agricultural spray irrigators and PWS companies
for new supplies of water. The Breckland Meres are SSSIs which occasionally dry out naturally.
However, under Section 57 of the 1991 Water Resources Act, the NRA are unable to use their statutory
powers to impose restrictions on abstraction in thought periods to protect this unique landscape feature.
Hence during the prolonged drought of 1989-92 the NRA had to revert to voluntary agreements with
spray irrigators in order to protect the Meres from low flow levels and by implication long term
ecological damage. Thus, within a 10km radius of the Meres voluntary restrictions were agreed on
irrigation use and in the aftermath of the drought, the NRA are introducing cessation clauses into
irrigation licences which come up for renewal. Thus, once the flow in the river falls below a certain,
pre-defined level irrigation abstraction is automatically banned in order to protect the Meres from
dehydration. Farmers use of irrigation in this catchment comes into direct conflict with the
enviromnent, as the NRA attempts to protect this unique landscape feature within the confines of its
statutory powers.
Gross	 Effective Committed	 Committed Balance 	 Best estimate
Resource Resource environment 	 abstraction nominally water available
tcmd	 tcmd	 tcmd	 available
Bain-Witham	 47.0	 82.0	 37.0	 36.6	 8.5	 0
Lark	 159.4	 127.5	 46.9	 83.1	 -2.5	 0
Thet-Little Ouse 263.4	 210.8	 132.9	 81.1	 -3.6	 0
Table 3.4 : Available groundwater resources in the three stud y areas.
(Source: NRA 1994a)
7 Meres are wetlands which occur when dips in the landscape intercept the water table.
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The allocation of water resources in the catchment is finely balanced, with no additional ground water
resources available for allocation (See table 3.4).
Lark*	 Thet-Lt	 Upper	 Lower
_____________ _____________ 
Ouse*	 Witham**	 Witham
PWS	 11874	 13790
	
1966	 12055.0	 4459.6
	1976	 20604.0	 10014.3
	
1986	 19376.0	 11213.6
	
1991	 22176.0	 22849.5
	
Industry
	
7663.5	 854
	
1966	 2194.23	 94.00
	
1976	 4586.86	 340.05
	
1986	 5543.02	 962.65
	1991	 6211.46	 1882.95
_____	 6264	 5400
Irrigation
	
1966	 587.18	 547.20
	1976	 1544.4	 1232.37
	
1986	 3110.33	 6540.73
	1991	 5075.95	 6552.03
General Agri.	 222.7	 99.0
	
1966	 300.16	 521.40
	
1976	 560.32	 898.50
	
1986	 593.79	 1445.2
	
1991	 712.68	 1452.3
TOTAL	 26,024.7	 20,309
	
- 1966	 15,146.57	 5622.2
	
1976	 27,295.58	 12,485.15
	
1986	 28,623.14	 20,162.15
	
1991	 34,176.09	 32,736.78
* Groundwater abstraction only.
** Surface and ground water abstraction 1996 only
Surface and groundwater abstraction 1993 only
Table 3.5: Historical licensed abstraction in the three catchment stud y areas (tcma).
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Although only 30% of the gross resource is actually licensed, NRA calculations suggest over half of
the groundwater resource should be reserved for the protection of flow levels in the River Thet (NRA
1994b). The allocation of licences has risen markedly since 1966 (see table 3.5) with PWS allocated
the largest proportion of licences. In fact. Cambridge Water Company was granted 3 licences in 1990
to export up to 8518 tcma for use in Cambridge City. This represents a total loss for the catchment,
as water companies normally return a proportion of their abstraction to the river of origin through the
return of effluents via the sewage treatment works.
Given the light sandy soils which predominate in the catchment, agricultural demand for water for
irrigation purposes is unlimited, although there is no publicly available data on the level of unmet
demand. The EA recognises this demand can only be met through the construction of on-farm water
storage facilities, and therefore no new summer abstraction licences are available. Thus, this catchment
conforms with two of the critical dimensions of the conflict catchment methodology, namely
agricultural demand for water comes into direct competition with the requirements of the in situ
environment; and new and tougher restrictions are being introduced into irrigation licences to protect
the environment.
3.2.3: The Lark Valley Catchment.
The Lark Valley catchnient area lies adjacent to the Thet-Little Ouse catchment, with Bury St.Edmunds
located at its centre (see figure 3.8). The catchment stretches from Bury St. Edmunds to Mildenhall and
Lakenheath in the north-west where the Lark river flows into the fen system of the Bedford level. The
northern reaches of the catchment fall in the Breckland ESA, and there are 6 water dependent SSSIs
and 12 wetlands managed by the Wildlife Trust. Flat sand land and chalk heathiand predominate in the
catchment which overlies the chalk aquifer. The flow of the River Lark is highly dependent on base
flow from the chalk aquifer and effluent discharges. During the drought of 1989-92 low flow levels
developed in the river and in fact part of the river has now been designated a "possible low flow"
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Figure 18: The LarL catchment.
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river by the NRA (NRA 1994 a). Effective resources in the catchment are fully committed, with no
additional resources available for allocation (NRA 1994 a) and so new irrigation licences are confined
to water storage facilities. In fact the Lark catchment has a resource deficit of -2.5 tcmd when
licensed abstraction and in stream river allocation are subtracted from the effective resource (see table
3.4). This situation is further complicated by the fact that sub-units of the catchment are over licensed,
with the licensed quantity of abstraction greater than the available resource.
Under the guidance of NRA officials it was decided not to interview all irrigators in this catchment, as
this would include abstractors on the River Kennet. Instead, work concentrated on the sub-units of the
River Lark namely sub-units A, B, and C on figure 3.8.
Once again the level of licensed abstraction has risen markedly since 1966 (see table 3.5), with spray
irrigation licences now accounting for 10.56 tcmd. During the drought period of 1989-92 abstraction
bans were imposed under Section 57 of the 1991 Water Resources Act. Total abstraction bans were
imposed on surface spray irrigation licence holders in 1990, followed in 1991 by 50% and then 100%
bans on groundwater abstractors. Voluntaiy restrictions were agreed between the NRA and all spray
irrigators in the catchment in 1992. Press reports (Pollitt 1991; East Anglian Daily Times 23.7.91; East
Anglian Daily Times 2 1.8.91) highlighted the level of opposition to abstraction bans among farmers in
the catchment, and identified movement towards a "farmers' group" to negotiate collectively with the
NRA over access to and use of water for spray irrigation purposes. This catchment conforms to two of
the key conflict catchment criteria, with increasing competition and conflict between users over access
to and use of reliable supplies of water, which is further compounded by the limited supplies of water
to protect in stream flow levels.
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3.2.4. The Barn-Witham Catchment
The Bain-Witham study area falls within the Upper and Lower Witham catchments in Lmcolnshire (see
figure 3.9), and is centred on the city of Lincoln and market town of l-lorncastle. These catchment sub-
units incorporate chalk heathiand and fenland and encounter distinctly different water resource
management conflicts including groundwater pollution; low river flows and the consequent impact on
the in situ environment; the refusal of new summer spray irrigation licence applications; restrictions on
abstraction from the Lincoinshire Limestone aquifer and the threat of abstraction bans or restrictions.
There are 38 designated SSSs and 28 Nature Reserves in the catchnients, with the north-eastern part of
the Upper Witham coinciding with the boundaries of the Wolds Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty
(ANOB) and Area of Great Landscape Beauty. The Upper Witham catchment also incorporates the
boundaries of the designated Nitrate Vulnerable Zone (NVZ) at Lincoln, and the Nitrate Sensitive Area
(NSA) designation at Branston Boothes, where voluntary schemes have been introduced by MAFF to
control the pollution of groundwater from nitrates, pesticides and herbicides leached from agricultural
and other land. Water resources within the Upper and Lower Witham catchments can be augmented
by the transfer of water from the River Trent via the Fossdyke canal. This transfer scheme is licensed to
abstract 41,059 tcma (EA 1 996c) which provides water for four main users:
(i) abstraction at Short Feny to meet abstraction and environmental needs from the River
Ancholme;
(ii) abstraction of water to meet spray irrigation and industrial demands for water from the
River Witham;
(iii) dilution and flushing of saline water from the lower reaches of the With am by
maintaining a residual flow to tide;
(iv) maintaining navigation levels and supporting fishing, recreational and environmental uses
on the River Witham (EA 1996b).
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Figure 3.9: The Bain-Witharn catchnient.
Licensed abstraction from surface and ground water sources in the Upper and Lower Witham are
dominated by public water supply which accounts for 11,874 tcma in the Upper and 13,790 tcma in the
Lower Witham (see table 3.5). Spray irrigation in both catchments accounts for 24% and 27% of total
licensed abstraction, which represents 6264.5 tcma in the Upper Witham and 5,400 tcma in the Lower
Witham. The level of actual abstraction varies quite significantly, with the figures for the Upper
Witham revealing the marked differences between thy and average year abstractions with spray
irrigators actually abstracting 3204 tcma in 1990, classified as a thy year, compared to 2305 tcma in
1994 an average year and underlines the potential for reallocating under- or un-utilised licences.
Rather than surveying all irrigation abstractors in the Upper and Lower Witham, analysis will focus on
two sub-units in these catchnients namely the River Bain and the River Witham.
There are a number of conflicts over access to and use of water within the River Bain. Firstly, licences
of right allowing the abstraction of surface water for spray irrigation purposes, have created particular
problems in periods of drought, leading to low river flows and concerns for the in situ river
environment. These licences do not include cessation levels, which automatically restrict abstraction
when river flows fall below a pre-defined level. In consequence, no new summer spray irrigation
licences are permitted in the Bain, and farmers are encouraged to construct on-farm water storage
reservoirs (EA 1996b). The second critical problem in the Bain concerns groundwater abstraction
from the Bain gravels, which extend along the lower reaches of the river and cover an area of 77km 2
The deposits are relatively thin and summer flows in consequence are very low, so there are strict
cessation levels on all renewable spray irrigation licences in order to prevent damage to the in situ
environment which includes a number of SSSIs. Thus, farmers are faced with high levels of uncertainty
over the reliability of water supplies and the threat of restrictions or complete bans are ever present.
The River Witham combines chalk heathland and fenland, with farmers licensed to abstract water from
the Lincoinshire Limestone aquifer and the dykes and ditches of the fenland drainage system. The
resources of the Lincolnshire Limestone are fully committed and no additional water is available for
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allocation. This aquifer has also been classified under the NRA Groundwater Protection Map, as
susceptible to pollution and already has high concentrations of nitrates, pesticides and herbicides
which exceed the limit of 50mg/i. NSA and NVZ designations fall on this aquifer and farmers are able
to adopt voluntaiy measures to reduce the threat of leaching. Surface water abstractions in the River
Witham are augmented through the transfer of water from the River Trent, which maintains flows
throughout the summer for spray irrigation abstraction. in fact, one group of farmers negotiated
collectively with the NRA to secure the transfer of additional water for abstraction in the West Fen
Drainage area, with farmers paying £1,000 for membership of the Water Transfer Company. This
represents an important collective response by farmers to the problems of unreliability of supply and
abstraction restrictions. The Rivers Witham and Bain provide critical insight into the conflicts
experienced in the allocation and regulation of abstraction water between competing users and uses.
Unreliability of abstraction supply was an established feature in these catchments, long before the
drought of 1989-92, and therefore provides key insights into how farmers respond at the farm level to
changes in the availability and reliability of water.
The three study areas are all located in the Anglian region, and all address different dimensions of the
conflict inherent in the allocation and regulation of water for use as spray irrigation. By concentrating
research in these specific areas it is possible to expose how competing actors with different interests
and values in water and the water environment, shape not only the direction of water policy at the local
level but also influence the response of the regulated to specific policy initiatives. These processes
have critical implications for the environment and by concentrating on specific catchments it is possible
to track, at the local level, the key processes perpetuating the dynamic displacement of environmental
problems from one media, time or place to another. This approach will also enable analysis to trace
the potential impact of demand management policies on inter-dependent economic and environmental
systems, exposing the unintended consequences and side effects which potentially result from policy
mtervention.
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3.3 Empirical Strate2y
The empirical strategy which developed in light of the conceptual approach outlined in section 3.1 is
necessarily complex and the work was divided into two phases. Phase one concentrated solely on
understanding the web of social relations within which farm businesses are embedded, focusing
particularly on the implications which these internal and external relations have for the management
and use of irrigation water. This necessarily requires a survey of farm businesses. The second phase of
analysis attempts to identify key agents from the State, market and social spheres of regulation who
directly and indirectly influence on-farm irrigated production, through controlling the flow of
information and capital to the farm. Interviews with these agents were supplemented with secondaiy
date sources such as company reports, NRA official reports and published statistics. The time frame in
which the empirical work was conducted may critically influence the response of individuals and firms
to questioning. The prolonged drought of 1989-92 had forced water issues onto the national political
agenda and many farmers had to critically re-evaluate their perception and valuation of water. This
survey was conducted in the aftermath of the drought, in 1994 when the "crisis" over access to, and
use of, reliable supplies of irrigation water had dissipated and was not an immediate issue for farmers
at the local level.
3.3.1 Phase one: The farm survey
The farmer is the critical point of eniry in opening up, for analysis, the complex web of State, market
and social forces of regulation which directly and indirectly impinge on their irrigation decision
making. Tracking the competing and conflicting signals which impinge on and distort irrigation
decision maldng it is possible to understand the complex processes which together influence the use
and management of irrigation water. Distinguishing three simple phases as water passes in, through
and out of the production system, enables clear identification of the dynamic processes which together
influence the transformation of 'water' as it enters and leaves the production system, revealing the
complex trade-offs which influence farmers' perception and valuation of access to and use of reliable
supplies of water. The farm survey has three primary objectives:
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(i) to focus on farmer knowledge and perception of water, water rights and the water
environment. These frameworks of understanding provide key insights into the way in
which farmers formulate and implement irrigation management strategies in response to
external forces of change;
(ii) examine the way in which State, market and social forces of regulation directly and
indirectly penetrate on-farm production decision making. Identifjing the network of
social relations principally concerned with irrigated production focuses on the form and
function of farmers' relationship with irrigation advisers, irrigation equipment manufacturers
and marketing outlets for irrigated produce. Through examining the flow of information and
capital between the farm and these external agents, it is possible to examine how these agents
directly and indirectly regulate farmers' use and management of irrigation water. The degree to
which farmers conform to, and actually incorporate, these new ways of doing things into their
own management practices is critical;
(iii) finally the survey aims to examine farmer negotiation and representation with the
NRA and Government over access to and use of reliable supplies of irrigation water.
Defming the sampling methodology is the first stage of any survey work, and the principles which
underpin this process emphases the importance of avoiding bias in the selection procedure (Moser and
Kalton 1971). The design of the sampling methodology is critically influenced by the nature of the
sample frame. Given the paucity of publicly available MAFF information on irrigation in the UK as
well as the limited number of empirical studies on irrigation by academics, potential sample frame
sources are very limited. NRA data on irrigation in the UK is limited to abstraction licence details and
no information is recorded on the crops which are actually irrigated. In consequence, it is impossible
to design a sample frame focusing solely on one commodity complex, such as irrigated potatoes or
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salad crops. In light of these problems, the target population was necessarily defmed as all agricultural
spray irrigators in the three catebment areas to enable the use, as a sample frame, of NRA licence data.
These listings record not only the name and address of all abstractors in the catchment but also
document the licence abstraction details. Thus information on the licence size (tcma), source (ground or
surface water), season (winter, summer or all year), use (industry, agriculture, spray irrigation, private
supply, PWS) and type (licence of right, renewable licence) are readily available.
There are however, a number of problems associated with the use of these listings. Firstly, an element
of variability is introduced into the sample design, as spray irngators range from potato, root crop and
dairy farmers to fruit and horticultural growers. As the EA does not record information on the actual
use of spray irrigation, it is impossible to control for this level of variability in the sample frame
design. Secondly, although the listings identify all agricultural spray irrigation licence holders in the
catchment this does not necessarily correspond with the number of actual irrigators. A number of
farmers hold onto licences, even though they don't irrigate, to enhance the land value or ensure
flexibility in future production (Rees el a! 1993). In addition the licence details are often dated and thus
it is difficult to actually trace all named licence holders. In fact Rees et a! (1993) were unable to trace
25% of licence holders identified in their sample frame. Given these problems it was decided not to
set up a strict sampling procedure either randomly selecting licence holders from the list or stratifying
the sample on the basis of the size or type of licence 8 . Instead all licence holders identified on the
NRA list were included in the sample population with the clear expectation that a proportion of licence
holders would be eliminated on the basis they were non users or were untraceable. In total 124 farms
were included in the sample frame (see table 3.6 Part A) and the target sample size was calculated as
roughly half of the sample frame population, in total 60-70 interviews across the three catchments.
8 This sampling procedure was applied in the Bain Witham catchment in the Rees eta! (1993) study. The original sample was
stratified into two groups: those who had invested in on-fann water storage facilities and a parallel set of farms who held
summer abstraction licences from surface waler sources. In total 20 were interviewed in this catchment in 1991. These
farmers were included in the 1993-4 sample population which was extended to included all agricultural spray irrigators
including ground water spray irrigators in the catchment.
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PartA	 PartB	 PartC
Sample	 Interviews	 Refusals Unable to Never	 Unable to
	
Sold Refused
Frame*	 Completed	 locate	 used	 interview in land explanation
_____________ _________ ______________ _________ __________ licence	 period	 ____________
Rain-	 51	 31	 20	 4	 8	 0	 0	 8
Witham
Lark	 43	 19	 24	 7	 7	 5	 0	 5
Thet-Little 30	 12	 18	 7	 4	 2	 2	 3
Ouse
Total	 124	 62	 62	 18	 19	 7	 2	 16
Table 3.6: Phase One sample frame and completed interviews.
* These figures differ from the number of actual spray irrigation licences allocated in the catchments, as farmers hold multiple
licences.
The second stage in the research design process concerns the choice of research tools used in the
field. A number of complex issues were pinpointed in the research objectives focussing on farmer
knowledge, perception and decision making processes in response to the conflicting signals emanating
from State, market and social forces of regulation. Clearly these issues are not amenable to simple
unequivocal answers and disentangling farmers' responses through highly structured questionnaires or
postal surveys would provide only a superficial understanding of on-farm irrigation management
practices. In consequence a review of the literature (Moser and Kalton 1971; Gilbert 1993; Bremer
1987; MushIer 1986) identified focused interviews as the most appropriate research tool, allowing in-
depth discussion of a limited number of pre-defined topics.
Focused interviews are in essence a 'guided conversation' (Lofland 1971), with a set number of topics
which the interviewer wants the respondent to talk about. The interviewer is free to phrase the question
as they wish, ask the questions in any order and probe the respondent to provide fuller explanations of
their behaviour (Fielding 1993a). An interview guide takes the place of a standard questionnaire and
sets out the topic headings which the interviewer must address. The interview guide is reproduced in
Appendix A. Eleven key topic headings were defined, including a section requiring quantitative data
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on the nature of the farm business. Key questions were outlined under each of these topic headings to
ensure some degree of comparability between respondents. Nevertheless, these only acted as a guide
or introduction to the topic area. Each interview was taped; thereby the interviewer was not distratted
by writing notes and enabled full participation in the conversation. Although this is a highly labour
intensive research method, as the tapes must subsequently be transcribed, the benefits are evident in the
rich and detailed information provided by the respondents. A diary recording the main themes from
each interview supplemented the transcripts. This proved a useful tool, building up a picture of the key
issues and themes as they emerged from the interviews.
In line with standard practice (Fowler 1988) the interview guide was piloted in the Bain-Witham
catchment, where it was administered to 6 farmers. These interviews tested the draft interview guide,
and full verbatim transcription of these interviews highlighted topic areas which needed more rigorous
probing by the interviewer. In fact, the section on the perception of water and the water environment
proved problematic, as the farmers seemed unwilling or unable to provide clear responses to
questioning, despite probing. In consequence an additional set of questions were included which
attempted to reveal indirectly farmers' perception and knowledge of water and the water environment.
These questions took the form of hypothetical scenarios, where farmers were asked to outline how
they would respond to changes introduced into their abstraction licence to protect the interests of other
water users and the water environment. This line of questioning provided a clearer response from
farmers and was included in the final interview guide.
Interviews were successfully completed with 62 farms between January and April 1994 (see table 3.6
Part B). Originally the target sample population was 70 farms; however, it was judged that the costs of
prolonging the attempt to secure additional interviews outweighed the benefits of a marginal increase
in final sample size9 . As expected a large proportion of the licence holders were untraceable'° (18 in
9 The fact that farmers themselves were becoming increasingly busy, planting potato crops etc. made it difficult to find a
convenient tune to interview, despite their willingness to participate in the survey.
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total) or never used their licence (19 in total) (see table 3.6 Part C). Significantly, seven farms in the
Bain-Witham catchment had given up irrigation since the initial survey in 1991. Interviews with these
farmers, where possible, were completed in order to gain an understanding of the combination of
factors which influenced the movement out of irrigated production.
The response of the farmers to the focused interview was positive, and only three farmers refused to
be taped. Interviews lasted on average between 60 and 90 minutes, although in some cases the
interviews lasted over 2 hours. The focused interview proved the most appropriate research tool, with
farmers willingly talking about a number of very complicated issues. Full verbatim transcriptions of all
interviews were completed before the commencement of phase two of the empirical work. This
strategy ensured full knowledge of all transcripts and enabled the identification of key questions for
the second phase of interviews.
3.3.2: The general characteristics of the farm sample.
Irrigation in the UK is primarily concentrated on the potato crop which accounts for 44% of the total
volume of water applied to crops nationally. Other vegetable crops, sugar beet, orchard fruit, soft fruit
and grassland make up the remaining area, with a marked decline in the area of irrigated grassland
occurring nationally (see figure 3.10). These trends are broadly replicated in the farm sample, where
a total of 62 interviews was completed in the three study areas, with the majority of farmers (38)
producing high value potato and vegetable crops. Of the remaining twenty four farms, two are dairy
units using irrigation to guarantee production of silage crops; three are fruit farms using irrigation to
guarantee fruit quality and yield and six produce flowers or garden plants in specialist units. The
remaining thirteen farms hold licences, but don't actually irrigate concentrating instead on their arable
and livestock enterprises, and in fact seven farms stopped irrigating in the aftermath of the drought of
1989-92.
'°Eveiy attempt was made to trace licence holders: sending additional letters; visiting the farm address; cross checking with
other interviewees in the locality.
93
	Quantity Ml	 All	 Lark	 Thet-Little	 Bain-Witham
________________ ________________ ________________ Ouse	 ________________
	
• 0-0.1	 0	 0	 0	 0
0.1-2	 4	 2	 0	 2
2-	 5	 3	 2	 1	 0
	
5- 10
	
5	 1	 0	 4
	
10- 25	 11	 2	 1	 8
	
25- 50
	
11	 2	 1	 8
	
50-100	 9	 2	 3	 4
	
100-150	 4	 1	 1	 2
	
150-200	 7	 2	 3	 2
	
200-500	 7	 5	 2	 0
	
500-1000	 2	 0	 1	 1
n	 62	 19	 12	 31
Sum	 6761.63	 2187.9	 2191.1	 2090.79
Mean	 109.06	 115.15	 182.5	 67.44
Table 3.7: Total licensed Quantity (me2alitres)
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The total licensed quantity of water allocated to farmers in the sample averages 109.06 megalitres and
ranges form a low of 0.1 megalitres to a high of 841.5 megalitres (see table 3.7). There are marked
differences between the three study areas, with 58% of farms in the Thet-Little Ouse licensed to
abstract over 100 megalitres of water, compared to 42% in the Lark and only 16% in the Barn-
Witham, where farms are concentrated in the 10-100 size band. Unsurprisingly, there is a marked
difference between the licensed and actual quantity of water used, reflecting the under- or non-
	
Quantity Ml	 Licensed Abstraction	 Actual Abstraction
zero	 0	 13
	
0.1-2	 4	 3
	
2-	 5	 3	 3
	
5-	 10	 5	 6
	
10-	 25	 11	 10
	
25-	 50	 11	 4
	
50- 100	 9	 11
	
100- 150	 4	 5
	
150- 200	 7	 3
	
200- 500	 7	 3
	
500- 1000	 2	 1
__________________________	 62	 62
Table 3.8 : Licensed and Actual Abstraction (mealifres).
utiuisation of water resources in the three study areas (see table 3.8). In fact a total of 13 farms do not
use their licences and have not done so for a number of years. Water resources are also under-utilised
with farmers rarely using in excess of 70% of their licence in drought years. This in part reflects
rotational restrictions, changes in the cropping pattern and the overestimation of water requirement
included in the initial licence applications, and underlines the significant potential for the reallocation
of water to alternative users and uses.
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Part A: Licence Type
	 _________
Licence of Right only	 15
Renewable licence only	 16
Licence of Right and Renewable licence 	 31
Part B: Licence Season	 _________
Winter only Licence 	 6
Summer only Licence	 37
Winter and Summer Licence	 19
Part C: Reservoirs	 _________
None	 37
One	 19
Two	 4
Three	 2
Table 3.9: Licence details.
The sample is split equally between multiple and single licence holders, with a total of 15 farms
holding licences of right and an additional 16 holding a combination of licences of right and renewable
licences (see table 3.9 Part A). In fact, of farms holding only renewable licences, 12 have invested in
winter storage facilities as they attempt to improve on the reliability of summer abstraction licences.
Nevertheless, only 25 farms in total have invested in a reliable supply of water by constructing winter
storage facilities and, of these, 22 are located in the Bain-Witham and only 3 in the Lark catchment.
These differences can be partly explained by two simple points. Firstly, farmers in the Bain-Witham
study area abstract primarily from surface water sources which routinely suffer from low flow levels in
the summer months, thus unreliability of abstraction supply is an established feature of the growing
season. In contrast, farmers in the Thet-Little Ouse and Lark are reliant on abstraction from ground
water sources. Unreliability of abstraction supply has not been perceived as a problem by the farmers
themselves, and the drought of 1989-92 was the first time they experienced formal abstraction bans.
Secondly, the topography and geology of Lincolnshire favour the construction of cheap reservoirs. In
fact 7 farmers in the Bain-Witham have been able to construct reservoirs in conjunction with sand and
gravel extraction companies, where in return for the commercial rights to the sand and gravel, the
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extraction company agrees to ensure the excavated pit is suitable for on-farm water storage. The flat,
sand land which predominates in the Lark and Thet-Little Ouse catchments provides few cheap, natural
reservoir sites and thus farmers have to rely on rubber lined reservoirs which are significantly more
expensive.
Farm size varies quite dramatically across the sample, from units of less than 5 hectares to large estates
approaching 5,000 hectares (see table 3.10). However, caution should be exercised when interpreting
these figures, as small land holdings often represent highly water intensive horticultural units, and in
fact the six units producing flowers and plants are all less than 10 hectares and when these units are
excluded, the average farm size is 472.7 hectares. Break-down of the sample into the three study areas
reveals marked differences in size, with farms in the Lark catchment averaging 189.52 hectares, while
in the Bain-Witham the average size is 551.61 hectares, and these differences are partly explained by
the presence of large estates covering more than 2,500 hectares in the Lincoinshire study area. Land
ownership predominates in the sample, with less than 5,500 hectares actually rented under formal
tenancy agreements (see table 3.11). Despite this, in the Lark and Thet-Little Ouse catchments, renting
out land under formal and informal agreements accounts for 1800 hectares, reflecting the local market
for rental of sand land with water rights attached (see section 6.1.4 for full details).
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Part A:
	 All Farms	 Lark	 Thet- Little Bain-
Farm Size
	 Ouse	 Witham
(ha)	 ____________ ____________ ____________ ___________
	
0- 5
	 5	 2	 0	 3
	
5- 10
	 1	 1	 0	 0
	
10- 50
	 7	 4	 1	 2
	
50- 150	 12	 3	 1	 8
	
150- 250	 10	 4	 4	 2
	
250- 500	 11	 3	 2	 6
	
500-1000	 10	 2	 1	 7
1000-1500	 2	 0	 1	 1
1500-2500	 1	 0	 1	 0
2500-5000	 3	 0	 1	 2
62	 19	 12	 31
Sum	 26516.7	 3,601.2	 5815.5	 17,100.11
Mean	 427.68	 189.53	 484.62	 551.61
Part B:Total All Farms	 Lark	 Thet- Little Barn-
irrigated	 Ouse	 Witham
area (ha)
	
0- 5	 16	 4	 2	 10
	
5- 10
	 1	 0	 0	 1
	
10- 25	 12	 4	 0	 8
	
25- 50	 14	 6	 4	 4
	50- 75	 4	 0	 0	 4
	
75- 100
	
5	 1	 2	 2
100- 150	 6	 2	 3	 1
150- 250	 2	 2	 0	 0
250- 500	 0	 0	 0	 0
500-1000	 1	 0	 0	 1
1000-1500	 1	 0	 1	 0
n	 62	 19	 12	 31
Sum	 3305.5	 770.7	 1545.7	 989.4
Mean	 53.31	 40.5	 128.1	 31.91
%ofTUA	 66.11%	 21%	 21%	 5.7%
Table 3.10: Farm size and total irri2ate4j area.
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hectares
Area Owned
Area rented in formal
Total
Area rented out formal
Area rented out informal
Sub total
Total utillsed area
of which
arable
Horticulture I fruit
Permanent pasture
Remainder buildings, roads, woods
22839.41
5382.20
28221.61
1214.10
534.44
26473.07
25903.74
24049.33
163.59
1690.86
569.28
Table 3.11: Land tenure and land allocation.
42 farms grow potatoes which total 1491.6 hectares and account for 46.6% of the total irrigated area
(see table 3.12). Root vegetables, namely carrots and parsnips, are the second and third largest irrigated
crops representing 17.2% and 16% of the total irrigated area respectively and are wholly concentrated
in the Lark and Thet-Little Ouse study areas. Onion and broccoli, both high value crops, are also
entirely under irrigation and make up 7% and 5% of the total irrigated area. Irrigation of orchard and
soft fruit crops is concentrated on just three enterprises in the Lark catchment, and the entire area of
apples, pears and soft fruit are irrigated, although not for frost protection. Flowers are grown on three
farms, where they make up 12.4 hectares and are also concentrated in the Lark catchment. These three
enterprises grow a variety of flowers including Statice and Sweet William which are all irrigated. The
final irrigated crop is forage maize, which is grown for silage feed on the two daiiy farms in the
sample and these farmers have both switched into maize production, rather than irrigating grassland, as
it is tolerant to drought conditions. Thus, none of the farmers irrigate grass, reflecting the national
decline in the area irrigated.
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Total area	 Total area	 Proportion	 Proportion of
irrigated	 crop area	 total irrigated
________________ ________________ ________________ irrigated	 area
Early potatoes	 269.12 (8)	 269.12	 100%	 8.3%
Main potatoes	 1222.52 (35)	 1222.52	 100%	 38.0%
Apples	 113.70 (3)	 113.70	 100%	 4.0%
Pears	 23.31 (2)	 23.31	 100%	 0.7%
Soft fruit	 5.53 (3)	 5.53	 100%	 0.1%
Bulbs	 8.90 (2)	 8.90	 100%	 0.2%
Flowers	 12.14 (3)	 12.14	 100%	 0.4%
Broccoli	 162.00 (1)	 162.00	 100%	 5.0%
Carrots	 556.65 (7)	 556.65	 100%	 17.2%
Leeks	 14.97 (2)	 14.97	 100%	 0.46%
Onions	 233.10 (11)	 233.10	 100%	 7.0%
Parsnips	 517.61 (3)	 517.61	 100%	 16.0%
Sugar beet	 3433.00 (44)	 0
Beans	 383.47 (7)	 0
Peas	 1394.86 (14)	 0
Springbarley	 1581.95 (16)	 0
Winterbarley	 2557.86(25)	 0
Spring wheat	 40.47 (2)	 0
Winter wheat	 7881.44 (45)	 0
Linseed	 966.66 (18)	 0
Oats	 44.11 (4)	 0
OSR	 1671.91 (14)	 0
Forage maize
	
84.98 (2)
	 84.98	 100%	 2.6%
Grass lays	 1033.46 (15)	 0
Permanent	 1690.86 (14)	 0
pasture
Total	 25903.74	 3224.53	 12.43%	 100%
Table 3.12: Cro p allocation (hectares)
Surprisingly, none of the farms in the sample irrigate sugar beet, which totals 3433.0 hectares and is
grown by 44 farmers. Nationally, sugar beet makes up 9.7% of the total irrigated area in reported 1993
MAFF statistics, and 16.5% of the total irrigated area in Rees et al's study in 1993. The non-irrigation
of this crop marks a significant change, and a number of factors have contributed to this. Firstly, and
perhaps most importantly, the drought experience of 1989-92 forced farmers to re-evaluate their use of
irrigation and reserve water, traditionally used on sugar beet for other high value crops. Secondly, in
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the Lark and Thet-Little Ouse catchments the spread of the Risamania" disease and the possible
linkage with irrigation, has critically influenced farmers and encouraged them to stop irrigation of the
crop in order to ensure against the incidence of the disease. Thus, specific local problems in
combination with water restrictions have led to a significant reduction in the area of sugar beet irrigated
in the three catchments.
The marketing of irrigated produce varies, depending on the actual crop. The flower and plant
producers either sell directly through the wholesale markets in Birmingham and London or through
local market traders; while the fruit producers sell primarily through co-ops, although a small
percentage is marketed through pick your own and farm shop enterprises. These producers are not
involved in complex marketing relationships with the down-stream food network, and are wholly
reliant on the free market, with no forward contracts or price guarantees. in contrast, the producers of
potatoes and other vegetables, a total of 38 farms, are involved in complex and multi-various inter-
relationships with the downstream food network, incorporating forward contract and free market
production.
3.3.3 Phase two:- survey of actors in the irrigated production network.
Phase one interviews identified the network of social relations, specifically related to irrigated
production within which the farm families were embedded. These interviews expose the way in which
agents from off the farm directly and indirectly regulate on-farm irrigation decision making. The
second phase of empirical work primarily concentrates on building up a picture of the processes of
interaction between the State, market and social forces of regulation, within which farmers are
embedded. Focusing primarily on the perspective of key actors from these spheres of regulation, the
analysis aims to understand the mechanisms through which they directly and indirectly regulate on-
farm production decision making, and gain an understanding of the relations of power which link
"A viral disease which primarily affects sugar beet Once diagnosed, the farmer is prevented from growing sugar beet and
other root crops for up to three years.
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actors in a complex irrigated production network. Interviews are focused at two levels. Firstly, key
actors in the local network of social relations are pinpointed for interview, as these actors directly
influence on-farm irrigation decision making through direct face to face contact, and include local NFU
and CLA representatives, as well as representatives from local produce marketing companies, irrigation
equipment manufacturers and irrigation advice bureaux. These actors are linked into the networks of
regional and national actors and so the second level of analysis focuses on regional NFU and CLA
representatives as well as regional and national processing and marketing outlets for irrigated produce,
irrigation equipment manufacturers and irrigation advice bureaux.
The survey had three primary aims:
(i) to understand the way in which external agents enrol and control farmers in a network of
social relations.flow do they directly and indirectly control the production and consumption
decision making of not only farmers but other agents in the food network?
(ii) to explore the dynamic process of interaction with farmers. What strategies are developed
by these agents to directly and indirectly regulate on-farm irrigated production?
(iii) to examine these actors' knowledge and perception of water and the water
environment.What is their understanding of the problems posed both for on-farm production
and the water environment by unreliability of water supply?
The sampling strategy for this phase of work was not tightly structured and relied on the
identification, by farmers in phase one, of key agents in the network of social relations who directly
and indirectly influence on-farm irrigated production. Prior to the commencement of the empirical
work it was assumed that irrigation advisers, irrigation manufacturers and marketing outlets for
irrigated produce would play a significant role. In reality however, the picture was somewhat different,
with limited contact between farmers, irrigation advisers and irrigation equipment manufacturers'2.
Nevertheless, representatives from the food processing and packing industries proved critical, directly
and indirectly regulating on-farm irrigated production through the specification of strict produce
12 fl.j in part reflects the low level of technological innovation in irrigation equipment manufacture in the UK, with the hose
reel irrigator predominating on farms.
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quality criteria for potatoes and root vegetables, the predominant irrigated crops in the farm sample.
Twenty three companies were identified as the principal marketing outlet for irrigated produce (see
Table 3.13 Part A), with a cross section of crisp manufacturers, potato merchants and frozen vegetable
manufacturers. The sample frame does not claim to be representative of the whole LTK potato and root
vegetable market, but instead provides a window on, or snap shot of, the way in which regional,
national and international food processors and marketing companies interact with not only other
companies in the network but critically farmers at the local level.
Once again focused interviews were considered the most appropriate research tool, enabling detailed
exploration of a limited number of issues. The interview schedules for companies identified in the
irrigated production network cover seven key topic headings, with the emphasis varying depending on
the nature of the company and its relationship with farmers at the local level. Topic headings covered
the structure of the company; produce quality criteria; contract production; land rental; research and
development; water resource management issues, and finally future options. All interviews were
taped, and immediate full verbatim transcription ensured that the line of questioning was constantly
under review so additional issues could be pursued in subsequent interviews if necessary.
PART A: Sample frame 	 PART B: Completed
____________________________ ____________________________ interviews
Potato crisp companies	 3	 3
Potato chip companies 	 2	 2
Potato merchants	 5	 -
Potato packhouse	 5	 5
Vegetable processor 	 4	 -
Vegetable packhouse	 4	 3
Supermarket	 2	 2
Sub Total	 25	 15
Local NFU and CLA
	
6	 5
Regional NFU and CLA	 2	 2
Farmer Groups
	
8	 8
Environmental Groups
	
5	 2
TOTAL	 46	 32
Table 3.13: Phase two sample frame and completed interviews.
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The point of contact in the processing and marketing companies were mdividuals identified by the
fanners, and in all cases they were based in either the agronomy or raw material procurement
departments. Initially it was planned to conduct parallel sets of interviews with these individuals as
well as with personnel in the product development and marketing departments. These departments
were considered critical to the development of new products, as they were perceived as the key agents
setting the product quality criteria which the agronomy and raw material procurement personnel then
worked to. However, this path of investigation was closed as the agronomy and raw material
procurement personnel refused to provide contact names in the other departments. Nevertheless, the
interviewees were fully aware of the key requirements which the product development and marketing
personnel demanded and provided insight into the dynamic interaction between the two departments.
In all, fifteen interviews were completed (see Table 3.13, Part B). Of these, ten were concerned solely
with potato processing and marketing and included the dominant crisp and chip manufacturers in the
UK and European markets. However, gaining access to the potato merchant sector proved difficult.
None of the identified companies agreed to be interviewed, claiming constraints of time or no interest
in the subject area. Nevertheless, interviews with the potato co-ops and commercial pack houses
identified the key supennarket personnel responsible for the procurement of potatoes. A further two
interviews were therefore conducted with supermarket personnel, thus tracking the potato from the
farmers' field to the supermarket shelf. Three root vegetable pack houses agreed to be interviewed,
reflecting the dominance in the Suffolk and Norfolk study areas of just four companies. Financial and
time constraints influenced the decision not to contact the frozen vegetable manufacturers who were
both located in Scotland. Thus the root vegetable network concentrates solely on the fresh market.
Phase one interviews identified the role and significance of NFU and CLA representatives in
negotiations and representations with the NRA over access to and use of irrigation water. Local
representatives from the NFU and CLA were easily identified for each catchment area, with six
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individuals identified at the local level (see table 3.13 Part A). Nevertheless, in two research areas
these representatives were by-passed in negotiations with the NRA, with the formation durmg the
1989-92 drought of farmer water groups. The breakdown of this traditional pathway of farmer
negotiation was considered significant and thus an additional eight individuals from the water groups
were pinpointed for interview.
In total five interviews were completed with local representatives from the NFU and CLA, which were
supplemented by two further interviews with regional NFU representatives who held specific
responsibility for spray irrigation issues. Interviews were also successfully completed with five
representatives from the Lark Valley Abstractors group and three representatives from the Peddars
way group in the Thet-Little Ouse catchment (see table 3.13 Part B). In order to contextualise the
nature of the conflict in these two catchments during the 1989-92 drought, interviews with local
environmental groups in the Lark and Thet-Little Ouse were considered important. Despite contacting
local Friends of the Earth, Council for the Protection of Rural England and Royal Society for the
Protection of Birds groups, no representatives were willing to be interviewed. Thus representatives
from the Norfolk - Suffolk Wildlife Trust and the Brecks Couniiyside project were interviewed
reflecting their importance in setting the local agenda on water abstraction and pollution issues.
3.4 The analysis and presentation of data
The analysis of the rich and detailed information which emerged from the empirical work posed a
number of complex questions which focused on both practical and methodological issues. The sample
size is not large enough to support detailed statistical analysis of sub-groups of the sample, and thus no
attempt will be made to establish causal relationships between farmer types and irrigation use. Instead,
the analysis concentrates on identifying the key characteristics among the sample in relation to farmer
knowledge, use and management of irrigation water and the water environment. Initially, the primary
focus of concern are the practicalities of managing and organising the different data sources. The
interview transcripts themselves combine quantitative and qualitative data which are supplemented by
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NRA statistics on licensed abstraction in the three catchments; MAFF parish data on agriculture in the
three areas; as well as company reports, statistics and fact sheets. This morass of detailed information
requires an orgamsational framework to ensure both the qualitative and quantitative sources
complement and enrich the analysis.
The first step in organising the farm survey transcripts focus specifically on the quantitative data,
which cover the nature of the farm business; water sources; irrigation equipment and investment
levels. This information is recorded on individual sumniaty cards and then transferred to a spread
sheet package (Lotus 123). This provides summary statistics on the nature of the farm sample and
enables the generation of gross margin values and opportunity cost analysis of expenditure on water
storage and irrigation equipment (see Appendix B for full details of methods employed). These figures
provide a crude measure of the value in use of irrigation water and an indication of the willingness of
farmers to pay for reliability of abstraction supply. Nevertheless, quantitative data form only a fifth of
the farm survey transcripts and the management and analysis of the vast bulk of qualitative material
requires a more imaginative system of organisation.
The analysis of qualitative data proves much more problematic than quantitative data, with no
standardised methods and procedures of analysis, let alone clear guidelines on linking qualitative and
quantitative data (Mason 1994). Two objectives shaped the development of the qualitative analysis.
Firstly, the data must be easily accessible and manipulable to prevent time consuming sorting and
resorting of transcripts. Secondly, the analysis must not get lost in the minutiae of farm management
practices and must be firmly linked to and generate theoretical concepts and questions. Full verbatim
transcription of all interviews were placed on the word processor, ensuring flexibility and easy
manipulation of the text through the cut and paste function.
The literature on qualitative analysis emphasises the importance of developing descriptive and
analytical categories to organise and classify the information (Mason 1994; Strauss 1987). This
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necessitates searching through the transcripts for themes in order to develop categories which can then
be used to index or code the data. Each paragraph of the transcript is then coded and placed in the
appropriate computer file or filing cabinet folder. Numerous studies have documented how labour
intensive and tedious this procedure is, often generating a mass of files and sub files (Porter 1994)
plotting the key relationships emerging from the data.
Applying this approach to the farm survey transcripts, the analysis focuses firstly on the identification
of key themes and relationships emerging under each of the ten topic headings. In all, twenty
transcripts are initially categorised and the codes evaluated. On the basis of this, a code book recording
all variables under each question is developed and this is then applied across all 62 farms. The next
stage tests the nature of the relationship between categories, for example what form of irrigation
application advice did farmers receive, was this related in any way to the farm size, marketing outlet or
reliability of abstraction supply? Generating answers to this type of questioning can be time
consuming, but is essential in identifying the key themes and theoretical questions for analysis. In
consequence, descriptive categories under each of the ten transcript topic headings are given numerical
codes and inputted onto the Lotus 123 spread sheet file holding the farm survey quantitative data This
enables the transfer of the file for use on the DBASE STATS package which apart from generating
standard statistics also calculates two and three way cross-tabulations. Thus the data can easily be
grouped and re-grouped, identifying the key areas of conflict and variation in the data. This provides a
wholly descriptive account of the farm sample and identifies a series of theoretical questions which
provide the starting point for further analysis of the transcripts.
This second stage of the analysis concentrates on the generation of conceptual categories and the
identification of cross sectional themes. Five key questions are the starting point for analysis and
concentrate on:
108
(1) the externalisation of irrigation decision making;
(2) contract farming and the redefinition of the land-water relationship;
(3) changing nature of marketing relationships;
(4) changing knowledge and perception of water, water rights and drought;
(5) corporati sin, negotiation and representation over access to and use of reliable supplies
of irrigation water.
Using the cut and paste function on the word processor, relevant sections from each transcript are
brought together in one file, clearly labelling the excerpts home address. This enables detailed
exploration of conflict and variation in the data, while allowing easy access to the original transcript
and summary card to contextualise the information. This is vital as it is wrong to assume all responses
are equally valid and relevant. The fact that individual responses are influenced by a number of factors
specifically related to that situation - such as the location of interview, the style of interviewing, who
made the response and how they interpreted the question - must be considered in the analysis of the
answer. This stage of the analysis concentrated on the detailed exploration of conflict and variation in
the data and drew together a number of cross sectional themes and categorisations. Central to this are
the concepts of risk and uncertainty, which emerge as key concepts in the analysis.
The results from the analysis of the farm survey are presented in Chapter Six, where a number of
different presentational forms are mixed together. Tables and basic statistics on particular dimensions
of the farm sample are used throughout the text, and case studies are also developed to provide insight
into the dynamics of on-farm irrigation decision making, focusing particularly on the influence of
actors from the irrigation production network. These case studies are chosen to represent the range of
strategies found in the sample as a whole, and are exemplars of the dynamics influencing farm
irrigation development. Detailing these as case studies enables examination of the combination of
factors which influence fanner behaviour and traces the influence of State, market and social forces of
regulation at the farm level. The other style of presentation is direct quotes from the farmer interviews,
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which are used throughout the text to highlight particular points in the argument; however false names
are used in order to protect the anonymity of the respondent.
Analysis of the interview transcripts from phase two adopts the same key principles. Nevertheless, the
fact that interviews range across a number of distinctively different actors means the use of the
computer spread sheet and statistics package are limited, as the sample size is too small to provide
statistically significant results. This is not considered a problem, as the data provide key insights into
how particular actors come together in particular places, and interact with and regulate, farmers' use
and management of irrigation at the local level. Once again the key themes are identified in the
transcripts and are used to build up case studies. Plotting the key linkages which tie potato and root
vegetable processing and marketing companies into networks provides insight into the dynamics of
network enrolment and control at a distance. The construction of flow diagrams establishes the form
and function of these inter-firm relationships and ultimately with farmers.
Once again quotes from the transcripts are used throughout the text and company names are changed to
ensure anonymity. Analysis of the irrigation production network is presented in two chapters. Chapter
Five focuses on the network of market relations concerned with irrigated potatoes and root vegetables.
Case studies are used to identifj the form and function of companies relationships with one another
and the implications this has for on-farm irrigation management practices. Analysis of the social
forces of regulation is presented in Chapter Six, where once again case studies are used to explore the
dynamic process of farmer negotiation and representation over access to and use of reliable supplies of
irrigation water.
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Figure 3.11: The network of social relalions traced in the empirical anal ysis of the
agriculture-water interface
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3.5: Conclusion.
The application of the interface-network methodology to analysis of the agriculture-water interface
exposes the network of social relations within which farmers at the local level are embedded. The
complex and dynamic processes of interaction were revealed through the empirical strategy, which
tracked farmers' inter-relationship with the NRA; NFU, CLA and produce marketing outlets to gauge
the power and influence of these State, market and social forces of regulation over irrigation decision
making. Figure 3.10 documents the form and function of these inter-relationships, and exposes the
pathway of inter-linkages followed in the interviews. These inter-relationships are not simple or linear
as the off-farm finns, state agencies and farmer representative groups are themselves incorporated into
intricate inter-firm or inter-agency relationships. Through tracking the form and function of these inter-
relationships, the analysis is able to build up a picture of the relations of power and dependence which
critically shape interaction with farmers at the local level. In fact it is possible to distinguish three
distinctive networks related to the NRA; NFU and produce marketing outlets which intersect at the
agriculture-water interface. As figure 3.10 reveals there is only limited interaction between the down-
stream food network, NRA and farmer representative groups, while there is close contact between the
NRA and farmer representative groups as they negotiate over access to, and use of reliable supplies of
irrigation water. Thus farmers, who are the focal point of these disparate networks, are forced to
negotiate on three different levels and the analysis in the succeeding chapters will explore the actual
nature of these inter-relationships and the implications for the use and management of irrigation water
and the water environment.
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CHAPTER FOuR
STATE INTERVENTION AT THE AGRICULTURE-WATER INTERFACE: THE
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
The dual processes of regulatory restructuring and de/reregulation have played a central role
reshaping the form and function of state intervention throughout the 1980s and 1990s in both the
water and agricultural sectors. Chapter One sketched out a broad outline of these dynamic
processes of change, focusing in particular on the implications of regulatory restructuring and
dissonance for environmental policy and the quest for sustainable development. This chapter will
further develop these central arguments by concentrating on the detailed analysis of the political,
institutional and administrative factors shaping the design and implementation of State policy at the
agriculture-water interface. In addressing these issues, this chapter will draw on the postulates set
out in Chapter Two, relating specifically to the state failure thesis and political science critique of
the environmental policy process. These postulates contend that inappropriate state intervention
perpetuates the dynamic displacement of environmental problems from one media, time or place to
another (Janicke 1990; Andersen 1994), and that asymmetrical bargaining power; the legacy of the
past system of regulation and administrative constraints critically distort all stages of the
environmental policy process (O'Riordan 1976; Weale 1992; Rees 1990; Majone 1989; Downs
1967).
In order to explore the relevance and applicability of these arguments, the chapter is divided into
three sections. The first section will concentrate on the detailed scrutiny of the institutional
framework governing the allocation and regulation of water in the UK. This will examine the past
and present role of vested interests in shaping the direction of water abstraction policy and the
legislative and administrative constraints within which the water regulators operate. The
implications of these processes for the allocation and regulation of water for use as spray irrigation
and the water environment will be clearly distinguished. The second section will then move on to
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examine the key forces shaping the future direction of water policy. The analysis will examine
whether inappropriate state intervention in fact undermines integration of the environment into
policy, by charting the shift in emphasis away from supply to demand management policies. This
realignment of policy marks an important turning point, and the analysis in the third section will
explore the specific implications of these policy measures for spray irrigation use. The analysis will
set out how the principles of demand management translate into policy, and the critical barriers
which, in reality, will undermine the efficiency and efficacy of these policy initiatives in the
agricultural sector.
4.1: The or2anisational framework 2overnin2 water re2ulation in the UK.
The development of a discrete institi.itional or legislative framework which concentrates solely on
the allocation and regulation of water for use as spray irrigation has, to date, failed to emerge in the
UK. In fact the reality is far more complex, as the regulation of spray irrigation use is inextricably
intertwined with the other users and uses of water. It is vital therefore, to examine this wider
context, to explore how the legislative and institutional constraints within which the regulators
operate, influence the allocation and regulation of irrigation water. The analysis will concentrate on
the detailed examination of the key players involved in the regulation of water use, namely the
National Rivers Authority (NRA) latterly the Environment Agency, and the Office of Water
Services (OFWAT), and will identify the fmancial, legal and administrative constraints which
critically circumscribe their ability to effectively manage water supply and demand in the UK.
In the aftermath of the privatisation of the Water Companies in 1989, the organisational framework
governing the regulation of water altered dramatically with the creation of the National Rivers
Authority (NRA) and the Director General of Water Services (OFWAT). These organisations in
combination with the Department of the Environment have core responsibility for the regulation of
water. The EU also exerts an increasingly powerful influence particularly through the Water Quality
and Urban Waste Water Directives, which will be reinforced by the proposed Framework
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Directive on Water Resources. The regulatory framework governing the water sector is
complicated, and although the wide dispersal of regulatory powers, insures against the possibility of
regulatory capture by vested interests, it could lead to competition between regulators and the
possibility that the regulated play off one regulator against another.
The division of responsibilities between the core regulators were set out in the 1989 Water Act
which was subsequently consolidated into the Water Industry Act 1991 and the Water Resources
Act 1991. The Director General of OFWAT has primary responsibility for ensuring that:
. water and sewerage functions are properly carried out throughout England and Wales;
• undertakers are able (in particular, by securing reasonable returns on their capital) to
finance the proper carrying out of these functions.
The NRA, in contrast, is an independent statutory body with responsibility for:
• river quality and the quality of inland and coastal waters;
• land drainage and flood control;
• management of water resources;
• fisheries;
• recreation and conservation;
• navigation;
• licensing of abstraction water;
• independently monitoring river quality and discharges from sewage treatment plants.
In 1996, the NRA merged with Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP), the waste
regulation authorities and some functions of the DoE to form a new Environment Agency which is
a non-departmental public body sponsored by the DoE which takes over responsibility for the core
water management functions. These bodies are all under the overall responsibility of the Secretary
of State for the Environment (and for Wales, the Welsh Office) who has ultimate responsibility for
steering policy change.
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4.1.1: The National Rivers Authority (NRA)'.
The wide breadth of the NRAs responsibilities reflects the integrated or holistic approach which is
central to the management and development of water resources in the UK. This approach demands
that the quality and quantity of ground and surface waters are dealt with in an integrated manner.
Hence, with respect to its water resource management function the NRA aimed
". .to manage water resources in order to achieve the right balance between the needs
of the environment and those of abstractors" (NRA 1995b p32)
In the discharge of this duty, the NRA had four main tools: abstraction licensing, abstraction
charging, catchment planning and resource management agreements. There are however, a number
of legal and administrative constraints associated with these management tools which have built up
over time and significantly distort and undermine the design and implementation of water policy.
1. Abstraction Licences.
The 1963 Water Resources Act introduced the abstraction licensing scheme into the UK and
effectively transferred the function of water allocation from common law to the River Authorities.
The licensing system was primarily designed to exert control over water usage, and anyone taking
in excess of 5,000 litres of water a year, from ground or surface water sources, had to obtain a
licence specifying the location, time period and maximum quantity and rate of abstraction..
Nevertheless, the framing of the original legislation created and perpetuated a number of legal,
environmental, financial and administrative problems which undermine the ability of the NRA to
effectively discharge its duty.
The 1963 Act established permanent or licences of right which were granted to anyone bo c1ained
to have abstracted water during the previous 5 years. The licensed quantity of water was ea1jttater4
on the basis of abstraction usage during this period and as the River Authorities had no means of
Merged into the Environment Agency from 1 April 1996. During the period this researrh
	 c iurtrd. t 'as Lei
as the NRA.
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knowing accurately what this quantity was, the licence entitlements were effectively established by
the abstractors themselves (Rees 1978). Licences of nght were allocated to water undertakers,
farmers and industrialists with little consideration for the impact on the water environment. In
consequence the sum total of water allocated in these licences was, in some cases, greater than the
available flow in the surface or ground water resource, particularly in periods of drought. Thus, low
river flow levels and dehydrated wetlands are a direct consequence of the historical development of
the licensing system, as the authorities failed to recognise and integrate the needs of the
environment into the licensing system. Abstraction by public water supply companies holding
licences of right, have a particularly negative impact on the water environment given the size and
rate of their abstraction. Nevertheless, as licences of right do not come up for renewal, the NRA
was unable to introduce stricter controls on abstraction. Renewable licences, in contrast, came into
operation from 1969 and are renewed every 5-10 years, thus the licensing authority is able to amend
licences in order to introduce stricter controls, such as cessation levels.
The abstraction licence does not guarantee the supply of water, nor is it wholly reliable, as under
drought conditions the licensing authority can impose restrictions. Spray irrigation licence holders
are subject, under section 45 of the 1963 Water Resources Act and consolidated in section 73 of
the 1991 Water Resources Act, to temporary restrictions on abstraction which deny abstraction
altogether or reduce the amount taken. The licensing authorities can themselves introduce these
controls without having to revert to Drought Orders issued by the Secretary of State for the
Environment. In consequence spray irrigation licence holders are vulnerable, in less extreme
conditions, to the imposition of controls. In contrast, controls on Water Company and industrial
usage are subject to special drought orders, issued by the Secretary of State for the Environment.
Under section 73 of the 1991 Water Resources Act, a Water Company can apply to the Secretary of
State for a drought order which can authorise:
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• further restrictions by a Water Company on non-essential uses of water such as garden
watering with hose pipes or filling of swimming pools or ornamental ponds, in order to
conserve supplies for more important uses;
• abstractions of more water from surface or ground water sources than would otherwise be
allowed;
• temporary use of water sources from which abstraction has not been licensed; or
• reductions in the amount of water that would otherwise be released from a river to maintain
river flows.
As the licensing authority, the NRA had an advisory role, while power to implement an order rests
solely with the Secretary of State. Although the NRA, in practice, was consulted on the likely
impact on water resources, the environment and other abstractors, there were no statutory
provisions to consider the impact on the environment, nor balance the needs of the Water Company
against the environmental damage resulting from further abstraction. The problems associated with
this approach were starkly revealed in the drought of 1995, when Yorkshire Water applied for 30
drought orders over a six month period to control domestic and industrial consumption. In fact,
Water Companies have reverted to drought orders in six out of the last eight years and their use is a
standard measure to control demand. These measures however, were originally designed for use in
exceptional periods and not for use as routine measures resorted to as a matter of course to control
demand or increase supplies. In fact, under drought conditions, the NRA is unable to effectively
protect the in situ water environment as they rarely advise against Drought Orders, given the third
constraint within which they operate (see below).
The second critical constraint focuses on the power of the licensing authorities to revoke unused
licences or to decrease the entitlement in situations where actual consumption is well below
authorised levels. In reality, the NRA and its predecessor the RWA, rarely exercised this right as
the licensing authority must pay financial compensation to the licensee for any loss of capital assets,
land value, or income flow from the land caused by the withdrawal of water. The compensation
payable to Water Companies subject to licence revocation would be very high, although these costs
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could be recouped through an increase in abstraction licence payments. However, these costs would
ultimately be passed onto the consumer through increased water prices and thus political realities
have to date prevented the actual revocation of licences.
The third constraint within which the licensing authorities operate, is the statutory duty laid down in
the 1963 Water Act, which stipulates that public water suppliers provide supplies to	 their
customers. This has been interpreted to mean constraints cannot be imposed on abstractions by
water undertakings, and underpined the NRA's relationship with the Water Companies. The NRA
was required by the 1991 Water Resources Act to have particular regard to the statutory duties of
the water supply companies. Thus, the NRA had to ensure the Water Companies could provide
"adequate" quantities of water to their customers. Clearly, this had critically important implications
for NRA licensing policy, as they must effectively grant all Water Company applications for new
licences or drought orders regardless of the environmental impact.
2. Abstraction charging
The 1963 Water Resources Act also introduced the principle of payment for water and in April
1969 the regional charging schemes came into operation. This scheme firmly established the
guiding principles of abstraction charging which underpined the regional NRA charging schemes.
Abstraction charges were calculated on the basis of the total quantity of licensed water and all
abstractor groups, with the exception of spray irrigators, were charged an annual figure which varied
in relation to the source, period and use of abstraction water. Spray irrigation licence holders are the
exception to this general mie as it was considered inequitable to charge for the full licensed quantity
if irrigators were subject to abstraction restrictions under section 45 of the 1963 Water Act. In
consequence, most spray irrigators are charged on a two part tariff, whereby they pay for 50% of
their licensed abstraction at the start of the season and remaining payment is dependent on their
actual consumption in the season. Thus, spray irrigators normally only pay the full licensed quantity
charge in years when their actual usage reaches the full entitlement.
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LI Megalitre	 Anglian	 Midlands	 Southern
Summer, irri*	 £22.54	 £14.97	 £16.91
Winter, irri*	 £ 2.25	 £ 1.50	 £ 1.69
Industry*	 £ 8.45	 £ 5.61	 £ 6.34
Water Company	 £69.62	 £62.90	 £52.10
metered unit charge
Table 4.1: Regional abstraction char2es 1996-7 (LIML).
* Calculated on the basis of unsupported sources, otherwise figures vaiy significantly.
The charges levied under the abstraction charging scheme are minimal and rarely have an impact on
water using behaviour (Rees and Williams 1993). Under the NRA abstraction scheme industrialists
in the Anglian region paid £8.45/ML, while farmers paid £22.54/ML for summer abstraction and
£2.25/Mt for winter abstraction into storage for use later in the year (see table 4.1). These charges
were typically only 3% of the cost of purchasing the same volume of water from a Water
Company (NRA 1995a). The NRA and its predecessor the Regional Water Authorities (RWA's)
were prevented from increasing water charges to incentive levels by a number of legislative
constraints. The primary constraint was the duty imposed on the NRA only to set charges to recover
current expenditure on water resource activities. Thus, the NRA had a duty to set charges to meet
the annual cost, approximately £70 million, of implementing its water resource functions. As the
Department of the Environment (1 992b) itself recognises the resulting abstraction charging
schemes
"..do not bear any relationship to the full costs imposed by particular abstractions including
the costs imposed on the environment" (p24).
Reforming these schemes in line with the principles of incentive charging would ultimately lead to
an increase in water charges potentially far in excess of current levels, creating profits for the NRA
(Rees et a! 1993), which under current legislation is untenable. Nevertheless, as Rees et a! (1993)
document there is still scope for improving the price signal to abstractors within the confines of the
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cost recovejy constraint. These options, however, were not incorporated into the new charging
scheme of 1993, because of an NRA Board decision to minimise the shift in incidence of charges
between abstractor classes. Political acceptability played a critical role shaping this decision.
3. Resource management agreements
The division of assets and responsibilities between the NRA and the privatised Water Companies in
1989 posed a number of complicated problems. The Water Companies themselves own the supply
reservoirs (existing and future) and all ground water source works. The NRA in contrast was
responsible for the availability and quality of water resources, but did not own the means of
transforming resources into effective supplies. Thus the NRA was forced to rely on the Water
Companies to provide supplies to support agricultural and industrial abstraction, recreation,
fisheries and wildlife protection, waste disposal and pollution dilution. In periods of crisis such as a
drought or a major pollution incident there was potential for major conflicts of interests between
these competing users and uses of water which could have prevented a rapid and effective
response. To overcome these problems the Water Resources Act 1991 enables agreements to be
made between the NRA and Water Companies concerning the operation of water resource schemes
owned by Water Companies.
Resource Management Agreements signed in 1989, based on previous internal agreements in the
RWA's, set out the conditions for regulatory releases and arrangements for dealing with crisis.
Nevertheless, if the NRA wanted to improve resource deployment within the region, or obtain
additional regulatory releases during drought periods, these agreements would have to be re-
negotiated. This poseed a conflict of interests as the NRA had a statutory duty to have particular
regard to the statutory duties of the Water Companies and ensure they can supply 'adequate'
quantities of water to customers. This effectively undermined the ability of the NRA to re-negotiate
management agreements in order to fulfil their environmental protection objectives and the Water
Companies, understandably, were unwilling to agree to changes in these agreements which would
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increase costs. Although the NRA was able to invest on its own behalf in supply enhancement or
river regulation schemes, it was constrained by the availability of investment capital. Most
investments have to be funded out of the revenue gained from abstraction charges and given the cost
recovery principle which governs the setting of charges, the NRA was generally unable to
accumulate sufficient capital to embark on major new investment projects. Thus, to overcome these
problems the NRA had undertaken joint projects with Water Companies to benefit other users,
although it was impossible to envisage these projects getting off the ground unless they were in
line with Water Company plans.
4. Catchment management planning
Catchment planning was a relatively new management tool developed by the NRA and focused on
the holistic or integrated management of water. The early stages of development coincided with the
establishment of the NRA and initial discussions focused on the value of catchinent planning to the
corporate unity of the new orgamsation (Newson 1991). Catchment planning evolved and should
not be confused with river basin management. The approach recognises the inherent dynamism and
inter-dependence which characterise the use of water, with land use planning in particular, having a
direct impact on water. Thus, the central objective of the catchment planning process was the
development of an overview of all the pressures on water in a defined area. The plans focus on the
multiple uses and users of water and therefore consider water quality, water abstraction, fisheries,
flood defence, navigation, recreation, in-situ flora and fauna and wetland sites. The implementation
of objectives in one sector may conifict with those in another and, in consequence, the catchment
plans attempt to balance these by adopting an integrated or cross-functional approach (NRA
1 99O. The objectives of catchment planning are summarised by Chandler (1994) as:
• to provide a consistent framework within which the responsibilities of the NRA may be
discharged;
• to resolve the conflicts between objectives of NRA functions, both where the Authority acts
directly and where it regulates the activities of others;
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• to assign priorities for the division of scarce resources between NRA functions within a
defmed catchment area;
• to influence those whose actions impinge on the functions of the NRA, but over whom it
has no direct conirol;
• to provide an opportunity for those with an interest in the water environment to influence
the evolution of NRA operational policy.
Catchment plans are based on surface and ground water systems with the boundaries derived
primarily from topographical features. A plan may comprise a whole river system, a group of
adjacent catchments or a sub-catchment of a larger system, and in every case will include the
surface drainage and its associated groundwater. 200 catchments have been identified by the NRA
for individual management plans (Chandler 1994). The plans were developed on the basis of
current and potential uses of water and water related activities, and explored the range of factors
which impact on them. The enviromnental dimension of each use is integrated in order to provide a
vision of the "ideal" river, which is then compared to reality and feeds into the prescription of
significant issues and corrective actions. A consultative management plan is then drawn up which
describes the catchment and its uses, compares the current status against relevant UK and EU
legislation, lists the significant issues and sets out the management options, identifying their
advantages and disadvantages. The consultation exercise attempts to gain the views of all
concerned with the water environment including Local Authorities, industry, Water Companies,
farmers and their representative organisations, environmental groups and anglers, and culminated in
the production of a final plan which outlined the areas of work and investment proposed by the
NRA and others over a five year period.
In theory, catclunent planning offers a clear way forward in identifying and resolving the conflicts
which evolve between water management objectives. In reality, however, this is incredibly difficult
to achieve and the management plans often resort to little more than listing the problems and
possible solutions. In fairness, this reflects the poorly developed information base on key processes
in some catchment areas, and thus partly explains the very limited extent to which the concepts of
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environmental interdependence and integration are explored in the plans. A good example is the
Ely-Ouse catchment management plan, which covers the conflict catchment study areas of the Lark
and Thet- Little Ouse. The document concentrates solely on the description and identification of
potential problems under each of the key headings of water quality, water abstraction, flood
protection, fisheries, navigation, conservation and recreation. Little attention is paid to cross-
functional issues. This is revealed in the example of the impact of increased spray irrigation which
is assessed purely in terms of the impact of abstraction on river flow levels and the implications for
pollution dilution processes and the maintenance of water quality standards. Nevertheless,
abstraction for spray irrigation can also directly contribute to the problem of pollution itself, given
the potential threat of increased run-off and leaching of nitrates, pesticides and herbicides
following the application of inigation water. This is a particularly important issue on the flat sand
lands of the Thet-Litfie Ouse which overlies a major chalk aquifer, where the soil is classified in the
high risk category for leaching (NRA 1992a) and reflects a significant problem which is not
addressed in the plan.
A second example, which concerns both the Lark and Thet-Little Ouse sub-units concentrates on the
linkage and interdependence between water and land management. Both units fall within the
Breckland Enviromnentally Sensitive Area (ESA), and farmers are encouraged, through a voluntary
scheme, to conserve or improve the landscape, wildlife habitats and historical features of the Breck
heathland. The predominant soil types are light sand land which, with spray irrigation, produce high
quality potatoes and root vegetables. As the NRA itself recognised, demand for water for irrigation
in these areas is unlimited, and thus the critical question should focus on the implications of
meeting this demand not only for the water environment, but for the landscape itself. By implication
an increase in spray irrigation will increase the area under intensive production of potatoes and
root vegetables. This has an important impact as more land is converted to intensive production
thereby altering the landscape and its dependent flora and fauna. Nevertheless, these issues weree
not even alluded to in the management plan and underlines the very limited extent to which the
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principles of integration and inter-dependence are incorporated into the catchment management
process.
The failure of catchment management plans to fully integrate and follow through the full
implications of the concepts of inter-dependence and integration, may partly be explained by
institutional factors. NRA functions in relation to water quality, water abstraction, flood protection,
fisheries, conservation, navigation and recreation are all largely separate divisions within the
organisation and thus there is little cross over among the staff on a day to day basis. Consequently,
there is limited cross-fertilisation of ideas and issues, as staff are largely confined to their specific
policy patch. Secondly, the budgets for each of these areas are separate, and thus even if a project
emerged which served a number of inter-related objectives there would undoubtedly be difficulties
deciding which budget or budgets should actually fund the project.
Chapter Two postulated that the past system of regulation would play a key role shaping the design
and implementation of environmental policy. The analysis of the institutional and legislative context
within which the NRA operated underlines the importance of this, demonsirating how the legacy
of the past critically distorted the NRA's powers to effectively promote the sustainable
development of water resources. This is revealed in the area of water licensing and charging, where
the NRA was tied to schemes introduced in the 1963 Water Resources Act. Government reforms
were a vital prerequisite to ensure the NRA could effectively discharge its duty and ensure the
protection of the environment. However, political factors and the unequal balance of power between
the NRA, OFWAT and the Water Companies are, in reality, a critical barrier to change.
The duties and responsibilities of the new Environment Agency with respect to water resource
management do not differ markedly from those of its predecessor the NRA. Although the concepts
of sustainable development and integrated pollution control lie at the heart of the new agency, it is
questionable whether the structural changes will, in reality, foster closer integration of the
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environment into policy. In the case of water policy, the new agency operates under the same
institutional constraints which afflicted both the Regional Water Authorities and NRA. The agency
has not been granted new powers and thus operates within the same legislative framework, with the
same staff and operating procedures under the guise of a new name. In fact, the addition of a new
duty on the agency further blunts its power, as it must now
"..work with all relevant sectors of society, including regulated organisations, to develop
approaches which deliver enviromnental requirements and goals without imposing
excessive costs (in relation to benefits gained) on regulated organisations or society as a
whole" (DoE 1995b p2).
This duty is interpreted as a new and explicit constraint on the powers of the Environment Agency
to effectively protect the environment and promote sustainable development, as it is now forced to
consider the costs and benefits of all its actions, including those incurred by Water Company
customers. Hence, the ability of the Environment Agency to encourage Water Companies to set
strict leakage reduction targets or further expand domestic metering is undermined. The new
agency, long heralded as vital to the development of integrated environmental policies, in reality
represents a missed opportunity. The Government has shied away from instigating the reforms
which are so central to the sustainable development of water resources in the UK, and instead
reverted to piecemeal reforms which do not upset the prevailing balance of power or interests.
4.1.2: Office of Water Services (OFWAT).
The power and influence of OFWAT is critical in determining the integration of the environment
into policy and the quest for sustainable development. Leakage levels, company charging policy and
capital investment programmes all come under the remit of OFWAT, and are the key to ensuring
the effective and efficient regulation of increasingly limited water resources. Nevertheless, the
actual power of OFWAT is in reality diluted, as the DoE retains specific powers on key issues, and
OFWAT is relegated to little more than an advisory role. Thus, OFWAT is unable to set statutory
leakage control targets, and can only encourage the Water Companies to instigate action. Water
metering is also a critical issue, but OFWAT is only able to advise and not direct Water Company
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policy. Unlike the other pnvatised utilities and utility regulators, OFWAT and the Water
Companies were under no statutory requirement to encourage the efficient use of water, until the
introduction of an amendment in the 1995 Environment Act. Prior to this it was in the interests of
the Water Companies to encourage the use of water, rather than promoting conservation and
OFWAT was unable to challenge this position. The introduction of a new conservation duty on
both the DG of OFWAT and the Water Companies reverses this position and marks an important
turning point in their relationship. The amendment ensures the DG can stop companies introducing
tariffs, such as declining block tariffs, which encourage water use rather than the efficient use of
water. The amendment will also enable the Water Companies themselves to undertake water saving
services such as tap re-washering, supply pipe inspection and information campaigns on the wise
use of water in the home.
In line with the postulates set out in the political science critique of environmental policy, the
analysis identifies the critical role played by legislative constraints in undermining and distorting the
design and implementation of environmental policy. OFWAT operates under a number of legal
constraints, which circumvent its power and influence over the Water Companies. In effect the
power and influence of OFWAT was effectively blunted when the organisation was first created,
and reflects the political manoeuvrings of Conservative Government Ministers, as they attempted to
ensure the successful flotation of the Water Companies on the stock exchange at privatisation.
These political factors have played a key role shaping the extent of OFWAT control over the
direction of Water Company policy, as they have effectively avoided tougher policies on water
metering and leakage control which are vital to the promotion of sustainable water resource
management.
4.1.3: Asymmetrical bargaining power.
Both the EA and OFWAT operate under a number of constraints which are, in part, a legacy of the
past system of regulation, and in part a reflection of political manoeuvrings to ensure the successful
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privatisation of the Water Companies. Given these constraints, the relationship and interaction
between the EA and OFWAT is critically important to ensure policy initiatives do not result in
unintended consequences and side effects. A co-ordinated approach between OFWAT and the EA is
critical; however this is undermined by the encroachment of OFWAT onto EA spheres of influence,
which constrain its powers to effectively protect the water environment.
The EA itself is unable to force Water Companies to invest capital to alleviate the environmental
problems which result from over abstraction. Investment programmes are negotiated at the periodic
review of Water Company Market Plans. These quaclripartite discussions involve OFWAT, EA,
DoE and the Water Companies and reflect the unequal balance of power. The DoE intervened at the
outset of negotiations in the 1994 Periodic review to restrict the level of price rises, forcing the
NRA and OFWAT to accept a balance between environmental objectives and price rises (DoE
1993a). Major expenditure was required to ensure compliance with the EU Urban Waste Water
Directive, the NRA was allowed to demand only limited expenditure to alleviate the problem of low
flow levels. The environmental consequences of this decision are reflected in the south-west
region, where the NRA was only able to successfully secure investment to alleviate low flow levels
in one catchment, despite recommending three schemes requiring immediate action (NRA 1 995e).
Investment to alleviate these problems must await the negotiations of the next periodic review, by
which time the damage to the in situ water environment may be irreversible. These negotiations
expose the realities of the complex trade offs calculated between the EA and OFWAT, as they both
represent different interests which ultimately conflict.
The relationship between the EA and OFWAT is not the sole source of conflict and contradiction in
the water sector. Powerful vested interests in the Water Companies and their representative groups,
the Water Services Association (WSA) and Water Companies Association (WCA), critically
influence the form and function of regulation. Key figures within the old Regional Water
Authorities played a central role drawing up the new privatised system, and went on to chair many
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of the newly private Water Companies, although few are left today. Consequently, the system of
regulation is heavily biased towards the protection of Water Company interests, with the power of
the NRA effectively undermined by the duty to have particular regard to the statutory duties of the
Water Companies and ensure they can provide "adequate" quantities of water to their customers.
In comparison to other vested interests, represented by fishing, environmental, boating and
recreational groups as well as industry and agriculture, the Water Companies have unequal power
and influence over the development of policy by OFWAT, EA and ultimately the DoE. This is
reflected in the metering debate, where some of the Water Companies have persistently argued
against the introduction of meters, citing the increased costs to customers and questioning the
assumption that metering will, in reality, reduce demand and thereby put off to some future date,
investment in new supply sources (WSA 1996; WCA 1996). The Water Companies and their
representative organisations have orchestrated their resources to undermine the strong arguments
for metering articulated by environmental groups, the EA and OFWAT. Nevertheless, underpinning
these arguments are the other critical costs which metering will impose on the Water Companies
themselves, including significant labour and capital investment costs incurred through meter
installation, meter reading and billing systems. Unsurprisingly, these arguments have proved highly
influential and, combined with the important social lobbying of doctors and welfare groups,
critically influenced the Secretary of State's decision to allow the continued use of existing charging
schemes after March 2000. Thus, the introduction of a comprehensive national metering policy has
been distorted by the powerful vested interests of the Water Companies, despite the insistence of
both the EA and OFWAT that metering is critical to the sustainable development of water
resources.
The power and influence of other vested interests concerned with water issues is relatively minor as
the interests of the Water Companies reign supreme. The EA, through the Regional Flood Defences
Conimittee, Regional Fisheries Advisory Committee and Regional Rivers Advisory Committee,
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ensures that representatives from the Local Authon ties, agriculture, industty, environmental and
angling groups have a direct line of communication with the EA over the direction of policy.
Representatives from these groups are also included on the Catebment Management Panels which
play a critical role in developing and reviewing individual catchment management plans. Despite
the establishment of a structure of communication, the EA and its predecessor have had to
overcome a level of complacency and ignorance of the significance of water issues on the part of
interest groups specifically in agriculture and industry.
In the agricultural sector both the NFU and CLA have focused principally on the issue of land
drainage, and in successive rounds of water industiy reorganisation, have successfully lobbied
against the transfer of land drainage responsibilities from MAFF to the DoE (Richardson el a!
1978). In fact, agricultural and land owning interests have dominated the land drainage system,
determining both the evolution of institutions and policies (Parker and Penning-Rowsell 1980).
Farming representatives predominated on the Regional Water Authority Land Drainage Committees
and, at the local level, on the Internal Drainage Boards and have overseen massive capital
investment in drainage facilities (Parker and Penning-Rowsell 1980). In stark contrast, agricultural
interests in the allocation of water resources for use as spray irrigation have been largely ignored by
both the NFU and CLA.
Although the Natural Resources (Technical) Committee (1962) argued strongly in favour of giving
equal weight to the supply of agricultural and industrial demands for water, neither the NFU nor
CLA capitalised on this and it never became a reality. Despite the concession of a two part tariff in
the 1963 Water Resources Act2 , regional and national NFU and CLA officials failed to recognise
the importance of water abstraction policy to agriculture. This situation prevailed throughout the
1970's and 1980's and in consequence through the drought of 1988-92, there was no established
2 Pnls concession was agreed on the basis that spray irrigators are the only abstractor group subject to Section 45
Abstraction bans. Hence, charging for water which may not be available was judged inequitable (Porter 1978).
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structure of communication between national NFU, CLA and NRA officials on water abstraction
policy. At the regional level, irrigation issues were discussed at a general, annual meeting between
NFU, CLA and NRA representatives which also covered land drainage, flood defences and water
quality issues. In consequence, agricultural interests represented by the NFU and CLA have exerted
little direct influence over the direction of water abstraction policy. Nevertheless, this has been
counter-balanced by the presence of MAFF, who have indirectly represented agricultural interests.
MAFF played a key role in the nomination and appointment of NRA and latterly EA board
members at the national and regional levels and in the appointment of representatives to the
Regional Flood Defence Committees. Thus, although not directly focused on water abstraction
policy, agricultural interests have been represented.
The drought of 1988-92 proved a critical turning point in the relationships between the NRA and
agricultural interest groups, as the imposition of compulsory abstraction bans on spray irrigation
licence holders underlined the importance of access to, and use of, reliable supplies of irrigation
water for farmers at the local level. The NFU and CLA have established closer contact with the
NRA at the national and regional levels (see section 6.2 for greater details), and culminated in 1995
with a significant concession to agricultural interests in the Environment Act. The amendment
relates to the Land Drainage Boards, which hitherto had no involvement in irrigation. This situation
has now changed, so these boards can manage water levels to facilitate irrigation. These boards
could potentially play a vital role in the management of water for spray irrigation, providing not
only an important forum for discussion at the local level, but also providing a key management
structure for the reallocation of water licences and collective investment projects in water storage
facilities. Although agricultural representative groups have played a relatively minor role shaping
the direction of water abstraction policy in the past, they are now reasserting their influence and
playing a more prominent role in the debate over the direction of water resource management
policy.
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The political science critique of environmental policy in Chapter Two postulates that asymmetrical
bargaining power critically undermines and distorts all stages of the environmental policy process
(Rees 1990; O'Riordan 1976). This analysis confirms the central importance of these processes.
The unequal balance of power and influence between competing institutions and interest groups
critically shape the design and implementation of water policy, and undermines the protection of
the environment. The analysis demonstrates how political objectives critically shaped the division of
responsibilities and duties between the Water Companies, NRA and OFWAT and culminated in the
Water Companies wielding unequal power and influence over the form and function of regulation.
The powers of both the NRA and OFWAT were effectively blunted by the Conservative
Government's desire for the successful pnvatisation of the water industiy. The analysis also
reveals how vested interests, namely agriculture, industiy and environmental groups, have played a
relatively minor role in the past shaping the direction of water abstraction policy; nevertheless this is
now beginning to change. The conflicts and contradictions which characterise water abstraction
policy reflect the competition between these different groups and institutions as they attempt to
shape and influence all stages of the policy process.
4.2: The future direction of policy: balancin2 water supply and demand.
The image of drying out rivers, dehydrated wetlands, fields of dying or withered agricultural crops
and parched domestic lawns and gardens, are firmly associated in the UK with periods of low
rainfall and drought. The origins of these periodic water crises are not however simply physical
scarcity problems, although this is how they are represented in the press and TV. In reality, the
problems are far more complex, as policy intervention has exacerbated the situation, reflecting both
market and state failure problems.
Inappropriate state intervention has in fact created and perpetuated a number of environmental and
economic problems in the UK water sector and is reflected most starkly in the introduction of the
licensing system in the 1963 Water Resources Act. Although the system successfully established
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the principles which define and allocate rights to water, it also succeeded in creating far more
complex environmental problems. The allocation of licences to existing users failed to recognise
the impact of this abstraction on river flow levels and the in silu environment, and culminated in
the level of licensed abstraction, in some catchments, being in excess of the in-stream flow levels.
Thus, the unintended consequences and side effects of the licensing system are seen today in the
problems of low flow rivers, dehydrated wetlands and over abstraction.
The introduction of the water charging scheme reflects the problems of both market and state
failure. The scheme, also introduced in the 1963 Water Resources Act, introduced the principle of
payment for water abstraction into the UK. The scheme exhibits signs of market failure as the price
signals do not incorporate all the costs, including the environmental costs, of water use. Thus, water
users are not forced to internalise the full cost of their resource use, as prices are too low to impinge
on their decision making. These pricing principles underpin the charging schemes used by the
Environment Agency today. However, reform of these schemes is further complicated by the cost
recovery constraint introduced in the 1963 Act, whereby price rises are limited to recovering the
costs incurred through implementing the water resource management functions. In consequence, the
Environment Agency is unable to set prices at incentive levels to promote efficiency and water
conservation. These complex market and state failures have critically undemrined and distorted
integration of the environment into water policy, and play a key role shaping the future direction of
policy.
Traditionally in the UK water sector, a "supply fix" approach has predominated, whereby shortfalls
in supply are resolved through the construction of new water sources. This approach has
unquestionably assumed all future demand projections should be met, and has resulted in the
massive investment in new supply reservoirs. The problems associated with this approach are
exemplified in Kielder Reservoir and Rutland Water, where the demand for water failed to
materialise in the planned time frame, and consequently Kielder reservoir is still largely under-
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utilised today. The supply fix philosophy exemplifies the key features of the technocratic approach
to the environment identified by Janicke (1990), whereby shortfalls in water supply are simply
reduced to a technical question of enhancing supply capacity. The philosophy is deeply ingrained in
the water sector, reflecting the predominance of an engineering framework of analysis, which
closes off from consideration alternative policy options (Hirschleifer eta! 1960).
The supply fix approach fails to address the underlying causes of demand increases, and
concentrates solely on the construction of new reservoirs which, although successful in resolving
the short term problem, only succeeds in shifting the problem to another time period, when the
margin between supply and demand eventually narrows. This approach is unsustainable over the
long term from both an economic and environmental perspective. Firstly, the number of suitable
new reservoir sites are limited, and there is likely to be increased opposition from environmental
and amenity groups to the loss of landscape and wildlife habitat. Secondly, the early commitment of
resources of land, labour and capital to meet the inflated demands of water users is untenable from
an economic viewpoint. The economic theory of market failure states that if consumers are not
faced by prices which fully reflect the marginal costs of providing them with goods and services,
then their demands will be inflated. These inflated demands can only be met if other users or the
taxpayer are prepared to subsidise consumption. Over the short term, where total demands are
within the available capacity of the system, these subsidies are low. However, if investment takes
place to expand capacity, then the subsidies become large and obvious.
The predominance of the supply fix philosophy encountered a number of critical problems in the
mid- to late- 1970s which increasingly brought into question the basic assumptions of the approach.
A combination of forces ensured greater attention was focused on avoiding premature capacity
development and increasing the useable output from existing supply sources (see Rees and Williams
1993 for a full account). Nevertheless, it is important not to overemphasise the importance of these
changes, as the supply fix culture is still deeply ingrained in the post- privatisation regime. This is
134
perhaps best exemplified by the publication of the NRA Water Resources Development Strategy in
March 1992 (1 992b). This document outlines in detail the range of alternative water supply sources
in the UK and covers inter-regional transfers, re-use of effluents, desalination, a national water grid,
water from Europe, and the transfer of water by ship. Alternative measures such as demand
management, leakage control and metering are only briefly alluded to and as Kinnersley (1994)
argues
"The determined presentation of exclusive supply side strategies in this NRA
discussion document represented a recycling of old thinking that a body claiming to
be a guardian of the water environment had no cause to be pleased with. It was ignoring
the fact that, if public opinion is to be moved at all towards moderating household usage
of water, making it sound as if plenty of water from elsewhere could readily be transferred
to the areas of still growing consumption could hardly be helpful" (Kinnersley 1994,
p102).
Publication of this document and the ensuing criticisms marked the beginning of the end for the
supply fix approach, with movement towards greater emphasis of demand management policies.
This is an important switch in emphasis by the regulators of the water industry and a combination
of factors influenced the change. The most important of which, was the drought of 1988-92 which
underlined the vulnerability of certain regions to low rainfall and the economic, social, and
environmental consequences. The fmal year of the drought coincided with publication of a
Government consultation paper "Using Water Wisely" (July 1992) which was a key text in
establishing the debate on demand management in the UK water sector. In combination with the
CPRE (1993) report "Water for Life" and the POST (1993) publication "Dealing with Drought"
these documents recognised the importance of demand management techniques in reducing the
demand for new water supplies. This debate culminated in August 1995 with the Government itself
recognising the shift in emphasis in "Water Conservation: Government Action", which explicitly
states
"Until recently, the normal response in the UK to water shortages was to open up new
resources by sinking new boreholes or building new reservoirs... .However, all options
now have to be assessed from an environmental viewpoint and only those deemed
acceptable should proceed. The Government's position is therefore that existing resources
should be used to the fullest possible extent, taking into account economic and
environmental considerations, before additional resources are developed" (DoE 1 995a p1).
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This marks an important sea change in the culture of regulation, with the DoE, NRA and OFWAT
switching the emphasis of state water policy.
Despite the sudden interest by Government, the NRA and OFWAT in demand management; the
principles have been firmly established in the UK literature since the early 1970's (see for example
Rees 1973; 1976; Herrington 1973), and overseas these principles have been put into practice in
Australia, the USA, Canada and Israel (see Tate 1989; Long 1990; Howe el a! 1986; Postel 1992).
Demand management measures in combination with water conservation address the combination of
market and state failures which afflict the water sector. Policy attempts to reduce the consumption
of existing water resources and shift the demand for new supplies, thereby putting off to some
future date investment in new sources. A combination of economic incentives and direct command
and control style regulatory tools can be used, and include:
• water bylaws, building regulations and ecolabels;
• land use planning guidelines and rules;
• leakage control and targets;
• planned direct water re-use;
• indirect waste water re-use;
• dual water supplies;
• water conservation advice and audits;
• in-house re-use;
• water metering;
• incentive charging for abstraction;
• tradable abstraction permits.
These regulatory tools are by no means mutually exclusive and a combination of measures will be
necessary to shift the perception and valuation of water in order to encourage, in turn, a shift in
behaviour towards the wise use of water.
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A central plank of demand management policies are economic incentives which include pricing
policies for abstraction water, tradable permits and permit auctions. These measures reflect the
classic policy prescriptions of the neo-classical economic model which, in theory, attempt to
resolve the problem of market failure by improving the economic signal to consumers. This
ensures that available resources are allocated between competing users and uses in order to
maximise the total welfare derived from the resource. Consequently, all water users should be
faced by water prices which reflect the full marginal costs incurred in supplying them, including the
environmental costs. Prices should be measured in opportunity cost terms and reflect not only
revenue and capital expenditure but also losses imposed on other water users. The application of
these pricing principles to water proves highly complex, as water is not one product, but several,
with widely varying cost characteristics. Ideally, volume charges should vary with the time of use,
the supply source, location of use within the catchment and the quantity and quality of resource
relevant return flows. Nevertheless, in reality, pricing schemes which conform to the principles of
marginal cost pricing prove too difficult and complex to implement (Rees el a! 1993).
An alternative, based on damage avoidance costs, proves less complicated and is based on the
politically acceptable precautionary principle. Rees and Williams (1993) identify the central
features of a damage avoidance cost scheme, which calculates, once politically acceptable stream
quality objectives and minimum flow levels have been established, the long run costs of storage
provision and other flow and quality enhancement measures. This forms the basis for the damage
avoidance cost, which is then applied to particular units of abstraction, which vary in relation to the
season of abstraction, the loss-return ratio, the location of abstraction and return flows in the
catchment.
Overseas evidence relates how water pricing schemes shift water using behaviour, leading to
greater awareness of water conservation in the home, industry and agriculture (Postel 1992;
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Herrington 1997; Wmpenny 1994; Rees et a! 1993). Nevertheless, these schemes do not lead to an
immediate change, and it is only over time that full cost charges shift the perception and valuation
of access to and use of water. In light of these problems, economists argue tradable permits and
permit auctions prove more effective and efficient in reallocating water resources among
competing users and uses. In theory, tradable permit schemes offer a number of advantages over
pricing systems (see Rees el a! 1993 for a full discussion), and are based on the assumption that if a
market is created in environmental goods and services, trading would ensure available resources are
allocated to those who valued them most highly. The application of this system in the water sector
also overcomes the state failure problems associated with the legacy of the system of property
rights. As noted in section 4.1.1, the licensing system introduced in the 1963 Water Resources Act,
established licences of right for existing users of water which are inalienable. A proportion of these
licences are now under- or un-utilised, but current legislation prevents the Environment Agency
from revoking these licences without paying compensation, which is politically and economically
unacceptable. In theory, trading overcomes these problems by ensuring no costs are imposed on
existing abstractors, who are granted defacto property rights, which are potentially valuable.
In theory transferability of all, or part, of the licence shifts supplies from low to high valued uses
and thus improves efficiency. Trading systems can also potentially improve the environment,
particularly in catchments suffering over abstraction and low flow levels. The licensing authority,
through controlling the total number of permits issued within a catchment, would be able to ensure
abstraction did not exceed the capacity of the catchment or aquifer. In the case of existing over
abstracted catchments, trading would either have to be preceded by licence revocation and an
auction of available capacity, or each licence would have to be reduced by an appropriate
percentage to get the tradable quantity down to capacity (Rees et a! 1993).
Under current UK abstraction charging schemes and water legislation it is impossible to introduce
these changes. Nevertheless, a shift in Government policy heralded in the Environment White
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Paper: The Second Year Report (1992) established their commitment to incorporate economic
incentive measures into the centre of UK environmental policy. The attractions of economic
incentives to the Conservative Government were acknowledged by John Gummer, Secretaiy of
State for the Environment, when he stated
"By using appropriate instruments, we can spare indusliy the straitjacket of detailed
regulation and still deliver high environmental standards. Indeed economic
instruments may enable us to secure a continuing improvement in environmental
performance more readily and automatically than we could do by old fashioned
'command and control' prescriptions" (1993b, foreword)
Despite these verbal commitments and the reiteration of the Government's plan to publish a
discussion document on the role of economic incentives in the water sector (DoE 1995 a; DoE and
MAFF 1995; DoE 1996a), in practice the introduction of these measures is no nearer, with the
Government missing an important opportunity to incorporate the reforms in the 1995 Environment
Act.
The shift in emphasis to demand management policies marks an important change in the form and
function of water policy. Addressing the combination of state and market failures which afflict the
water sector, these policy measures should, in theory, ensure the closer integration of the
environment into policy. Nevertheless, although the realignment of state policy is important, the
battle is not yet over. The design and implementation of demand management policies will be the
subject of intensive conflict, as powerful vested interests attempt to shape and influence the form
and function of the policy measures. These processes could critically undermine and distort the
integration of the environment into policy and lead to further unintended environmental
consequences and side effects.
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4.3: The application of demand mana2ement principles in the a2r cultural sector.
The debate on demand management in the UK has concentrated almost exclusively on domestic and
industrial consumers (see NRA 1995a), with little consideration of how these principles would be
translated and implemented in the agricultural sector. To date, conservation of water in agriculture
has focused on the construction of on-farm water storage facilities and the management of water
during extreme drought periods (see for example MAFF 1992, 1996). Nevertheless, the switch in
emphasis to embrace the principles of demand management, has critical and far reaching
implications for agricultural spray irrigators which has been recognised by the NFU in a series of
policy documents and speeches (NFU 1996; Naish 1994; Smyth 1995). Drawing on overseas
experience it is possible to identif, '
 a range of policies which in theory could be introduced to
significantly shift the agricultural demand for irrigation water (see table 4.2).
Firstly, farmers can introduce a number of changes to farm management practices over the short
tenn, which could conserve and make more efficient use of existing supplies of water.
Encouraging farmers themselves to critically evaluate the use of spray irrigation on crops is vital to
ensure water is not used on crops, where the response rate is low or where the economic value is
marginal. Thus irrigation of cereals and sugar beet should be questioned, and irrigation water
reserved solely for high value crops, where the response rate in terms of yield and quality are good.
Secondly, greater attention should be paid to the particular crop variety actually used. Drought
tolerant varieties or even scab resistant potato varieties can significantly reduce the demand for
water through the season, and reduce the impact of drought and water stress. The third
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• use of thought tolerant crop varieties;
• switch out of irrigation of low value crops;
• improve crop cultivation techniques to improve the soil moisture retentive capacity;
• use of irrigation scheduling systems;
• use of efficient application technology;
• direct reuse of treated effluent;
• recycling;
• economic incentives;
• construction of on-farm water storage.
Table 4.2: Demand mana2ement options in the a2ricultural sector.
(Postel 1992)
option concerns the use of alternative soil cultivation techniques, such as bed systems instead of
ridges in potato production for example, which can critically improve both the moisture retentive
capacity of the soil and reduce run off water. These measures, in combination, would make more
efficient use of water which is actually applied.
The fourth critically important factor influencing agricultural demand for water is the irrigation
equipment itself. Hose reel irrigators predominate on UK farms and are a highly inefficient way of
applying water, as water is lost not only through wind blow but the rate of application is also
highly variable (Bailey 1990; 1993). Trickle or centre pivot systems are far more efficient,
applying water directly to the root system, with trickle systems reducing consumption of water by
25-30% compared to hose reels (Bennington 1994). Nevertheless, these systems are highly capital
intensive, although recent developments in irrigation tape technology 3 may prove more economic
3 lrrigation tape is made up of two pipes one within the other. One acts as the main supply while the second smaller pipe
feeds water out through slits spaced 20cm apart. The tape can be laid in a potato ridge a few inches above the potato
seed when planted. The manufacturers claim that operating the system 1 hour a day is sufficient to apply 1 inch of
water a week.
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at £940/ha for renewable tape (Farmers Weekly 10.5.96). Technological innovation may lead to
further developments in this area, improving the efficiency of water application. Current irrigation
scheduling systems also play a vital role, as they focus on maintaining critical soil moisture deficit
levels, to maximise crop growth and hence yield and quality. As Weatherhead el a! (1994)
acknowledge, the switch to irrigation scheduling systems may, in reality, actually increase the
amount of water used. In consequence the fifth policy option focuses on encouraging
manufacturers to develop alternative scheduling systems which maximise the efficiency of water
applied, ensuring less water is applied but at the critical stages of crop growth.
Federal Republic of Germany
One of the longest operational uses of waste water for plant production is at
Braunschweig, where around 44,500 m3 per day of waste water is used for an irngition
scheme which has been operating since 1954.
France
On the island of Porquerolles, waste water is used to irrigate citrus, apricot, peach and
plum trees. Thus use of treated waste water represents 60% of the irrigation water
demand.
Israel
It is estimated that 23% of the irrigation of cotton, citrus, field and fniit crops is supplied
by marginal quality water.
Ukraine
Irrigation with partially treated sewage effluent has shown marked increases in soybean
and maize yields and it has been calculated that waste water could provide 15-20% of all
irrigation water requirements.
Table 4.3: Direct re-use of treated effluent - overseas evidence.
(Source: Postel 1992)
The sixth option, direct reuse of treated effluent, has been largely dismissed by the UK
Government on the basis of possible health risks. Nevertheless, irrigation water does not need to be
of potable quality and is recognised by the World Health Organisation, which established quality
standards for irrigation water which limit the level of faecal coliform and parasitic worms, two of
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the main disease cartying agents. Thus, as long as reuse water is only used on crops which are
peeled, skinned, cooked or processed before being eaten there are minimal health risks. Direct
reuse schemes have been developed for irrigation purposes in the USA, Australia, South Africa,
Japan, Israel and Singapore (see table 4.3) and have the advantage of not only providing a supply
source rich in nutrients which can reduce the use of fertilisers, but is also a reliable local supply.
The final option focuses on the role of economic incentives. The current abstraction charging
scheme for spray irrigation provides few incentives for water economy, with water costing
£22.541ML for summer abstraction in the Anglian region or £2.25/ML for winter abstraction (see
table 4.1). In consequence the actual price signal has limited impact on irrigation decision making
as the cost of water itself represents only a small proportion of irrigation running costs. In fact, fuel
and labour are the most significant cost elements (Weatherhead el a! 1994), and can influence
irrigation management significantly. The scheme does incorporate some incentive measures,
primarily the differential between the cost of winter and summer abstraction (see table 4.1), in an
attempt to encourage the construction of on-farm water storage facilities. Despite this, the current
scheme does not encourage water conservation, as charges are based on a two part tariff, and
therefore only a fraction of the cost is related to the actual volume of water used. Reform of the
current abstraction tariff scheme in line with incentive charges based on damage avoidance costs,
would ensure charges are related to the actual volume of water used. The weighting factors used in
the scheme could vary depending on the source of supply (surface or ground water), point of
abstraction (up or downstream) and period of abstraction (winter or summer). In consequence, the
weighting accorded to winter abstraction could be set at zero, to encourage more effectively the
construction of on-farm reservoirs (Rees et a! 1993).
An alternative to economic incentive pricing is tradable permit systems, which offer a number of
advantages in the reallocation of existing agricultural licences. The differential between licensed
and actual abstraction is, in fact, quite significant in the agricultural sector (see tables 3.3 Parts A
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and B) and in the three catchment study areas 37 licences were either untraceable or no longer
used. This represents in total 581.456 tcma in the Lark; 692.6 12 tcma in the Thet-Little Ouse and
271.712 tema in the Bain Witham (see table 4.4).
______________ Lark
	 Thet-Little Ouse Bain-Witham	 TOTAL
Untraceable licences 7 	 7	 4	 18
volume	 548.294 tcma 398.24 tcma 	 60.927 tcma
Un used licences	 7	 4	 8	 19
volume	 33.l62tcma	 297.372tcma	 210.785
Total	 58L456tcma 692.6l2tcma	 271.7l2tcma	 37
Table 4.4: Breakdown of the un-used and un-traceable licences in the three catchment study
areas.
Undoubtedly there is significant potential to reallocate existing supplies of under- or un-used water
to other uses and users. The introduction of tradable permit systems would be relatively simple in
the agricultural sector, as long as trading is confined within specific geographical areas and involves
only farmers. This ensures that all traders have broadly similar market power and prices are not
distorted by the fmancial power of individual Water Companies (Rees el a! 1993). The
Environment Agency could control and regulate the number of licences available in the catchment,
to protect other abstractors and the water environment. In the case of over-abstracted catchments,
the Environment Agency could either buy up licences as they come onto the market, or revoke
Jicences not used in the previous 5 years, reallocating the released water to ensure the protection of
the in situ enviromnent and river flow levels. The system could trade licences either permanently
or on a yearly basis and therefore prior to the commencement of the growing season, farmers would
evaluate their water needs on the basis of their rotation; farmers with a surplus would sell their
entitlement; farmers with a deficit would buy water which would then be transferred via the river or
drainage network for application on their own land. The organisation of the system would be
relatively simple and cost effective, particularly in light of the recent amendment to the Land
Drainage Act (1991) in the Environment Act 1995, which would enable the internal drainage
boards to organise and administer the system at the local level.
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These policy reforms should, in theory, lead to a sustainable pattern of water use in the agricultural
sector. In reality however, the situation wifi prove far more complex as there are not only critical
political and institutional barriers to change, but it is questionable whether these policies will in fact
prove effective in changing the behaviour of farmers. Undoubtedly, the design and implementation
of demand management policies will be subject to intensive political scrutiny and lobbying from a
variety of vested interests. Farmers and their representative organisations are unlikely to passively
accept changes which increase their costs. Consequently, it is possible to predict with some
certainty that political bargaining processes will play a key role determining the actual form of
demand management policies in the agricultural sector.
This approach to policy can also be criticised at a more fundamental level, as it is questionable how
effective these demand management policies will prove in realigning the use and management of
water at the farm level. The current debate, both in the UK and overseas, has progressed within very
narrowly defined parameters reflecting a purely sectoral approach to water policy. Consequently
policy makers from the EA, OFWAT and the DoE fail to take account of how other State, market
and social forces of regulation influence both the use and management of irrigation water and
response to demand management policies. As Chapter One argued, it is vital to adopt a wider inter-
sectoral approach to policy, to avoid the unintended consequences and side effects which
undermine and distort integration of the environment and economy. This is not happening in the
design and implementation of demand management policies to control irrigation use. Policy makers
fail to recognise how specific state policies developed by MAFF and the EU, and market forces of
regulation emanating from the food network, critically undermine and distort their specific policy
initiatives on the wise use of water. Nevertheless, it is inconceivable that farmers' response to
tradable permit systems, for example, will develop in a vacuum completely divorced from their
wider management objectives and strategies. The conificting and contradictory policy signals
emanating from the plethora of State, market and social forces of regulation will play a key role
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shaping farmers' responses, and it is therefore vital that water policy makers recognise and address
the multiple layers of regulation wiThin which the target population are situated.
This is no simple task, as the agricultural sector has witnessed an intensive period of change, with a
major shift in emphasis and power away from the producers of food (Marsden and Little 1990).
Farmers are now locked into an increasingly complex food system with input suppliers, food
manufacturers, processors, retailers and wholesalers playing an increasingly important role
alongside traditional MAFF, EU and GATF officials in regulating both the production and
consumption of food. These non-farm parts of the food system have been dubbed the "new
regulators of the food system" (Flynn and Marsden 1992), as they directly and indirectly penetrate
on-farm production decision making to ensure reliability of supply, consistent quality and
acceptable prices (Marsden and Wrigley 1994). In consequence, farmers have to balance the
demands of their new masters, against those of the State regulators in MAFF and the EU who are
grappling with the increasing financial costs of the agricultural price support system, while at the
same time integrating environmental protection objectives more closely into agricultural policy.
This poses a number of complicated questions for farmers as the signals emanating from the non-
farm parts of the system may potentially conflict with, and undermine official EU and MAFF
policy and vice versa. Hence, dissonance between agricultural policy objectives is increasing and
poses greater risks and uncertainties for farm management and by implication the management and
use of irrigation water.
Changes in the form and function of agricultural state intervention have variable implications for
irrigated production. On the one hand irrigated produce falls largely outside of the CAP price
support system and in consequence production is largely unaffected directly by the reforms
introduced under MacSharry. However, these changes do have an indirect impact which should not
be underestimated, as uncertainty over the direction of policy reforms contribute an important
element of insecurity and uncertainty to on-farm production decision making. Consequently,
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farmers may, for example, have increased the area under production of irrigated crops, thereby
reducing their vulnerability to reductions in the price support system; they may also have reduced
their level of capital gearing by cutting back on investment in major projects such as equipment or
buildings, in order to reduce their vulnerability to price volatility.
Irrigated production is more directly affected by the new Government reforms of the Potato
Marketing Board (PMB), as irrigation in the UK is largely concentrated on potatoes (Weatherhead
eta! 1994). Changes to the structure of the PMB and the removal of intervention and quotas pose
significant risks and uncertainties for producers. Restructuring of not only the production of
potatoes but also the marketing relationships with downstream food network may result. These
changes will have important consequences for irrigation use. Small potato producers may move out
of potato production and thereby no longer use their irrigation licences; in contrast, other large
potato producers may intensifj potato production, increasing the acreage and thereby increasing
their demand for irrigation water. Reform of the PMB potentially has important unintended
consequences for the use and management of water at the farm level and future demand for
abstraction water.
The reforms to the form and function of state intervention in the agricultural sector throughout the
1980s and 1990s mark a significant shift to the post-productivist agriculture, where the protection
of agriculture for agriculture's sake is no longer the guiding principle of policy formulation.
Although not directly concerned with irrigation, the reforms introduced both by MAFF and the EU
have a number of unintended consequences, which potentially influence the use and management
of irrigation water, and distort the response of farmers to the policy signals emanating from the
Environment Agency on demand management.
Running in parallel to the changes in the form and function of State regulation, the UK food
network also plays a critical direct and indirect role shaping on-farm production decision making.
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The power and influence of these forces of market regulation have increased throughout the 1 980s
and 1990s; companies both up and downstream of the farm have been able to penetrate on-farm
decision making in order to control and manipulate production (Munton 1992; Marsden et a! 1992;
Hawkins 1991 and 1994; Ward 1994a+b). These firms could play a central role shaping both
farmers use and management of irrigation water and response to demand management policies.
Irrigation equipment manufacturers could critically shape the process of technology transfer,
encouraging farmers through tailor made financial packages and after-sales technical back up to
purchase specific types of irrigation equipment. Obviously, these processes could undermine the
Environment Agency's message on demand management and the conservation of on-farm water, by
promoting machinery which perpetuates the inefficient and wasteful use of water. Food
manufacturers and processors could also play a critical, although less obvious, role shaping
irrigation decision making through their specifications in relation to consistency of produce supply
and quality. These divergent signals could have significant unintended consequences and side
effects for the use and management of on-farm irrigation water, as they potentially contradict and
conflict with the policy signals emanating from the Environment Agency.
Explicit identification of the wide number of state and market forces of regulation impinging on
decision making at the farm level, underlines the potential sources of dissonance which will
undermine and distort the power and efficacy of demand management policies in the agricultural
sector. Enviromnent Agency officials must consider how the combination of regulatory forces
could be realigned to ensure they work in synergy rather than dissonance in order to promote the
sustainable development of water resources. This critical task moves beyond simply the closer
integration and co-ordination of Environment Agency and MAFF policies, which in itself is
important, and must instead address the far more complex issue of ensuring synergy between
market and state forces of regulation. Undoubtedly, this alternative approach will encounter
political, institutional and administrative problems but these must be overcome to ensure the
removal of a critical barrier which impedes the integration of the environment and economy.
148
4.4: Conclusion
This chapter has identified the combination of state and market failures which have critically
influenced the form and function of regulation at the agriculture-water interface. Inappropriate state
intervention has culminated in the problems associated with low flow levels, over abstracted
catchments and dehydrated wetlands. The origins of these problems can be traced back to the
system of licensing introduced in the 1963 Water Resources Act. The legacy of the reforms
introduced in this Act constrain the effective and efficient regulation of water today, by impeding
the introduction of demand management measures such as incentive charging and tradable permit
schemes. The analysis also underlines how the institutional framework governing the regulation of
water has been critically shaped by political bargaining processes. The Conservative Government
ensured the successful flotation of the Water Companies on the stock exchange by designing a
regulatory framework which did not impose undue price constraints or impede Water Company
interests. Thus the division of responsibilities and duties between the NRA, OFWAT and Water
Companies ensured the effective protection of Water Company interests. OFWAT is unable to
impose compulsory leakage targets or water metering and can only advise Water Companies on the
best way forward. Reliance on the voluntary principle ensures an incremental process of reform, as
the Water Companies introduce policy changes in a piecemeal fashion. The power and influence of
the NRA to protect and conserve the water environment and the interest of other users of water is
also circumscribed by its relationship with the Water Companies. This is revealed in the duty
imposed on the NRA to have due regard to the interests of Water Companies, and ensure they have
"adequate" quainities of water for their customers. The unequal balance of power and influence
between the official regulators and the Water Companies, and between the Water Companies and
other interest groups, plays a critical role shaping the design and implementation of policy in the
water sector.
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Institutional and political constraints have critically influenced and distorted the policy process and
contributed to the technocratic, piecemeal approach to water supply, where the construction of new
water sources has been the automatic response to supply and demand imbalance. This policy
approach, however, has only succeeded in shifting the problem to another time and place as it does
not address the real problems underlying the imbalance between water supply and demand and the
increasing conflict between the users and uses of water. The analysis reveals how the shift to
demand management measures, combining economic incentives and direct command and control
style regulations, redress these problems focusing on the combination of market and state failures
which afflict the water sector. Nevertheless, there are still real problems associated with this
approach which are revealed in the discussion of the role of demand management policies in the
agricultural sector. The analysis demonstrates how the integration of the environment and market
through demand management policies is undermined in the purely sectoral approach to policy
which focuses solely on the water sector. In reality the EU, MAFF, DoE, supermarkets, input
suppliers, food processors and manufacturers all play a central role shaping farmer decision making
and consequently will critically influence the response or non-response to demand management
initiatives. Resolving these problems is vital to ensure that the plethora of regulatory forces at the
agriculture-water interface work in synergy rather than dissonance and thereby enable the effective
integration of the environment and economy.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE FOOD NETWORK AN]) OUALITY: TRACING THE IMPACT OF MARKET
FORCES OF REGULATION ON IRRIGATION USE AND THE WATER
ENVIRONMENT
The power and influence of market forces of regulation potentially play a critical role shaping
integration of the environment and economy. Chapter Four demonstrated how the international
food network directly and indirectly controls and regulates on-fann production decision making,
and highlights two critical questions which are central to this analysis. Firstly, how do off-farm
firms directly and indirectly regulate and control the on-farm use and management of irrigation
water? What are the implications for demand management policies and protection of the
environment? This chapter, drawing on the focused interviews with firms involved in the marketing
and processing of potatoes and root vegetables, will concentrate on the detailed exploration of
these complex issues and will employ the postulates set out in the theory of the firm, political
economy tradition, and literature on risk and uncertainty. These postulates will enable the analysis
to examine the nature of the inter-firm linkages, exposing in particular the relations of power and
dependence which shape interaction between firms, and between firms and farmers, identifying the
critical barriers to change which will potentially undermine the efficiency and efficacy of state
forces of regulation, in particular demand management policies.
In addressing these issues, the analysis will be presented in four sections. The first section will
concentrate on establishing the key features of the national potato and root vegetable market, the
primary irrigated crops in the UK, providing critical insight into the key actors involved in the
different market sub-sectors and the changes which have occurred in the pattern of production
across the UK. This establishes the broad national context within which the surveyed firms
operate. The second section will move on from this and examine the potato and root vegetable
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network, describing the form and function of the inter-relationships and inter-linkages between
firms, and between firms and farmers. This analysis will explore the direct and indirect measures
through which firms control each others behaviour, focusing in particular on the role of the
supermarkets and the potato processing companies. These actors play a key role in the potato sector,
and the analysis will explore the relations of power and dependence which underpin their
interactions with subordinate firms and farmers. The key mechanism through which these
companies exert indirect control over on-farm production is through the specification of strict
produce quality criteria. The third section of this chapter will examine in detail the competing
definitions of quality and the implications for the use and management of irrigation water at the
farm level. The final section will draw together these various strands of analysis to critically assess
the impact of these complex inter-relations on irrigation use and the water environment. The
analysis will explore the role of off-farm firms in implementing demand management policies,
highlighting the critical barriers to change.
5.1: The UK potato and root ve2etable market the national picture.
The potato market represents one of the most highly segmented sectors of the UK vegetable
industry, with significant value added to the product afier leaving the farm gate. On-farm
production of potatoes has been subject to significant levels of uncertainty over the last five years,
with the future of the PMB and the quota system under Government review. In addition, average
prices have been extremely volatile (see table 5.1) with significant inter- and intra- seasonal
variation, ranging from a low of £60.60/ton to a high of £173.10 in the 1994 season, while in 1995
prices ranged between £100/t to £260/t. These figures mask significant price variations with
premiums attached to specific varieties and produce which conform to precise quality
specifications. Morris (1993) suggests post-harvest prices range from £30/t for outgrades, through
to £45-50/t for general ware, to £90-120/t for quality pre-pack standard. In the processed market,
prices typically stand at £60-70/t. In combination with the high variable costs associated
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___________________ 1991	 1992	 1993	 1994	 1995
Registered potato	 14,254	 13,667	 13,493	 12,356	 11,625
producers
Total area ('000 ha)	 154.3	 154.9	 148.1	 141.0	 146.3
of which:
early	 51.0	 52.1	 52.4	 51.9	 55.0
main crop
	
103.3	 102.8	 95.7	 89.0	 91.3
Irrigation
Area receiving	 37%	 39%	 37%	 47%	 49%
irrigation
Yield irrigated crop	 46.1	 52.3	 49.7	 51.1	 50.4
t/ha
Yield unirrigated	 37.5	 48.7	 46.4	 44.2	 38.4
crop t/ha
Total production	 5001	 6239	 5763	 5231	 4982
('000t)
Average maincrop	 78.2	 85.7	 56.6	 79.5	 156.86
producer price (L't)
Price range	 62.9 -	 75.2 -	 48.6 - 72
	
60.6 -
	 100.6 -
115.3	 111.5	 173.1	 260.9
Table 5.1: Potato production in En&and and Wales.
(Source: PMB 1996)
with production, on average £1500/hectare (Nix 1994), the farmer is subject to significant levels of
economic risk and uncertainty. These factors have contributed to the decline in the national potato
area, which dropped by 8,000 ha between 1991-95 and the number of registered producers fell by
2,629 (see table 5.1). Nevertheless, this has not translated into a marked decline in the level of total
production, implying an intensification of the scale of production on the remaining farms (Bates et
al 1996).
Although the pattern of production across the UK has remained relatively stable over time, there
has been a movement towards use of light sand and chalk lands in Essex, Suffolk, Norfolk and
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Figure 5.1 The changing geographical pattern of potato production in the UK.
The proportion of the nationaJ potato area by county
(Source : PMB various years)
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Lincoinshire whereas production on the heavier soils in the fens of Lincoinshire, Lancashire,
Cheshire and Cambridgeshire has remained relatively stable (see figure 5.1). As Morris (1993)
recognises, this shift reflects changes in potato production methods which favour lighter, more
thought prone soils. In fact the movement towards lighter soil types enables greater production
flexibility, allowing access to potatoes throughout the season without the problems of water logging
as well as avoiding significant eel worm problems which afflict the fen and silt lands. Despite these
advantages, lighter soil types do not retain moisture and are more prone to drought; consequently
potatoes are vulnerable to problems of common scab and irrigation is an increasingly vital
element of production. The proportion of the potato crop receiving irrigation has increased
markedly in the five eastern counties (see figure 5.2), with Essex experiencing a doubling in the
area irrigated between 1982 and 1990 from 1100 ha to 2250.1 ha. These shifts in production within
the eastern counties of England, to the use of light land for the production of both main crop and
second early potato production., have important implications for water resource management. These
counties are already vulnerable to thought, with the lowest average annual effective and drought
effective rainfall levels in the UK and the impact on agriculture is further compounded by favouring
light soils which are more prone to thought.
___________________ 1990/91
	
1991192	 1992/93	 1993/94	 1994/95
DOMESTIC
Raw loose	 2218	 2693	 2577	 2500	 2388
Raw prepacked	 625	 -	 -	 -	 -
Canned / other	 15	 21	 22	 24	 21
Dehydrated	 25	 26	 37	 22	 21
Crisped	 389	 427	 506	 508	 434
Frozen/Chilled	 395	 463	 509	 564	 457
TOTAL DOM
	
3667	 3630	 3650	 3618	 3321
NON DOM
Raw	 948	 850	 1082	 1534	 1252
Canned/	 300	 297	 314	 263	 391
dehydrated/ other
Crisped	 207	 150	 128	 177	 200
Frozen/ chilled
	
580	 629	 818	 793	 862
TOTAL NON	 2035	 1926	 2341	 2767	 2706
DOMESTIC
TOTAL USAGE	 5702	 5556	 5991	 6384	 6027
Table 5.2: Consum ption of potatoes in the UK. (Source: PMB 1996)
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The market for potatoes is divided into the fresh and processed sectors, with a total of 6,027,000
tonnes consumed in the UK in 1994/95 (PMB 1996). There are marked divisions within these
sectors, with the fresh market made up of loose, pre-packed and specialist niche potatoes, which
are sold through specific outlets namely supermarkets, wholesalers, chip shops and farm shops. The
process sector is divided principally into the crisp and frozen chip markets, with the dehydrated and
canned markets representing a declining share of total consumption (see table 5.2). The
consumption of fresh potatoes has remained relatively stable in both the domestic and catering
sectors, with the growth in consumption occurring in processed crisps and chips (see table 5.2). This
has translated into a steady increase in the tonnage of raw potatoes pmcured by the processing
companies, which increased in the frozen sector from 668,000 tons in 1990/9 1 to 954,000 tons in
1994/95 (see table 5.3).
'000 tonnes	 1990/91	 1991/92	 1992/93	 1993/94	 1994/95
CANNED/
DEHYD/OTHER
Homegrown	 152	 163	 140	 149	 171
Imported	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
CRISPED
Home grown	 595	 584	 695	 693	 641
Imported	 11	 10	 2	 4	 5
FROZEN/
CHILLED
Homegrown	 668	 742	 838	 911	 954
Imported	 38	 74	 62	 53	 57
TotalUKgrown	 1415	 1489	 1673	 1753	 1766
usage
Total processed	 1464	 1573	 1743	 1814	 1829
Total UK potato	 6555	 6267	 7802	 7065	 6445
production
% processed	 21.6%	 23.8%	 21.4%	 24.8%	 27.4%
Table 5.3: Estimated tonna2e of raw potatoes used in processing in the UK.
(Source: PMB 1996)
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National figures on the production of field scale root vegetables, namely carrots and parsnips, are
not readily available from reported MAFF statistics. In fact, these crops are subsumed under the
heading of outdoor fleldseale vegetables which totalled 127,000 hectares in 1994 (MAFF 1995).
The reported value of the carrot crop reached £93 million in 1994, and the higher prices reflected
the reduced yields which were a consequence of the cold spring and dry summer (MAFF 1995).
Production of these crops are primarily for the fresh market, with the baby carrots and "carrots with
tops" evolving as niche products alongside the general loose or pre-pack carrot and parsnip. Carrots
are also frozen for the domestic and catering markets, although data on the size of these markets are
not readily available.
The general characteristics of the potato processing and marketing companies interviewed in this
study are presented in table 5.4. In total 2.3 million tonnes of potatoes are processed or packaged by
these ten companies, which represent the market for 45% of total UK farm production in 1994.
More significantly perhaps, the five processing companies used a total of 1.3 million tons of raw
potato, representing 75% of total consumption in this sector in 1994. The processing companies all
operate in the international market and ownership varies from sole family control to public limited
company status. Three crisp and one frozen chip processor are subsidiaries of multi-national, agri-
food companies with interests across the food production and consumption process ranging from
seed and chemical fertiliser inputs, to animal feed stuffs, to snack food production, to food transport
distribution companies. These processing companies have developed a combination of direct and
indirect linkages across the food chain through ownership or partnership agreements with specialist
potato seed producers, membership of international research and development institutes, and their
own in-house research programmes. These companies have also developed forward contract
production agreements with farmers to ensure production of potatoes.
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In contrast, in the fresh market the firms primarily operate at the national or regional level, and only
one firm is a subsidiary of a multinational company. A total of 1 million tonnes of potatoes are
packaged by four of these companies 1 , which represented a fifth of the national tonnage in 1994.
These companies are also directly involved in potato seed, as producers of seed and through
membership of national and international research and development institutes. Direct involvement
with farmers, through forward contract production, is confined to specialist niche varieties, but the
companies offer a range of specialist production and marketing advice to farmers through the
season. The three root vegetable pack-houses are quite distinctive regional companies, whose
operations are confined to the Breckland area of Norfolk and the Fenland of Cambndgeshire and
Lincoinshire. These companies are family owned and managed and have diversified into specialist
pre-packing from their core business of carrot, parsnip, potato and salad crop production. Land
ownership ensures these companies retain control of production, with a staff of specialist
agronomists and fleldsmen continually monitoring the crops. The companies also lease land with
water rights attached on a yearly basis from other farmers in the locality. Details on the actual
production system, in terms of the land area and quantities produced, were not forthcoming as the
companies claimed this information was confidential. Nevertheless the full extent of this
sophisticated system was revealed through the farmer interviews, where a number of fanners leased
out their land with water tights ( see 6.1.4 for full details).
5.2: The structure of the potato and root ve2etable network.
The structural organisation of the potato and root vegetable network provides critical insight into the
key mechanisms through which finns directly and indirectly control and manipulate the production
and consumption of food. Previous analysis has focused on the interaction between farmers and off-
farm firms (Hawkins 1991; Marsden et a! 1992) but failed to explore the complex inter-
relationships within which these firms are themselves embedded. This represents a significant gap,
'Note one of the companies refused to reveal figures on the tonnage of potatoes packaged annually.
161
as interaction with farmers is the end point of a complex and multi-dimensional process of market
regulation, as firms within the food network directly and indirectly shape and manipulate each
other's behaviour. The form and function of these inter-linkages and the relations of power and
dependence which underpin them, are central to understanding the way firms shape and influence
on-farm production decision making.
Economic theory has traditionally concentrated on two forms of inter-firm linkage, namely vertical
integration and independent transactions in the market place. Vertical integration is assumed to
reduce uncertainty over the supply and price of raw material inputs (Crew 1975) through the linear
consolidation of the entire production process under the control of a single firm. This has been
viewed by traditionalist and Marxist geographers as an unproblematic process, driven by economies
of scale and the reduction of transaction costs or the inevitable consequence of the centralising
tendencies of capitalist accumulation (see Holmes 1986 for a full review of this literature). Neo-
classical economic analysis, in contrast, assumes all firms engage in cost rational decision making in
which all firms are independent and equal. Nevertheless, between these two extremes there are a
number of alternatives which suggest vertical integration within firms or commodity sectors is not
inevitable and that subordinate firms may occupy important structural positions (Fitzsiminons
1986; Holmes 1986; Ekinsmyth el a! 1995).
This is clearly the case in the UK food sector, where vertical integration between supermarkets,
food processors, food manufacturers, pack-houses and farmers has failed to occur (Marsden and
Wrigley 1994). In fact the relationships which connect the producers and consumers of food cannot
be characterised as simple, nor linear type system in which market exchange occurs between equals.
In reality, farmers, as the producers of food, have been reduced to little more than the suppliers of
raw material inputs, which are progressively transfonned and re-valued by successive
manufacturers, packagers and retailers before finally arriving on the supermarket shelf (Munton
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1992; Marsden and Arce 1995). These relationships are complex and multiple, as firms are tied
together through a network of inter-linkages which are maintained and reinforced by flows of
capital and infonnation to control and regulate the production and consumption of food. The
relations of power and dependence which underpin this network are critically important, enabling
detailed exploration of the ways in which the supermarkets and processors exploit their position to
manipulate the decision making of subordinate firms and, by implication, farmers. This is evident in
the potato and root vegetable sectors, where the analysis identifies a complex network of inter-finn
linkages which control and regulate the operations of the surveyed firms (see figure 5.3). The
analysis distinguishes between the fresh and processed potato networks, where there are marked
differences in the form and function of the inter-firm linkages.
5.2.1: The fresh potato network
The fresh potato network identified iii figure 5.3 Part A concentrates on the web of linkages,
through which supermarkets control and regulate the production and consumption of fresh potatoes.
This represents the quality end of the market, which sells niche salad, pre-pack, baking and loose
potatoes, as opposed to the wholesale and chip shop trade which concentrates on bulk supply. The
organisation of potato procurement in both the supermarkets interviewed is based around a team of
produce buyers and potato technologists. The responsibilities of these personnel are divided along
technical lines, with the buyers primarily responsible for ensuring a constant supply of potatoes to
the stores on a weekly basis. They are also responsible for spotting and developing new market
opportunities, which in the potato sector relate to new niche varieties. In contrast, the potato
technologists are responsible for ensuring the quality of the potatoes and compliance with health
and safety legislation.
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The supermarkets have no direct contact with the actual growers, working instead through a pool of
between 8-10 specified potato suppliers, or "preferred suppliers". This procurement strategy
represents a significant shift in emphasis away from the wholesale spot market and the use of
merchants and evolved in the early 1990s in response to the introduction of British Standard
BS5750. The changes to these inter-firm relationships reflect, in part, the unintended consequences
and side effects which result from this new State regulation. A central element of this standard is
the traceability of produce, which ensures a potato can be traced, for example, from the seed to the
supermarket shelf, ensuring full knowledge of all chemical applications used on the seed, in the
field and in storage. Merchants operating on the spot market are unable to guarantee the provenance
of produce, and thus the supermarkets are themselves legally liable if any produce on their shelves
actually break the standards. In consequence, working through a pool of suppliers the supermarkets
are able to ensure all produce meets the legal requirements by stipulating each supplier signs a
declaration on product quality assurance. This is drawn up by the supermarkets and incorporates the
key elements set Out in BS5 750, ensuring legal responsibility for traceability is shifted from the
supermarket to the supplier. The supermarkets, through the potato technologists, police this system
and ensure compliance through audits and unannounced spot checks at each supplier.
The potato technologists are also responsible for the development of the produce quality criteria.
which are specifically designed for each segment of the potato market. In conjunction with the team
of buyers, the potato technologists draw up a list of between 8-10 preferred potato varieties, which
the stores will stock over the year. Quality specifications are drawn up specifically for each variety,
and the information is then relayed to the pool of suppliers. Although the supermarkets set out strict
conditions of supply encompassing the quality specifications and standards on health and safety,
there are no written contracts with the supplier specifying the actual price, delivery date or quantity
to be supplied through the year. This ensures the supermarkets retain a flexible approach and are
able to take advantage of quality or price variations in the wider market.
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The pooi of supennarket suppliers includes two distinct types of commercial operation, namely
farmer co-ops and commercial pack-houses who supply a range of differential quality potatoes, not
only to supermarkets but also to wholesalers, pre-packers, chip shops and processors. The form and
function of the inter-relationship with farmers is markedly different in each of the groups.
The co-ops have a committed number of farmers who grow a set area of potatoes which are over-
seen by co-op agronomists and fieldsmen. Although there are no direct contracts between the co-op
and fanner, setting a price for the supply of supermarket standard potatoes, the co-op s do guarantee
a market outlet for the crop whatever its quality. The co-op agronomists critically influence and
shape the potato marketing strategy of the farmer by providing information and advice on the
suitability of particular varieties to their land and water resources. Individual meetings are held with
farmers in the autunm to discuss the harvested crop and to plan the following year's production. The
agronomist advises on the market sector which the farmer is best suited to, on the basis of past
performance, land and soil type, availability of irrigation water, storage facilities, harvesting
equipment and the cash flow requirements of the farmer. On the basis of this information the
agronomist will suggest the most suitable market sector, and in consequence the potato variety. All
subsequent advice relates to the growth characteristics of the variety, with the agronomist providing
pre-season information on the seed spacing rates, fertiliser, pesticide and herbicide application,,
when to trigger the first irrigation application, when to spray off the crop 2 and when to harvest.
Through the season, fleldsmen visit once every seven to ten days to monitor the crop and provide
advice on specific problems. This close contact enables the fieldsmen to ensure farmers record all
information relating to fertiliser, pesticide and herbicide applications, thereby complying with
BS5750.
2 T management procedure is a vital pre-harvest operation, which kills off leaf and stem growth on the potato plant and
succeeds in speeding up the tuber skin setting process, avoids the onset and spread of disease and controls the size of the
potato tubers.
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The co-op has developed close contacts with farmers playing a key role shaping and manipulating
on-farm production decision making to ensure produce conforms to the supermarket quality and
health and safety standards. This is in the interests of the supermarket which benefits not only from
the local knowledge and contacts of the co-op staff, but also, the close contact between co-op staff
and farmers means that the co-op effectively polices production to ensure compliance with the
quality and safety standards set by the supermarket. Thereby the supermarket avoids incurring any
of the financial costs of regulating production.
In contrast, the second group of suppliers, namely the potato pack-house companies, maintain
minimal direct contact with farmers, using a pooi of other companies, predominantly farmer co-ops
but also merchants to supply potatoes. The companies are active in the national potato market and
supply specialist niche salad, pre-pack and baking potatoes to their supennarket customers. These
companies operate two distinctive potato procurement strategies, with all salad niche varieties
grown on forward contracts with farmers. The procurement of standard pre-pack and baking
potatoes adopts a markedly different approach with no direct involvement with farmers, working
instead through a pooi of defined suppliers who have sole responsibility for ensuring the
procurement of these potatoes. The suppliers sign a declaration, issued by the pack-house, which
incorporates the key elements of BS5 750 and relays the quality specifications set by the
supermarket. However, there are no contracts of supply between the pack-house and supplier, who
relies on weekly negotiations on price, quantity and delivery dates.
The form and function of the inter-firm linkages in the fresh potato network are clearly defined and
manipulated by the supermarkets, who have used their position of dominance within the food sector
to control at arms length the production and consumption of potatoes. The supermarkets have
established and maintained an effective network of control by procuring potatoes through a pool of
defined suppliers. This strategy enables them to control and regulate the flow of information and
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capital to other parts of the network, without incurring any of the financial and legal costs or risks
associated with close liaison with farmers, and is typified in the supermarket response to the
implementation of BS5750. When the standard was first introduced, the supermarkets were open to
legal prosecution, as their procurement operation failed to comply with the new standard and they
were unable to trace the produce on their shelves through all stages of the production process.
Restructuring their procurement strategy enabled the supermarkets to shift the risk of legal
prosecution, by ensuring responsibility for the traceability of produce rested finnly with their
suppliers. Consequently, it is the responsibility of the pool of preferred suppliers to ensure all
potatoes sold to the supermarkets are traceable, with access to all records on the crop histoiy
relating to the use of all chemical inputs used on the seed, in the field and in storage. The
introduction of the new BS5750 has had a number of unintended consequences and side effects
which were not foreseen when first introduced by Government and reinforce the position of the
supermarkets as the new regulators of the food system, as they effectively take on responsibility for
policing the implementation ofBS575O through audits and unannounced spot checks.
The role of the suppliers within this network is critical, as they are the central point, or channel of
negotiation and representation between supermarkets and farmers. These firms are used as "social
carriers" (Marsden and Arce 1995) by the supermarkets, who take advantage of their close contact
with farmers at the local level to relay and enforce the supermarket quality specifications. The
position of these subordinate firms is critical, enabling the supermarkets to control production at a
distance, without incurring any of the legal or fmancial risks and uncertainties associated with
vertical integration.
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5.2.2: The potato processing network
The potato processing network has undergone major restructuring over the last 5 years, with a
movement away from the use of potato merchants to greater direct contact with farmers. Figure 5.3
Part B underlines the close linkage between processors and farmers, with forward contracting the
key mechanism of ensuring supply. Change has been most dramatic among the crisp processors,
who had previously procured up to 50% of their potato raw material demand through merchants.
This figure has dropped significantly, with 70-80% of potatoes now supplied through forward
contracts with farmers. The supply shortfall is made up through the purchase of excess tonnage
produced by contract farmers, and in periods of extreme shortage, through merchants.
The switch in procurement strategy reflects the increasing competition between processing firms,
which are attempting to increase market share in a highly competitive international market. As part
of this strategy, the firms are now developing potato varieties which are specifically tied to their
end potato products, as well as strict quality criteria which are also related to these varieties.
Confidentiality is the key to ensuring competitors do not gain access to this critical inside
information, and the merchants are unable, given the nature of their operation, to guarantee this. By
cutting out these intermediaries and dealing directly with farmers, the processors are better able to
retain confidentiality while at the same time strictly monitoring and enforcing quality at the farm
level.
The procurement of potatoes is organised by a team of buyers and agronomists, with
responsibilities divided along purely technical lines. The buyers are primarily responsible for
negotiations with farmers over the contract, while the agronomists co-ordinate advice to farmers,
develop the quality standards, organise the seed sourcing operation and the research and
development programme. All the company agronomists provide detailed information to the farmer
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on the particular growing characteristics of the potato variety, but only one company supplements
this information with actual farm visits through the season to regulate and monitor production.
The nature of the inter-firm linkages in the frozen chip network does not reflect the same level of
organisational uniformity, with the firms adopting markedly different approaches to the
procurement of potatoes. This does not reflect differences in market position, as both companies
produce leading own brand products, as well as producing, on contract, own label products for fast
food, catering companies and supermarkets. Nevertheless, there are marked differences in the total
quantity of potatoes procured, with the larger user developing a procurement strategy in line with
the approach adopted by the crisp companies. Thus, a declining proportion of potatoes are procured
through merchants and there is greater reliance on forward contracts with fanners.
In contrast, the other company has no involvement with farmers, procuring all potatoes through a
pool of defined suppliers, including co-ops and merchants, spread across the UK. This procurement
strategy developed in response to the restructuring of the company, which forced the closure of the
agronomy department and consequent job losses. Hence constraints of capital and labour prevent
closer involvement with the farni sector. Consequently, although the company uses a list of
preferred potato varieties this is not strictly adhered to and the firm uses whatever varieties, of
whatever quality are available on the market at the time, to ensure a continuous supply through the
factory. The nature of the inter-relationship with the pool of suppliers is not therefore overly
restrictive, as the company does not attempt to reduce supply uncertainty through strict
specifications on variety or quality. This company however is the exception, as all the other
processors interviewed have attempted to reduce uncertainty over the supply of potato raw materials
through forward contract production.
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5.2.3 The root vegetable network.
The form and function of the inter-firm relationships in the root vegetable network are distinctly
different to the relationships noted in the fresh and processing potato networks. Although the
supermarkets, once again, devolve procurement of carrots and parsnips to a pool of preferred
suppliers, the pack-houses have a markedly different relationship with farmers. In fact, the three
pack-houses interviewed in this network, directly control production through the vertical integration
of the entire production process under their sole control. Thus, as the owners of land they are able
to directly regulate and control production to ensure produce conforms to the supermarket quality
specifications. These companies operate highly sophisticated, capital intensive systems of
production with specialist planting and harvesting machinery, agronomists and fleldsmen
monitoring the crops in the field and staff employed in the harvesting and packaging of the crops in
individual pack-houses. The expansion of production by these companies is dependent on the
acquisition of more land with water rights attached. Consequently, these companies also rent land
with water rights attached from other farmers on a one year seasonal contract or a lease back, swap
arrangement. This complicated system enables the pack-house firm to grow a set area of carrots or
parsnips on other farmers' land; these farmers then grow sugar beet or wheat as a break crop on the
pack-house's own land. No money changes hands, and each partner in the arrangement is wholly
responsible for all production decision making on their crop.
This system is supplemented by formal lease arrangements, and within the Breckland area the
companies compete among themselves in order to rent light sand land with water rights attached.
Land without water rights is not considered, as the risks of producing the crop without irrigation are
too high. In consequence, the pack-houses reserve a set quantity of water from the farmers' total
licensed quantity at the beginning of the season. The fanners are typically paid £1 50-200 per acre
for the land and £25-40 per acre inch for the actual water. Labour and pumping costs are included at
the end of the season, depending on actual usage. Although the farmers have no involvement in
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decision making in relation to the crop, they do set up and manage the irrigation system often using
their own irrigators, and trigger an irrigation application on the direction of the agronomist or
fieldsman.
The historical development of these firms provides critical insight into the key processes
influencing the development of their root vegetable procurement strategy, as they all started off as
farmers, producing carrots and parsnips for sale on the spot market. The financial risks of
production, reflected in the extreme fluctuations in produce prices as well as the differential
between farm gate and supermarket prices, forced these firms to diversify into pack-house
operations in order to reduce the risks and uncertainties of marketing the crops. By adding value
through packaging the crop, the firms were able to reduce the financial risks of price fluctuations
and deal directly with the supermarket customers, thus reasserting control over the off-farm
exchange process.
The organisational structure of the fresh and processing potato and root vegetable networks
underline the complex nature of the inter-firm relationships which underpin the food network. The
analysis demonstrates how the supermarkets and processors have successfully avoided vertical
integration, while at the same time refuting the contention of neo-classical economic analysis that
finns engage in cost rational decision making in which all firms are equal and independent. In fact
the analysis reveals the unequal balance of power within the food network, as the supermarkets and
processors are able to dictate the terms of trade to subordinate firms and farmers who occupy an
important structural position within the network. hi fact both the supermarkets and processors
reformed their produce procurement strategies in the late 1980s and early 1990s in response to new
Government legislation and the quest to maintain and increase market share. In consequence, the
form and function of their inter-relationship changed, with the supermarkets reallocating specific
duties and responsibilities to subordinate firms, while the processors withdrew from their
172
involvement with "middle men" and refocussed their procurement strategy solely on farmers. This
resulted in the supermarkets and processors concentrating their procurement strategy on specific
supply firms, and farmers insuring they inter-locked more precisely with their centrally controlled,
logistically efficient operations. The supermarkets and processors effectively control their respective
networks, which enables them to avoid all the financial risks and uncertainties associated with
vertical integration, while at the same time benefiting from all the associated benefits, namely a
reliable, consistent supply of produce which conforms to Health and Safety legislation, quality and
price specifications. This asymmetrical bargaining power enables the supermarkets and processors
to manipulate and regulate the operations of subordinate firms and fanns, successfully reallocating
the risks and uncertainties associated with production for others to bear.
5.3: Networks of quality: implications for the use and management of irri2ation water.
The supermarkets and food processors have successfully exploited their position of economic
power within the food network, to manipulate and control production without incurring any of the
fmancial risks of vertical integration. One of the key mechanisms, through which they exert control
over the production process and extract value, is the definition of precise produce quality criteria.
These criteria attempt to ensure the uniformity of produce in terms of colour, shape, size,
appearance and taste and require the direct manipulation and control of on-farm production
decision making. In both the fresh and processed potato networks, there are competing definitions
of quality, with different emphases given to different factors depending on the end use of the
potato. Despite this variability, the quality criteria have critically important implications for on-farm
management, particularly irrigation use, as it is one of the only management tools which can control
two of the most important quality dimensions, namely potato size and skin finish.
In the fresh potato network the supennarkets are the driving force behind the continual refinement
of quality standards, as they attempt to increase the value added to the fmal product and create new
173
markets. This is reflected most clearly in the actual marketing of potatoes in store, with the
movement, over the last 5 years, away from the sale of loose potatoes with no identification of
variety or cooking purpose, to an increasingly nichified or segmented approach. Thus, potatoes are
now clearly marketed either by purpose, for example, chipping potatoes, baking potatoes or salad
potatoes; or by variety for example Mans Piper, King Edward, Cara or Charlotte varieties. These
potatoes are rarely sold in loose form and the standard practice across the supermarkets is the
packaging of pre-washed potatoes in packs, punnets or pre-weighted bags. As a consequence of this
marketing strategy the appearance, and most importantly the skin finish of the potato, has become
increasingly critical to their saleability.
Each supermarket develops a list of preferred potato varieties, which succeeds in restricting choice
to 8-10 pre-selected varieties, chosen on the basis of past sales performance and market research.
The supermarkets undertake customer testing of the potatoes primarily among their own staff, but
also occasionally extended to the general public. Blind tests score the different potato varieties
against four key criteria namely taste, cookabiity, appearance and texture. This information then
feeds in to the choice of potato variety, and the design of the quality criteria (see table 5.5). The
choice of potato variety critically shapes and influences the quality specification and by extension
critically determines the use and management of irrigation water at the farm level.
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FRESH POTATO	 PROCESSING
MARKET	 POTATO
____________ ____________ MARKET
	 ____________
Supermarket (A)
	 Fish and Chip	 Crisps (C)
	 Chip and potato
_________________ frade(B)	 _________________ products (D)
niche salad crop
i. variety specific	 i. variety specific	 i. variety specific
	
i. variety specific
ii. skin finish	 ii. fly colour	 ii. size and shape
	 ii. fry colour
iii. size and shape	 iii. dry matter	 iii. thy matter	 iii. sugar levels
iv. damage, internal	 iv. size	 iv. sugar levels! fly	 iv. size
bruising	 v. damage	 colour	 v. thy matter
v. disease	 vi. disease	 v. damage	 vi. damage
vi. cookabiity	 vii skin finish	 vi. disease	 vii. skin finish
vii. skin finish
Baking potato
i. variety specific 	 Favoured varieties 	 Favoured varieties 	 Favoured varieties
ii. skin finish	 Mans piper	 Lady Rosetta;	 Russet Birbank;
iii. size	 Record; Saturna
	
Shepody; Yukon
iv. damage and	 Gold; Mans Piper;
internal bruising	 Pentland Dell.
v. disease
vi. cookabiity
Pre-pack potato
i. variety! purpose
specific
ii. skin finish
iii. damage and
bruising
iv. fly colour
v. dry matter
vi. size and shape
vii. cookability
Favoured varieties
Cara; King Edward;
Mans Piper; Mans
Peer; Desiree;
Marfona; Jersey;
Pink Fir Apple; Belle
de Fontenay;
Asparge; Esteema
Table 5.5: Central dimensions of potato quality,
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All potato varieties have variable tolerance to drought, which reflects their capacity to yield tubers
under conditions of water siress. The potato varieties favoured by the supermarkets (see table 5.5
column A) include three varieties King Edward, Mans Piper and Mans Peer which have vety low
levels of drought tolerance (NIAB 1995), and therefore require irrigation even under normal
weather conditions. Of critical importance for on-farm water use, potato varieties also offer
variable resistance to common scab, which is one of the most widespread diseases affecting
potatoes, leading to significant loss of skin quality (Bailey 1990). Irrigation application is the only
management tool which actually controls this disease, and water must be applied to ensure the soil
moisture deficit level (SMD) does not fall below 15mm for a critical 4-6 week period following
tuber initiation (see Bailey 1990 for full details). In fact, six potato varieties included on the
supermarket lists show low to moderate resistance to common scab (NIAB 1995), and irrigation is
therefore a vital element of production.
These problems are further compounded by the quality specifications which are drawn up for each
variety. The appearance of the potato is vital for all varieties what ever their end use, particularly as
supermarkets now sell pre-washed and packaged potatoes which clearly expose any minor
imperfections. Skin finish is obviously the most important element of potato appearance, and the
level of common scab is vital. The supermarkets will not tolerate any scab on salad or baking potato
varieties, and will only accept scab on chipping or general purpose varieties, if the scab covers less
than 5% of the potato, is confmed to the skin's surface and can be removed in one peeling. These
exacting specifications place severe pressures on farmers to produce scab free potatoes, and
encourage them to adopt an intensive irrigation regime. In fact, if farmers maintain the soil moisture
deficit levels at 15mm for the requisite 4-6 week period, calculations suggest that up to 50% of the
total water applied to the crop is used to control common scab. Irrigation in this phase of growth
does not produce any other benefits in terms of the size of the tubers or yield, which are both
improved through irrigation in the later stages of growth. Another vital element of potato
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appearance is the presence of cracks which develop as a consequence of water stress and a stop-go
growth pattern (Bailey 1990). Hair line cracks are only tolerated if they can easily be removed by
peeling.
The second critically important dimension of quality is the size and shape of the potato, particularly
in salad and baking varieties. Baking potatoes are defined within a 6 0-80mm size grade, with an
oval shaped tuber. To some degree farmers are able to control these variables by varying the seed
spacing rate. Nevertheless, the most important management tool influencing the size of the tubers is
the application of in-igation water in the later stages of the growth cycle to aid the "bulldng up3"
process. Thus, in combination with the clean skin finish, farmers are expected to instigate an
intensive irrigation regime which controls the incidence of common scab in the period immediately
following tuber initiation; ensure that the plant does not suffer any water stress leading to growth
cracks in the middle phase of growth, and then apply water in the later stages to ensure the tubers
meet the correct size specifications. Consequently, irrigation is vital to the production of the
"perfect" baking potato.
The size and shape of the salad varieties are also carefully defined with the Charlotte variety
expected to conform to a long, oval shape, with the tuber diameter ranging from a minimum of
20mm to a maximum of 45mm and the length ranging from 25-100mm. To ensure the tubers
conform to this long, oval shape, production is confined to the light sand lands. In consequence,
irrigation is vital to ensure against the problems of scab, which is particularly prelevant on sand
land, and ensure water stress does not create problems of growth cracks or misshapen tubers. The
growing season for these varieties is relatively short and in theory the demand for water should be
less. However, these varieties are often produced under double cropping systems, whereby one crop
3 Bulking up relates to the increase in size and weight of the tubers.
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is harvested and then another immediately planted, thus placing greater stress on water resources, as
the second crop is more susceptible to drought as the soil moisture levels are often depleted.
The third critically important dimension of quality is the level of tuber damage and bruising, which
is primarily controlled through the harvesting and storage procedures on the farm and in the pack-
house. Damage to the actual tubers such as scarring or removal of chunks of flesh, develop as a
consequence of mishandling when lifting the potatoes in the field, and poor machinery and labour
practices are often blamed. This is a critically important dimension of potato quality, which the
supermarkets are unwilling to relax, even in periods of shortage. The fourth dimension of quality
relates to the storage "potential" of the crop and the presence of any blemishes or diseases which
may subsequently develop into serious problems such as silver scurf black scurf and skin spots on
tubers. Hence, the potato entering storage must be unblemished, and irrigation is therefore essential
to ensure an even pattern of growth without water stress. The final dimension of quality focuses on
the cookability of the potato, and is particularly important for chipping and general purpose
varieties. In fact the dry matter levels are critically important and are defined in a range of 19-23%
dry matter to ensure the crispness of the final product.
The specification of strict variety and quality criteria serves to reduce uncertainty over the supply of
potatoes, as supermarkets attempt to ensure a consistent supply of uniform potatoes which conform
to their definition of the "perfect" potato. Significantly, this process also enables the supermarkets
to differentiate between different potato "qualities" in terms of the variety, use or appearance, to
create new markets which re-constitute or add value to a staple product of the UK diet. The
development of baby salad potatoes perhaps best exemplifies this process as the supermarkets have
re-valued and re-labelled small potatoes into a new niche or exotic potato product. The quality
criteria are central to the creation of these new potato markets, and a vehicle for the transfer of
surplus value from the farmer to the supermarket.
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In the processing potato network the quality specifications, although different, are no less exacting
with marked distinctions between the criteria for chip and crisp potatoes. All the crisp and one of
the chip processors interviewed work with a list of preferred potato varieties which are closely
matched to specific end products. The choice of these varieties is closely assessed against four key
criteria, namely consumer acceptability, process efficiency, on-farm production complexity and
environmental friendliness which is only slowly being incorporated into the assessment. Consumer
acceptability is acknowledged as the most important criterion, and the final products are tested in
market research where the taste, appearance, crunchiness and colour of the different products are
assessed by consumers. Different varieties are used in the final product to evaluate their
acceptability. The second key criterion examines the process efficiency of the different varieties
within the factory. Variations in terms of the dry matter levels or reducing sugar levels critically
influence the processing of the raw material inputs. For example, potatoes with low thy matter
levels will absorb more oil when cooked, thereby increasing costs and leading to a less crisp or
crunchy end product. In addition, low reducing sugar levels are critical to ensuring production of
the pale coloured crisp, favoured in the consumer tests and additional processing such as bleaching
the raw potato may be necessary to remove the excess sugar. These considerations are critically
important, as the companies attempt to reduce uncertainty, costs and variability within the
production process. The consistent supply of raw material inputs which conform to the same
standards thereby ensures the production of a uniform end product.
The third criterion, on-farm production complexity, relates to the viability of producing the variety
in UK agricultural conditions given the consiraints of climate and land resources. Obviously, the
vulnerability of the variety to drought and water stress is a factor which should be evaluated at this
stage. However, it is not incorporated into the current assessment criteria. The final criterion,
environmental friendliness, has only been introduced in the last 2-3 years and has been
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incorporated by one company into their research and development programme, reflecting their
response to new environmental policies emanatng from Government and the EU. To date they
have only focused on the use of chemical inputs namely fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides and are
examining the use of alternative varieties which demand less nitrogen and are susceptible to fewer
diseases requiring herbicide or pesticide applications. This approach has evolved in response to the
NSA and NVZ schemes and the potential extension of even tighter controls in order to prevent
groundwater pollution and protect drinking water quality.
These criteria, in combination, determine the choice of potato variety, with the crisp processors
today favouring Saturna, Record and Lady Rosetta while the chip processors prefer Russet Birbank,
Shepody, Mans Piper, Pentland Dell and Yukon Gold (see table 5.5 column C and D).
Nevertheless, the choice of varieties is not solely the responsibility of the processors as some of
their own customers, primarily for chip potatoes, favour the use of certain varieties which conform
to their own corporate definition of the perfect chip. A good example is McCain Chips, which is the
main UK producer of chips for the MacDonalds chain of fast food outlets. MacDonalds specify in
their contract with McCains the use of the Russet Birbank, Yukon Gold and Pentland Del varieties
which ensure the processing of chips which conform to the ideal end product, namely a long, thin
pale coloured chip.
The resistance of these varieties to drought is variable with Russet Birbank, Satuma and Record in
particular showing vely low resistance, while Yukon Gold and Pentland Dell only show moderate
resistance levels (NIAB 1995). This in-built susceptibility to drought is further compounded by the
crisp processors insisting that all their varieties are grown on light sand or sandy loam soils, which
have a low soil moisture retentive capacity and are prone to drought. In consequence, these varieties
are prone to even minor fluctuation in rainfall or short dry spells and irrigation is, therefore, vital to
ensure the growth of the crop through the season.
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The quality criteria which the processors have developed are specifically related to the variety and
end use of the product and comprise three critically important dimensions. Firstly, the thy matter
levels, which reflect the proportion of the tuber which is not water, must range between 20-23% dry
matter in both crispmg and chipping potatoes to ensure the correct level of crunchiness or crispness
of the end product. Secondly, the reducing sugar content of the tubers should range between 0.10-
0.20% to ensure the correct colour of the final product. These quality dimensions are only
indirectly influenced by irrigation application, as problems only occur if a stop-go growth pattern is
established. The application of water through the season ensures an 'even' pattern of growth and
prevents problems of sugar spotting or uneven fry colours. The third critical dimension of quality
relates to the size and shape of the tubers. The tubers must be an even shape and size, which range
between 45-65mm. Irrigation through the season prevents the onset of misshapen tubers and aids
the bulking up process, thereby ensuring the tubers conform to the size specification. These are the
three most important dimensions of quality, which the processors rarely relax. Nevertheless, there
are two further factors which also play a role, and failure to comply to these specifications can lead
to the rejection of the crop. Skin finish, although not as vital as in the fresh potato network, is only
tolerated within certain hnu...thus if the scab is very deep and cannot be removed in one peeling,
the sample is rejected. Tolerance to tuber damage and bruising is also limited and once the levels
fall below a defined level the crop is rejected.
The specification of strict variety and quality criteria in the processing potato network succeeds in
reducing uncertainty over the supply of raw material inputs, as the processors guarantee a constant
supply of potatoes for the factory. In addition, the processors also reduce a significant source of
variability and uncertainty within the factory production process itself. A consistent supply of
uniform potatoes ensures a standardised production process, thereby increasing efficiency and
reducing the costs associated with production within the factory.
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The market for carrots and parsnips is relatively undifferentiated, with limited scope for adding
value to the end product and developing new niche products. To date this process has largely
concentrated on the development of early carrots, parsnips, carrots with tops, and baby carrot
products. In consequence, the quality criteria are not designed to suit specific varieties or end
purposes and aie therefore broadly similar, relating to the length, width, shape and skin finish of
the carrot or parsnip. To ensure production conforms to these criteria, all carrots and parsnips are
grown on light, sand land which is the optimal growing medium and prevents shape distortion.
Irrigation water is vital to ensure the growth of the crop, as light land is susceptible to drought and
under these conditions the crop withers and dies. Thus irrigation is vital to guarantee the growth
and yield of the crop and only marginally improves quality.
Risk and uncertainty play a central role shaping the form and function of interaction between firms
and between firms and farmers in the fresh and processing networks, and this is reflected in the
specification of strict variety and quality criteria Ekinsmyth et a! (1995) argue that the over riding
issue for firms is the reduction of risk and uncertainty within both their production and marketing
operations, and the behaviour of the supermarkets and processors conforms to this. The analysis
demonstrates how supermarkets and processors attempt to reduce the risks and uncertainties
associated with the procurement of potatoes to fulifi demand within the factory and from the final
consumer. The firms are responding to different types of risk in different ways and reflect the multi-
dimensional nature of the concept (Royal Society 1992). Firstly, the specification of strict produce
variety and quality criteria enables the supermarkets and processors to exert greater control over the
flow of produce through their factories onto their supermarket shelves. Reducing uncertainty over
the supply of produce is critical, to reduce the variability associated with the quality of potatoes and
ensure they all conform to the same "homogeneous" standards. This strategy enables the
processors, in particular, to reduce the financial costs associated with producing the end product. A
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water at the farm level. Farmers become wholly reliant on access to, and use of, reliable supplies of
irrigation water to ensure production of the 'perfect' potato and the consequent price premiums.
Nevertheless, by adopting this management route they also become more vulnerable to the hazards
of low rainfall, drought and associated abstraction restrictions. Farmers' ability to resist these
processes of change are limited, as both the supermarkets and processors use their positions of
market domination to control and manipulate production decision making through direct and
indirect linkages with farmers and input suppliers.
5.3.1 Regulating quality at the farm level: direct and indirect mechanisms of controL
The form and function of the inter-firm linkages in the fresh and processing potato networks were
explored in section 5.2, and it is postulated that these processes of market regulation luive critical
implications for the inter-relationship between firms and farmers. Two key mechanisms of direct
and indirect regulation are identified: namely forward contract production and manipulation of the
flow of information and inputs to the farm. The analysis of these issues will draw on the postulates
set out in the literature on risk and uncertainty, exploring the contention that forward contracting
enables firms to extemalise the risk and uncertainties associated with production for other sub-
contracting firms to bear (Baich and Wu 1974; Ekinsmyth et a! 1995). In the potato networks,
forward contracting features predominantly in the processing network, although contracts are also
used to ensure the production of niche varieties in the fresh potato network.
Forward contract production in the processing potato network is used predominantly by the crisp
companies with only one chip processor actually using contracts to ensure supply. The proportion
of potatoes actually procured through contracts has increased significantly (see section 5.2.2 for full
discussion of reasons) and now represents between 70-100% of their raw material supply. The
relationship between the processor and farmer is unequal, and is entrenched in the forward contract
agreement. The interests of the processors predominate in negotiations, as they attempt to secure
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production of a target tonnage of preferred potato varieties. Discussions commence prior to the start
of the growing season, when the processor contacts growers who have successfully produced
quality potatoes in previous years. Other farmers, who contact the company showing interest in
contract production, are assessed to gauge their suitability. Four key factors form the basis of the
assessment exercise which are conducted by company staff through farm visits. Firstly, the
farmers'past performance, in terms of potato yield and quality are examined, paying particular
attention to the consistency of yield results and uniformity of quality. The second factor, which is
critically important, concerns the land and soil type. Crisp companies will only issue contracts to
farmers with light sand or loamy sand soils, which provide the optimal growing conditions for their
preferred varieties, particularly in relation to the dry matter levels of the tubers. The firms also
recognise that these light soils have reduced production risks, as the soils do not become water
logged enabling access throughout the season.
Thirdly, access to irrigation water is increasingly important, with one crisping company making
access to irrigation water a condition of contract. Other companies recognise the importance of
irrigation and are steadily increasing the proportion of contract farms with irrigation year on year,
with between 50-70% of contract fanns now able to irrigate. Nevertheless, none of the processing
companies actually recognise the differences in reliability of irrigation water, reflected in licences of
right and renewable licences, surface and ground water abstraction sources, or summer and winter
abstraction. These are important differences which translate at the farm level into differential access
to water in periods of drought and the associated risk of abstraction restrictions. On-farm water
storage, the most reliable source of irrigation water, is not, as yet, a condition of contract. The
failure of the processing firms to recognise the differential reliability of licence water in their
contract, reflects their failure to grasp the complexity of the irrigation issue and their limited
knowledge of water issues (see section 5.4 for discussion). The final assessment criterion ispurely
subjective and reflects the perceptions of the company representative involved in discussions with
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the farmer where they assess the attitude of the farmer, willingness to accept advice and ability to
work with the processor.
Once the company is convinced of the farmers suitability, the discussions move on to the actual
contract. The contract sets out the potato variety, quality specifications and the defects which will
lead to the rejection of the crop. The contract price is calculated on the basis of a two-part tariff,
which includes a fixed price calculated at the time of contract and a variable price which reflects the
market price at the time of delivery, and allows the processor to take advantage of possibly lower
seasonal prices. These calculations are fixed, and are not open to negotiation by the farmer. The
contract also sets out the delivery details, stating the tonnage and date on which the farmer must
produce the potatoes at the factory gate. Finally, a condition of contract stipulates that the farmer
must purchase potato seed directly from the processor. This strategy ensures the processor retains
some degree of control over the quality of potatoes, as the seed critically influences the incidence
of disease in the subsequent crop (see section 5.3.2 for full details) as well as ensuring the
processors an additional source of income. The quantity of seed supplied is calculated on the basis
of the total tonnage of potatoes the farmer has agreed to produce. The processors adopt a very
pessimistic approach and under estimate the yield/acre fanners will achieve, providing more seed
than is strictly necessary. In consequence, the majority of farmers exceed expectations and produce
in excess of the contract tonnage. The processors appear to be manipulating this situation to their
advantage, guaranteeing the production of a set tonnage of potatoes, while at the same time ensuring
farmers over produce. This allows them to buy up the surplus material at lower spot market prices
in the later stages of the season. On completion of contract negotiations, the processor provides the
farmer with a detailed information pack which contains advice on all production issues related to
the variety. This includes information on the seed spacing rate, seed bed preparation, application of
nitrogen, pesticide and herbicides programmes, when to trigger the first irrigation application,
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when to stop irrigation and when to harvest. Only one firm supplements this information with farm
visits.
Forward contract production in the processing network enables the processing firms to directly
control and manipulate both the on-farm production process and the off-farm exchange process,
without incurring any of the risks associated with production and land ownership. The contract
undermines the "independence" of the farmer, as production decision making is increasingly
dictated by the demands of the processing firm. This is primarily achieved through the specification
of strict potato quality criteria, which the processors directly regulate through the provision of
detailed infonnation and advice on the best management practices. The processing firm also
benefits from what Davis (1980) calls the self-exploitation of the farmer, who willingly co-
ordinates production decision making in line with the processor's advice, investing greater amounts
of his own time and taking greater care, in order to guarantee produce conforms to the quality
standards. In consequence, the processing firms succeed in directly and indirectly regulating
production and labour time on the farm, and thereby ensure the extraction and transfer of value
from the farmer to the processing firm.
In the fresh potato network, forward contracts are very rare and represent only a small fraction of
the total issued by the processing firms. Contracts are only used to ensure the production of niche
salad potatoes, and no other varieties are actually produced under forward agreements. The pack-
house companies have adopted this procurement strategy in response to two critical factors. Firstly,
the niche salad varieties are perceived as "difficult" crops to grow, which is further compounded
by the strict quality specifications. Secondly, the niche salad potatoes are specialist varieties which
serve only one purpose. Thus, if the farmer does not meet the quality specification, the potatoes
cannot be used for chipping, baking or processing purposes. In consequence the risks associated
with the production of these crops are high, and it is therefore difficult to persuade farmers to grow
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them on the free market. Forward contracts are the only way of guaranteeing the production of the
crop. The contracts are issued by the pack-house either directly to the farmer, or indirectly through
a co-op.
Given the economic and production risks associated with these varieties, the pack-house undertakes
a rigorous assessment of the farmer before issuing the contract. Four key factors are examined.
Firstly, and most importantly, only farmers on light sand land are considered, as this free draining
soil provides the optimal growing conditions for the crop. Secondly, the farmer must have access to
irrigation water, and a predefined quantity of water must be reserved solely for the crop, although
again there is no differentiation in terms of the reliability of the water source. Thirdly, the farmer
must be an established grower and prove that s/he can consistently produce high quality pre-pack
potatoes. Finally, the attitude of the farmer is critical, reflected in their willingness to accept advice
and work closely with the pack-house company. Only farmers who satisfy all these criteria are
accepted.
The actual contract sets out the potato variety and the associated quality criteria which the crop must
conform to. The full contract price is agreed prior to planting, in marked contrast to the two-part
tariff used in the processing network. Delivety dates are also stipulated, with the full tonnage
delivered to the pack-house on harvest. Finally, the pack-house stipulates, as a condition of
contract, that the farmer uses seed supplied by them. This reflects the limited supplies of seed
available in these varieties, with a small number of agents controlling supplies in the UK (see
section 5.3.2 for full details). Contract negotiations do not mark the end of the pack-house
involvement in the production of these varieties. Specialist agronomists and fieldsmen are closely
involved with the farmer, providing advice in weekly farm visits throughout the growing season
and in part reflects the difficulties of producing specialist varieties, of which the farmers have little
experience or knowledge. Thus, close contact is essential to ensure the varieties conform to the
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strict quality criteria, and reflects a markedly different approach to the form of contract
production in the processing network.
The principal mechanism through which the pack-houses and co-ops indirectly regulate and
manipulate farmer production decision making is by controlling the flow of information and advice
to farmers. These firms are the gate keepers, or quality regulators of the fresh potato network and
are used as a channel through which the supermarkets relay their potato variety and quality
specifications. In consequence, these firms play a pivotal role as they relay the information and
introduce "new ways of doing things" at the farm level. The pack-houses and co-ops provide
detailed production and marketing advice and information to farmers through specialist
agronomists and fieldsmen who monitor production throughout the season. This enables them to
directly manipulate and shape on-farm production decision making, to ensure farmers not only
produce the supermarket preferred varieties, but also that the potatoes actually conform to the
quality specifications. By maintaining close contacts with farmers, these firms are able to control
production at arms length, without incurring any of the risks associated with production and land
ownership. The processing and fresh potato networks have used a combination of direct and indirect
measures to regulate and control the production of potatoes, through direct forward contract
production and the indirect control of the flow of information and advice to fanners. Both these
mechanisms of arms length control enable the processors and pack-houses to regulate production
and labour time. This process maximises the transfer of surplus value from the farmer to the off-
farm firm, and ensures the production of produce which conforms to their specific variety and
quality criteria.
5.3.2 Regulating quality: controlling the supply and quality of seed.
The regulation and control of potato quality is not solely achieved through the manipulation of on-
farm production. A second critically important dimension of the work of both the processors and
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pack-houses focuses on the quality and supply of potato seed. This enables them to develop
specialist potato varieties suited to specific potato purposes, and control the quality of the seed
inputs used on the fann. The quality of the seed critically influences the incidence of disease in the
subsequent crop (NIAB 1995), and therefore control of this variable reduces one element of
uncertainty associated with potato production. In contrast to the 'arms length' control of farm
production, the processors and pack-houses have developed close linkages with specialist research
and development institutes nationally and internationally, and their own in-house research
programmes and specialist seed producing firms.
hi the fresh potato network, involvement in seed is solely the preserve of the pack-houses and co-
ops, with the supermarkets avoiding direct involvement in the day to day sourcing of new varieties
or control of seed quality4 . The pack-houses supply seed to farmers, either directly as a condition
of forward contract production, or through the commercial sales divisions of the company, which
enables them to directly control the quality of potato seed inputs at the farm level. Contacts in
international and national research and development institutes also enable these firms to respond to
new developments initiated by their supermarket customers.
The development of niche salad potato varieties reflects the complex interaction between
supermarkets, the pool of preferred suppliers, and their seed sourcing operations. Marketing
personnel in one supermarket spotted the potential for a new niche potato product, namely small
salad potatoes. Following discussions with the in-house potato technologists, a specification was
drawn up and relayed to the pool of defmed suppliers, who were asked to find a variety which met
this specification and suited UK production conditions. Membership of international research and
development institutes enabled these companies to search potential varieties across the globe. One
company successfully acquired the commercial rights to the Charlotte variety which conformed to
4 lNevertheless, they do play a role critically shaping and manipulating their suppliers most directly through the policing of
BS5750 where they demand full knowledge of all chemicals used on the seed.
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the supennarket specification, allowing them to control the supply of seed in the UK and by
extension, its use on the farm. This example highlights the commercial rewards of maintaining the
close linkages across the global food network. The firm capitalised on these close linkages to
quickly pin point a variety which matched the supermarket specification. The speed of their
response proved critical, enabling them to acquire the commercial rights to the variety before their
rivals, and thus control supply within the UK.
In the processing potato network the firms are closely involved in research and development into
new potato varieties, reflected in their own im-house programmes and through membership of
national and international research institutes, as they continually search for new varieties which will
improve the end product. The search for alternative varieties concentrates on two critical factors (i)
improving the efficiency of the production process and (ii) improving customer acceptability of the
final product. At the international level, these firms have established agreements with the major
potato research and development institutes, providing them with access to world-wide
developments in potato varieties. At the national level, the processors work through the Potato
Processing Association (PPA) which lobbies the PMB to cany out research. This focuses on
encouraging research funding into specific problems which occur in production or storage which
pose particular problems for the processors (Kirkman et a! 1991), although these companies have
not instigated research into irrigation issues in the past.
The companies also operate individual in-house research programmes, which focus on the
sponsorship of commercial trials into specific varieties. For example, one company has responded
to the stricter controls on chemical inputs at the farm level by developing a new research and
development programme into varieties which require less nitrogen input and are resistant to certain
diseases. This company perceives the introduction and extension of controls on chemical usage at
the farm level, as a significant threat to their future procurement of potatoes. By instigating
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research now, the company is attempting to ensure it has access to varieties which maintain
process efficiency and customer acceptability, while at the same time reducing the use of chemical
inputs. Once a new variety has proved itself in commercial trials, the processors often acquire the
commercial rights to the variety, allowing them sole control of the supply of the seed. This
management strategy enables them to develop specific varieties tailored to specific end products,
which are commercially confidential and therefore protected from rival processing companies. The
processors have extended this control, by developing their own seed growing operations either
through direct ownership of land,, or contract production with specialist, commercial seed growers.
The regulation of seed quality and supply enables firms in both the fresh and processing potato
networks to reduce uncertainty over the quality of potato production by reducing one significant
element of variability, namely the incidence of disease in the crop. In addition the research and
development programmes into alternative varieties also enables them to continually refine the
quality and add value to the end potato product. Processors and pack-houses have developed
complex and multiple inter-relationships across the food network to ensure the quality and supply
of potatoes. Their inter-relationship with farmers is characterised by direct and indirect forms of
regulation which enable the off-farm firms to control and manipulate production at arms length to
ensure the quality and supply of potatoes. The process of risk reallocation which underpins the
relationship between supermarkets, processors and their pool of 'preferred suppliers', is extended
by these firms in their interaction and inter-relationship with farmers at the local level. Balch and
Wu (1974) and Ekinsmyth el a! (1995) postulate that forward contracting enables the parent firm to
extemalise the risks and uncertainties associated with production for other sub-contracting finns to
bear. This analysis of forward contract production confirms this postulated relationship, with the
processing firms using the contract agreements to ensure the production and supply of their
preferred potato varieties. The contract agreement is used as a vehicle, to transfer the financial,
production and environmental risks and uncertainties associated with producing quality potatoes, to
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farmers at the local level. In particular, farmers have to bear the consequences of the processors'
preference for potato varieties which are vulnerable to drought and water stress, and leaves them
more vulnerable to the hazards of low rainfall, drought and abstraction restrictions.
In stark contrast, the relationship with seed input suppliers is markedly different as these subsidiary
firms are directly integrated into the parent firm enabling them to develop new varieties. This
reflects economies of scale, as the fmancial risks and uncertainties associated with integrating seed
input suppliers, compared to fanners, into the parent company are limited. Exerting control over
one or two subsidiary firms is relatively easy and the benefits far outweigh the costs. The parent
firm is able to develop varieties specifically suited to their end product while ensuring market
confidentiality, thereby enhancing their position in the market place. These processes of direct and
indirect regulation and control underline the significant role which companies in the fresh and
processing potato networks play in shaping on-farm production decision making and their central
role in protecting the environment..
5.4: Water demand mana2ement and the food network: barriers to chante.
Action to protect the environment is not unprecedented in the food network, with supermarkets, in
particular, responding to the explosion of interest in green issues in the 1980s. One of the most
important early initiatives was the introduction of organic vegetables in Safeway in 1984, which
was quickly copied by Sainsbuiys, Tesco, Waitrose, Budgen and Asda (Clunis-Ross 1990). The
success of this initiative encouraged Tesco to introduce the Nature's Choice range which attempts to
respond to the perceived environmental concerns of customers, without imposing the strict organic
production standards of the Soil Association. In the early 1990s however, the supermarkets
switched the emphasis away from the development of "niche" environmentally friendly or organic
produce, to the extension of uniform environmental standards and controls on all fresh fruit and
vegetables. The six main supermarkets, in conjunction with the NFU, have drawn up individual
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integrated crop management (1CM) protocols for all fresh fruit and vegetables grown in the UK (see
case study 1). This initiative attempts to regulate the use and management of chemical inputs used
on all fruit and vegetable crops, to minimise chemical usage and encourage alternative methods
such as integrated pest management. As the case study reveals, the 1CM initiative is a powerful
vehicle for promoting the safety of produce and the environmental friendliness of the production
system, with 73% of UK sourced produce sold through Sainsburys produced under 1CM conditions
(Cunningham 1996). This underlines the power of the supermarkets to instigate change in the food
network by forcing farmers to re-evaluate their use of chemicals and consider alternative systems of
control. Nevertheless the initiative adopts a very narrow definition of environmental friendliness
which focuses solely on the use of chemical inputs, and largely ignores the impact of agriculture on
abstraction water and the in situ water environment. In fact, irrigation use is only mentioned briefly
in the potato 1CM protocol in relation to its importance in controlling common scab, and fails to
recognise the consequences of meeting this demand for the water environment. The failure to
incorporate water and the water environment into this "environmentally friendly" initiative,
represents a critically important gap and a combination of factors may have contributed to this.
Access to and use of water in the agricultural sector may not be perceived as an environmental
problem by off-farm interests. The linkages between summer abstraction for irrigation, decline in
river levels and the impact on the in situ environment may not be clearly understood by these firms.
In fact, misconceptions about agriculture-water-environment issues may reflect their lack of
information on the importance of these issues in the UK. Whatever the possible justifications, the
failure to address irrigation issues in this document represents an important missed opportunity.
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CASE STUDY ONE: INTEGRATED CROP MANAGEMENT PROTOCOLS.
The integrated crop management (1CM) initiative was developed in the early 1990s by the NFU in
partnership with 6 of the leading UK supermarkets in response to consumer concerns about the
environment and the safety of produce. The principal objective of the initiative was to reassure
consumers that the UK's food production methods lead to good quality, safe food at affordable
prices. In consequence, the partnership has focused on the development of husbandry protocols,
or guidelines for individual crops which incorporate the
"..application of scientifically based, good horticultural practice, with particular emphasis on reducing
whenever possible the use of chemicals. This involves the promotion of viable integrated crop management
(1CM) systems and improved protection of the environment" (Wise 1994, p1).
The first protocols, for fresh carrots and cauliflowers were published in July 1993 and by October
1996 30 different fruit and vegetable crops were covered by individual protocols. The principles
of 1CM cross a number of husbandry disciplines, including integrated pest management, and
attempt to bring together current experience and knowledge of the integration of cultural and
chemical methods of pest and disease control. Integrated pest management techniques rely on
close crop monitoring using pheromone traps; sticky traps; pest incidence forecasts and disease
infectivity models for example, in order to minimise pesticide treatment and avoid blanket
treatments. The protocols form the basis of the supply agreement between the grower and the
retailer/pack-house (Wise 1994), and in consequence implementation replicates the system of
arms length control of on-farm production. Thus, indirect measures of regulation and control are
used to ensure production at the farm level conforms to the 1CM principles. The pack-houses,
which are primarily involved in face to face negotiations with farmers, must ensure all their
management and fieldstaff undertake training. Thus they are expected to be fully aware of all the
potential risks to crops and must be able to recognise all pests, diseases and weeds as well as
beneficial insects, which potentially affect the quality or yield of crops. The monitoring of crops is
central to the development of 1CM systems, and farmers are therefore expected to adhere to the
principles of "self audit" whereby detailed records are maintained on all aspects of the crop,
including pest incidence, pesticide applications and crop diaries. These systems of monitoring are
policed by the pack-house who verify the system to ensure information is readily available and
clearly contributes to the traceability of produce, encapsulated in BS5750.
The protocol for fresh potatoes, published in June 1994, covers all aspects of potato production,
from the selection of suitable sites, through rotation and preparation of seed. The major pests and
5 CWS Ltd; Gateway; Sainsburys; Safeway; Marks and Spencer; Waitrose. Additional contnbutions from MAFF; Adas;
the PMB; the Fresh Produce Consortium; the Horticultural Development Council; Horticulture Research international;
the Institute of Arable Crop Research and relevant fresh produce associations.
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diseases which afflict potatoes in seed, production or storage are outlined, and suitable chemical
and cultural methods of control documented. Thus, control of potato cyst nematode, one of the
most widespread pest problems afflicting potatoes, includes information and advice on site
selection, resistant varieties, integrated and chemical methods of control. The document also
outlines the health and safety hazards, for both the environment and operators, of all the major
chemical applications used to control pests, blight, herbicides and those used for desiccation.
Irrigation application is only mentioned in the context of control of common scab, where the
document states
"Resistant varieties should be used when possible. Common scab is especially prevalent on light sandy soils,
ploughing after grass, or after liming. Irrigation from first tuber initiation is the only method of reducing
common scab" (p31).
The 1CM initiative represents a powerful tool, through which the supermarkets are attempting to
control and regulate the use and management of chemicals on the farm. This is reflected in
Sainsbury's first environmental report published in 1996, where the store underlines its
commitment to the principles of 1CM and the long term reduction in the use of agro-chemical
inputs. To date 73% of UK sourced and 31% of imported fresh fruit and vegetables sold in
Sainsburys meet the 1CM standards (Cunningham 1996), and they are committed to the further
extension of the scheme. The 1CM initiative is a central part of Sainsbury's work to "green food
production" encouraging suppliers to maintain wildlife through ponds, woodlands and hedgerows
and reduce the use of fertilisers and the risk of ground and surface water pollution.
196
Evidence to support this line of argument is revealed in the survey, where there is widespread
ignorance of irrigation and water environment issues. Although the pack-houses, co-ops and
processors all recognise the importance of irrigation application in the production of quality
potatoes and meeting their specific standards, there is little awareness, let alone knowledge, of the
problems associated with competition for water between industry, agriculture, domestic users and
the environment, nor the limited availability of new sources of water to meet future demand. None
of the firms were aware of the problems of unreliability of abstraction supply, the threat to
agriculture of abstraction restrictions or the environmental justification for controls to maintain river
flow levels and protect the environment. In addition, none of the firms had heard of, let alone
commented on, local catchment management plans or the regional and national water resource
management strategies published by the NRA. Despite this, when provided with a brief sunimaly
of the key issues addressed in these documents, all the respondents recognised the important
implications for their future procurement of quality potatoes.
This level of ignorance is significant and represents a major impediment to change. The theory of
the firm recognises the central importance of access to and use of information in shaping the
decision making of firms. Casson (1982) postulates that unequal access to information between
firms and at the departmental level, plays a central role shaping their behaviour and response to
policy initiatives. The complete ignorance of irrigation and water environment issues among the
surveyed personnel may in fact reflect unequal access to information, with some other department
holding responsibility for this issue. Nevertheless, this is unlikely as the respondents failed to
suggest other departments whose remit may include water issues. In fact, they recognised that their
own departments should hold this information. Consequently, the ignorance of water issues simply
reflects the (mis)perception of water as a non-issue. This in itself represents a major barrier to
change, as the firms are unlikely to instigate new initiatives themselves, or respond positively to
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new demand management initiatives introduced by the Environment Agency. Rectifying this
situation is a vital first step, ensuring all levels of the food network including the consumer, and not
just farmers, are fully aware of the environmental consequences of inigation use.
Despite this, action by the food network will prove vital to ensure the sustainable development of
water resources. The attitude of these firms to the demand management policies set out in Chapter
Four will be critically important, as they could play a central role lobbying against certain
proposals and thereby undermine the efficiency and efficacy of the policy tools. The analysis in the
previous sections demonstrates how the signals emanating from the fresh and processing potato
networks, principally in relation to potato variety and quality specifications, conflict with and
contradict the work of the Environment Agency in promoting water conservation and demand
management on the farm. This is revealed in the proposals, outlined in Chapter Four, to control
demand for irrigation water through encouraging farmers to use alternative, drought tolerant crops
or crop varieties. The effectiveness of this proposal in practice is limited, as farmers are
increasingly restricted to those preferred varieties favoured by the supermarkets and processors.
Thus, in the fresh and processing potato networks, the supermarkets and processors limit
procurement to between 4-10 varieties, which offer low to moderate tolerance to drought.
Consequently, farmers are unlikely to switch to drought tolerant potato varieties which do not
appear on the "preferred variety" listings.
The combination of state and market forces of regulation at the agriculture-water interface
represents divergent tendencies which push and pull farmers in completely different directions, and
only succeed in promoting dissonance at the farm level. Action to promote synergy is vital to ensure
the integration of the environment and economy. As noted in Chapter Four, promoting synergy
between market and state forces of regulation is no simple task; however reforms introduced by the
food network could play a central role promoting the sustainable development of water resources.
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Over the short term, the supermarket and processors could promote and reinforce the Environment
Agency's message on the wise use of water on the farm, by hamessmg their existing resources and
organisational involvement with farmers.
The analysis demonstrates how processors, pack-houses and co-ops already play a central role
directly and indirectly shaping and manipulating on-farm production through controlling the flow
of information and advice to farmers. These forces of regulation could be harnessed to influence the
on-farm use and management of irrigation water. For example, the processing firms could stipulate
the construction of on-farm reservoirs as a condition of contract; the pack-houses and co-ops could
encourage the use of more efficient irrigators through advice and farm visits; while they could all
encourage changes to soil and land management practices which improve the soil's moisture
retentive capacity. In combination these changes should ensure the more efficient use of existing
water resources on the farm.
The switch to alternative drought and scab resistant potato varieties will only be successful if the
new varieties are sanctioned by the supermarkets and processors and included on their listings of
preferred varieties. To speed up this process, the processors and pack-house companies should be
encouraged to take advantage of their extensive involvement in research and development, by
instigating research into alternative varieties which combine drought and scab resistance with
process efficiency and customer acceptability. In the fresh potato network the quality specifications
relating to the appearance of the potato should be relaxed. The presence of common scab which is
deemed so critical to the appearance of the potato, does not in any way affect the taste or
cookability of the potato, but fuels the demand for water at the farm level by encouraging farmers
to instigate an intensive regime of irrigation. Thus the supermarkets could play a central role by
relaxing these quality specifications and re-educating consumers by emphasising the costs, both in
fmancial and environmental terms, of producing the "perfect" potato. These changes would have a
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significant impact at the farm level reducing the demand for water during the peak periods.
Nevertheless, at the time of interview none of the firms indicated a willingness to change their
preferred varieties or relax the associated quality specifications.
Over the medium to long term the companies could play a more proactive role and directly
intervene through a number of alternative management strategies to ensure the sustainable use and
management of irrigation water. The first management option considers the role of the food
network in encouraging the construction of on-farm water storage facilities. Reservoirs provide a
reliable supply of water, allowing farmers to guarantee water to a crop throughout the season,
while at the same time relieving the stress of summer abstraction on the water environment.
Nevertheless, the high capital costs of reservoir construction in some areas of East Anglia and the
absence of grant aid means capital constraints dissuade some farmers from investing. To date, none
of the firms who issue forward contracts with farmers, differentiate between summer and winter
abstraction licences and do not consider reliability of irrigation water a significant issue. However,
farmers' access to a reliable supply of irrigation water offers a number of advantages for the off -
farm firm, reducing production uncertainty and thereby ensuring the consistent supply of quality
potatoes. To further encourage farmers to construct reservoirs firms could provide capital, through
loans or joint financing agreements to construct individual or collective reservoirs, for fanners
engaged in forward contract production of niche or processing potatoes. All of the firms, including
the co-ops, rejected this suggestion outright, claiming there are no precedents for finns, in the
processing or fresh potato networks, becoming so closely involved in direct capital investment
projects at the farm level. As one company representative argued
"..we don't want to get sucked into that side of the job. At the end of the day we are a
food processor, if you start to diversify too much into those sorts of areas you can be
swallowed up in something" (Company A)
In contrast, the response to the introduction of a tradable permit system was more favourable, with
the companies recognising the benefits of the system and drawing on the parallels with the potato
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quota trading system. In the processing network, two firms claimed they would become involved
although only indirectly, by acting as a co-ordinator between farmers who want to buy or sell
surplus water rights. These companies would not become directly involved, financing the purchase
of additional water rights for individual farmers, but would act as a broker. Significantly, both these
firms played a similar role in the potato quota trading system. In contrast, the firms in the fresh
potato network avoid such direct involvement, and refuse to purchase water rights at the local level.
Even the co-ops who play a central role co-ordinating marketing and production advice to farmers,
claim they would only play an advisory role liaising between buyers and sellers of water rights,
rather than directly purchasing water rights.
In the root vegetable network, three firms claimed they would be actively involved in the tradable
permit system as buyers of water rights. As noted earlier, these firms are quite distinctive and
already operate a complicated form of water trading, through the rental of land and water rights for
specialist root crop and potato production. The involvement of these firms in a tradable permit
system as buyers of water rights raises critically important equity considerations, as they have
access to non-agricultural dependent sources of income enabling them to out-bid all other
participants in a trading system. Although this may conform to the principles of economic
efficiency, ensuring water is reallocated from low to high value uses, it raises critical questions of
social equity and distributive justice. In particular, this process will further undemiine and erode the
position of family farmers in the rural economy. These firms all operate highly intensive systems of
production, with high levels of dependence on chemical inputs and consequently there is a
significant risk of nitrate leaching and pollution of ground and surface water sources. As access to
water for irrigation is vital to the extension of this system of production, water trading perpetuates a
highly intensive system of production potentially creating far more complicated second2ry
environmental problems.
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The final option considers the re-use of waste water from the processing and packing plants for use
as irrigation water on farms. Theoretically if these firms are located within the central potato
growing areas, the cost of transporting waste water to farmers could be viable, particularly when
incorporating the reduced costs of water treatment. Nevertheless, there are a number of critical
problems with such an approach. Firstly, and somewhat surprisingly, the processing factories are
located at some distance from the central potato growing areas primarily in urban areas in Scotland,
Nottinghamshire, North Humberside and Yorkshire. Thus the costs of transferring waste water in
both financial and environmental terms escalate. Secondly, all of the firms claimed the re-use of
factory or pack-house water poses significant health and safety risks, with the waste water
containing high levels of chemical residues and soil washed from the tubers. Re-using this waste
water potentially increases the risk of spreading diseases, such as Risamania and consequently these
firms do not consider the re-use of their own factory or pack-house waste water a viable option.
Despite the rejection of the direct re-use of their own waste water, the processing and pack-house
companies did not reject the option of re-using waste water from other domestic or industrial
sources. The processing and pack-house companies argued that so long as national and international
standards were adhered to, the re-use of waste water for irrigation would not create any problems or
undermine the quality of their produce. However, the supermarkets contradicted this, suggesting
that re-use of waste water on the farm would create specific problems for them, as re-use of water
contradicts their message on quality. In fact both the supermarkets perceived that the re-use of waste
water as irrigation would prove a difficult and complex issue to relay to their customers.
The variable response of firms in both the potato and root vegetable networks to the range of
proactive water management options, exposes a number of critical barriers to change. Although the
reluctance of some of these firms to become involved in some of the schemes may in part reflect
their ignorance of water issues, a number of other factors prevent them from adopting a more
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proactive approach. Firstly, the problems associated with access to and use of water in the
agricultural sector are perceived by the supermarkets and processors in particular as solely a
problem for agriculture. Consequently, these firms argue action to resolve the problems associated
with water supply should be undertaken by farmers and the Government. This response reflects the
perception that access to water for irrigation is merely a question of improving the supply of water
and fails to recognise the complex environmental issues inter-twined in the allocation and regulation
of water. Critically, by shifting responsibility to the individual farmer and Government the firms
effectively ring fence the farm, accepting no responsibility for the environmental repercussions of
producing the "perfect" potato. These risks are firmly reallocated to farms at the local level.
The second critical barrier preventing a proactive approach is the reluctance of firms to increase the
variable and capital costs of procuring produce. The system of arms length control enables them to
avoid all the financial risks and uncertainties associated with agricultural production. Realignment
of this system, accepting a more proactive approach, would represent a major sea change in the
form and function of market regulation in the agricultural sector. Some of the reforms encourage
off-farm firms to take an equity stake in the production system, increasing their own variable and
capital costs of production. The over-whelming desire to avoid these costs explains their reluctance
to become involved in schemes such as financing on-farm water storage facilities. Finally the
economic power of the supermarkets and processors allows them to define the terms of trade within
the food network. The knowledge that other farmers from across the globe are always willing to
supply them with the correct quality produce, enables them to define the parameters of their
involvement with farmers. Consequently, they are not sympathetic to any production problems
encountered by farmers in the UK. To date they have been unwilling to introduce any changes to
their own operations, which would alleviate problems at the farm level if there are no obvious
benefits to them or their customers. These factors, in combination, explain why off-farm firms have
failed to instigate reforms to resolve the particular problems associated with access to and use of
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irrigation water. Nevertheless, these problems will have to be overcome as action by off-farm firms
is a vital prerequisite to ensure the sustainable development of water resources in the agricultural
sector.
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CHAPTER SIX
NEGOTIATING THE AGRICULTURE-WATER INTERFACE: FARMERS'
1NIMVEDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSE.
The predominant forces of regulatoiy dissonance at the agriculture-water interface have been
identified in Chapters Four and Five. The divergence between market and state forces of regulation
is exposed in the competing and conflicting signals emanating from the Environment Agency, and
the down-stream food network. The principal objective of this chapter is to assess the impact of
these contradictory forces on farmers, and to trace their implications on the use and management
of irrigation water and the water environment. The analysis will address three central questions.
How do farmers negotiate between and reconcile the competing signals emanating from the market
and state forces of regulation? What role do their perceptions and assessments of risk and
uncertainty play, as they trade-off the relative costs and benefits associated with engagement with
the down-stream food network and the Environment Agency? What are the identifiable gaps in
farmer knowledge of water, water rights and the water environment and what are the implications
not only for their use and management of irrigation water but also their potential response to
demand management policies? In exploring these questions, the analysis is divided into two parts.
Drawing on the focused interviews with farmers and their representative organisation, the first part
will focus on farmers' interaction and engagement with the down-stream food network. Meanwhile,
part two will examine farmers' negotiation and representation with the Environment Agency over
access to, and use of, reliable supplies of irrigation water.
The analysis of farmers' incorporation into the quality projects of the down-stream food network
will be presented in four sections, with the first section focusing on economic analysis of the value
in use (utility) derived from irrigation. This provides insight into the potential financial losses
incurred through irrigation withdrawal, and the consequent financial risks and uncertainties incurred
through failing to meet the quality specifications. The second section will then provide detailed
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analysis of the five key marketing approaches identified among the potato and root vegetable
producers, reflecting differential incorporation into the quality projects of the down-stream food
network. Access to, and use of, reliable supplies of irrigation water are central to the success of
these marketing approaches, and the analysis will identify changes introduced into the management
and use of irrigation water in order to reduce their vulnerability to drought and abstraction
restrictions. The third section will move on to explore farmer knowledge and perception of water,
water rights and the water environment. Drawing on the theory of the firm, and behaviouralist
literature on risk and uncertaint-y, the analysis will assess whether lack of information on water
issues plays a role, shaping their use and management of irrigation water and their potential
response to demand management policies. The final section will draw out the implications of
quality production for the design and implementation of demand management policies, focusing in
particular on the role of economic incentive measures. The second part of the chapter will shift the
emphasis, and will focus on the interaction between fanners, their representative organisations and
the NRA over access to, and use of, reliable supplies of irrigation water. The analysis will address
the contention that agriculture-state relations are undergoing a period of change, by examining the
response of these different groups to the drought of 1989-92 and its aftermath.
6.1: Ne2otiatin2 Quality at the farm leveL
The previous chapter identified the process of risk reallocation as a central dynamic underpinning
the inter-relationship between firms and between firms and farmers. This analysis will further
develop this line of argument by exploring the contention that farmers' incorporation into the
different quality networks critically influence and shape their use and management of irrigation
water. This should expose the key forces shaping farmer decision making, and the trade offs
calculated between the high prices associated with high quality produce and their ability to
consistently meet these quality specifications. Access to, and use of, reliable supplies of irrigation
water could prove central to the success of these marketing approaches; however, this has to be
balanced against the threat of drought and imposition of abstraction restrictions. Hence, farmers'
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perception and assessment of the relative financial, production and environmental risks and
uncertainties could play a central role in shaping not only their irrigation decision making, but also
their response to demand management policies.
6.1.1: Quality and the financial risks of irrigated production.
The production of potatoes and root vegetables is subject to significant levels of financial risk and
uncertainty, with marked inter and mtra seasonal fluctuations in the prices received by farmers (see
table 5.1 Chapter 5). These price differentials reflect not only variations in the availability of
produce but also differences in the quality, with prices ranging from a low of £501t for general ware
potatoes to £1 50/t for pre-pack supermarket standard potatoes' (Morris 1993). Thus, failure to
conform with the strict quality specifications can result in significant financial losses of up to
£100/t, and is potentially a powerful factor shaping on-farm irrigation decision making. Assessing
the impact of these potato price differentials on farmers' use and management of irrigation water
will prove critical in understanding their response, or non-response, to demand management
policies. One mechanism of evaluating this impact and providing insight into the scale of the
financial risks and uncertainties tied up with irrigation use is calculation of the value in use derived
from irrigation.
Standard environmental economic analysis postulates that the economic value (utility) derived from
irrigation will critically influence farmers' willingness to pay for water and thereby shape their
future response to demand management policies (Colby 1989; Gibbons 1986; Rees el a! 1993). It
is assumed farmers, as profit maximisers, will automatically respond to higher water prices by re-
evaluating their irrigation use and reallocating water from low to high value crops which should in
theory result in a decline in the demand for water. However, in practice the potato price differentials
may critically distort this process, and consequently farmers may not respond positively to water
'figures represent the prices for potatoes sold off the field and not those for stored potatoes, which can be
significantly higher.
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price rises. Although it is acknowledged that value in use figures provide only partial insight into
the complex set of factors influencing farmers' perception, valuation and use of irrigation water, it
does provide a crude measure of the likely fmancial losses incurred through irrigation withdrawal
(Rees eta! 1993; Lingard and Gowing 1995; Colby 1989; Gibbons 1986).
One method of calculating the value in use of irrigation water is through farm crop budget
analysis, where the value of outputs (productivity gains) generated by water use are compared to
the productivity losses resulting from restricted water use. The difference between these two values
provides a crude measure of the value in use of irrigation water, and a surrogate measure of
farmers' willingness to pay for additional supplies of water. The actual productivity gains and
losses attributable to irrigation use can be assessed through analysis of the farm's gross margins,
over the short term, when only the variable costs of production are included, and the long term
where both fixed and variable costs are added. Hence, gross margin figures are calculated on the
basis of current irrigation and land allocation practices to gain a measure of the productivity gains
attributable to irrigation, and include three alternative price scenarios for the potato crop of £50/t,
£80/t and £1 50/t to reflect the quality-price differential. The productivity losses resulting from
restricted water availability are calculated on the assumption that if irrigation water is unavailable,
farmers switch their crop mix to that which yields the highest net returns under dry farming, in this
case winter wheat (see appendix B for details of the methods employed). Comparison of these two
sets of figures provides an indication of the short term value in use of irrigation water. These figures
will prove critical in shaping farmers' response to any unit water price rises, once they have
undertaken investment in water storage and irrigation equipment. Including the annualised costs of
investment in water storage and irrigation equipment into the calculation provides a long term value
in use measure, allowing estimation of the demand for new abstraction authorisations.
Table 6.1 reveals the major financial losses incurred over the short term if farmers are forced to
switch to the thy farming option. Under the £50 potato price scenario, a total of 18 farms or 40% of
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the sample incur negative values indicating irrigated production is uneconomic when forced to
accept such low potato prices, and these farms would be better off moving out of irrigation to the
dry farming option. Detailed analysis of these aggregate figures reveals marked distinctions
between farms, with 13 located in the Bain-Witham catchment, where potatoes are the sole
irrigated crop. Of no less significance, these farms are all small family farms producing less than 25
hectares of potatoes, with access to less than 30 megalitres of water. In contrast only three farms in
the Lark and two in the Thet-Little Ouse incur negative values, reflecting the fact irrigation is used
on a number of high value vegetable crops, thereby insulating them from the impact of severe
potato price fluctuations.
When excluding the negative and zero values, the farms incur an average loss of £68,513. However
this figure masks the wide variation in outcomes with losses ranging from a low of £3,294 to a high
of £428,358. Consequently, the average figures must be interpreted with extreme caution. In fact,
detailed scrutiny of these figures reveals that the losses in the £50-100,000 range are incurred by
those farms producing in excess of 100 hectares of potatoes, while those farms in the £ 100-500,000
range combine large areas of potato with production of other outdoor vegetable crops.
Consequently, the size of the total irrigated area will play a significant role determining the scale of
the losses incurred switching to the dry farming option. Examination of the losses incurred per
irrigated hectare and per authorised megalitre, which average £981.18 (a range of between £57.34
and £6,900) and £1,458 (a range of £31.88 and £4,600) respectively, show that the losses are
greatly in excess of the current authorised abstraction charges.
As anticipated, the losses incurred under the £80 potato price scenario rise to an average of £71,775
ranging between £519 and £54,643 with a 13.8% reduction in the total gross margin incurred by
switching to the dry farming option. Significantly, under this scenario no farms incur negative
values, although a total of 10 farms, or 22% of the sample, incur losses of under £10,000. The long
term viability of irrigation on these farms will prove questionable when including the annualised
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Part A: Aggregate loss	 £50	 £80	 £150
Irrigated gross margin 	 18902885.14 20263357.6 	 26229919.0
Wheat gross margin	 17464107.02 17464107.0 	 17464107.0
Difference	 1438778.00 2799250.0 	 8765845.0
% change	 7.6%	 13.8%	 33%
39	 39	 39
Average	 31,972.84	 62,205.50	 224,765.0
Average excluding	 68,513.23	 71,775.60
negative/ zero values	 ___________ ___________ ___________
Part B: Distribution of 	 £50	 £80	 £150
aggregateloss (firm count) ____________ ____________ ____________
negative	 18	 0	 0
Under10,000	 3	 10	 4
£10,000 - £30,000	 2	 5	 2
£30,000 - £50,000	 5	 6	 7
£50,000 - £100,000 	 7	 8	 7
£100,000-f500,000	 4	 8	 15
£500,000 - £1 million	 -	 2	 4
Part C: Distribution of loss £50 	 £80	 £150
perirrigated hectare	 ____________ ____________ ____________
negative	 18	 -	 -
Under £500	 5	 15	 -
£500-fl000	 9	 8	 6
£1000-2500	 1	 9	 18
£2500-f5000	 4	 5	 12
£5000-10000	 2	 2	 3
Average loss	 £457.88	 £1209	 £2210
Average loss excluding	 £981.18	 £1396	 £2550
negative/ zero values
Part I): Distribution of loss £50
	 £80	 £150
perauthorised megalitre	 ___________ ___________ ___________
negative	 18	 -	 -
under £50	 2	 4	 -
£50-250	 6	 6	 -
£250-i500	 4	 13	 6
£500-fl000	 2	 5	 13
£1000-f1500	 4	 5	 4
£1500-2000	 1	 -	 4
£2000-i2500	 1	 2	 3
£2500-f5000	 -	 2	 6
£5000-7500	 -	 -	 1
£7500-fl0000	 1	 2	 2
Average loss	 £680.50	 £1094.60	 £1739.98
Average loss excluding 	 £1458.40	 £1263.0	 £2007.67
negative/ zero values
Table 6.1: Short term gross mpr2m losses
*Six farms who ended irrigation in the aftermath of the 1989-92 drought are excluded from the
analysis, only potato and root vegetable growers included.
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costs of irrigation investment into the calculation. In fact any increase in the variable or fixed costs
of production, could render irrigated production on these 10 farms uneconomic. In marked
contrast, under the £150 potato price scenario the sample farms experience a 33% reduction in their
gross margins when switching to the dry farming option. This potato price scenario represents a
conservative assessment of the price paid for supermarket standard pre-pack potatoes, with prices
for particular varieties often in excess of this figure. On average the farms experience a loss of
£224,765 by switching to the dry farming option; however this disguises the wide variation in
values with figures ranging from a low of £9,826 to a high of £382,461. In fact a total of 15 farms
incur losses of between £100,000 and £500,000, and examining these figures in combination with
the losses incurred per irrigated hectare and per authorised megalitre, reveals the losses are greatly
in excess of the current unit cost of abstraction water.
The short term gross margin analysis gives an indication of the financial risks associated with
irrigated production. The price differentials associated with the different potato quality networks
have a marked impact on the farms gross margins, and underlines the financial importance of
irrigation to ensure quality. Failure to meet the quality specifications associated with the
supermarket network, means farmers are excluded from the high potato prices associated with
quality pre-pack production. In consequence, farmers are forced to accept much lower prices as they
sell their produce on the general ware market, where prices average £501t. Under this low price
scenario, irrigated production is uneconomic for a total of 18 farms and they would be better off
financially switching to the dry farming option. The farms may be able to absorb such price shocks
for one season, but if they are forced to accept these low prices year on year, the long term viability
of irrigated production is questionable. This is reinforced under the £80 potato price scenario
where, tracking the response of these 18 farms, analysis reveals 10 farms where the financial
viability of irrigation is low. These faims incur losses of less than £10,000 and are vulnerable to
increases in the variable or fixed costs of production, which could render irrigation uneconomic.
211
The long term gross margin analysis includes in the calculation the annualised costs of irrigation
equipment and water storage, to provide a longer term value in use of irrigation, and an alternative
indication of the fmancial risks associated with production. The costs of irrigation equipment and,
where appropriate, water storage facilities are deducted from the irrigated gross margin and then
compared to the gross margin figures calculated under the dry farming option (see Appendix B,
Parts 1 and 2 for details of the methods employed). As expected, when the annualised costs of
irrigation and storage are included in the calculation, the size of the losses incurred in moving to dry
farming are smaller than those revealed in the short term gross margin analysis (see table 6.2).
Predictably, the number of farmers incurring negative values under both the £50 and £80 price
scenario increases to 24 and 10 farms respectively. Clearly, irrigated production on these farms,
under both the low and medium price scenarios, is uneconomic, and the farmers would increase
their net returns over tune by shifting out of irrigation into dry farming. The continued viability of
farms incurring losses of under £5000 in both the £50 and £80 potato price scenario is
questionable, when faced with the replacement or repair of irrigation equipment. Close examination
of these aggregate figures reveals that of the farmers incurring negative or zero values under the
£50 and £80 scenario, the annualised cost of irrigation investment on eight farms is in excess of
£50,000. High levels of investment in irrigation including construction of reservoirs, sophisticated
water transfer schemes and a low ratio of hectares per irrigator, translates into £500,000 - £1
million actually invested. These farmers must achieve the high prices of £150 It, and above, in order
to make a return on their investment. This is an important factor influencing their use and
management of irrigation water over the short term, and could also potentially distort their response
to alternative, demand management policies.
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Part A: Aggregate loss	 £50	 £80•	 £150
Irrigated gross margin	 18902885.14 20263357.6 	 26229919.00
Wheat gross margin	 17464107.02 17464107.0	 17464107.00
Annualised irrigation capital cost 	 1366043.60	 1366045.60	 1366043.60
Difference	 72732.40	 1433204.40 7,399,769.00
% change	 0.3 8%	 7.07%	 28%
39	 39	 39
Average loss	 £1,864.9	 £36,748.0	 £189,737
Average loss excluding negative /	 £4,848.80	 £49,420.84
zerovalues	 ________________ ________________ ________________
Part B: Distribution of	 £50	 £80	 £150
aggregateloss (firm count) 	 _____________ _____________ _____________
negative	 24	 10	 -
under £500	 1	 1	 -
£500-fl000	 -	 2	 -
£1000-i5000	 1	 3	 2
£5000-f.10000	 -	 2	 2
£10000-25000	 2	 4	 2
£25000-50000	 8	 3	 7
£50000-fl00000	 -	 10	 7
£100000-500000	 3	 4	 16
£500000 - £1 million	 -	 -	 I
Part C: Distribution of loss 	 £50	 £80	 £150
perauthorised megalitre 	 _____________ _____________ _____________
negative	 24	 10	 -
under £250	 6	 10	 5
£250-f500	 4	 8	 7
£500-750	 -	 4	 10
£75O-1000	 2	 2	 1
£1000-fl500	 -	 1	 5
£1500-L3000	 -	 1	 6
£3000-6000	 1	 1	 2
£6000-10000	 2	 2	 3
Average loss	 £212.17	 £609.59	 £1241
Average toss excluding	 £636.52	 £945.91	 £1432
negative / zero values	 ____________ ____________ ___________
Part D: Distribution of loss 	 £50	 £80	 £150
perirrigated hectare	 ______________ ______________ ______________
negative	 24	 10	 -
under £50	 1	 4	 -
£50-flOO	 -	 -
£100-500	 4	 5	 -
£500-f.1000	 6	 5	 8
£1000-5000	 3	 9	 30
£5000-fl0000	 1	 1	 1
Average loss	 £106.60	 £462	 £1469
Average loss excluding	 £320.0	 £717	 £1695
negative/ zero values
Table 6.2: The lone term gross margin losses (7% real cost of capital)
*Six farms who ended irrigation in the aftermath of the 1989-92 drought are excluded from the
analysis, only potato and root vegetable growers included.
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The losses incurred by the remaining farmers are still significant, with three farms in the £50 price
scenario incurring losses in excess of5O,000. These farms grow potatoes in combination with
other high value vegetable crops, and are therefore insulated from the impact of fluctuating potato
prices. Under the £80 price scenario, the number of farms incurring losses in excess of £50,000
rises to 14 farms and 24 under the £150 price scenario. Clearly, with such high rates of return on
investment, farmers incurring losses in excess of £50,000 would be largely unresponsive to
increases in the unit cost of irrigation water.
The incorporation of the price differentials associated with the different potato quality networks
reveals the scale of the potential financial losses associated with failure to confonn to the quality
specifications. Analysis of the short- and long-term value in use of irrigation water demonstrates
the significant fmancial losses some farmers would incur if irrigation water is withdrawn. It also
reveals that irrigation is already unviable on other farms, particularly when the annualised costs of
ii-rigation investment are included in the calculation. Consequently, it is likely that farmers will
display a range of responses to demand management policies reflecting their differential levels of
investment in irrigation, and dependency on achieving high premiums for irrigated produce.
6.1.2. Interaction with the down-stream food network: The marketing of irrigated produce.
The marketing of potatoes and vegetables is a complex and dynamic arena of decision making,
with a range of alternative options open to farmers. The key factors which differentiate these
various marketing options are the produce quality specifications and the associated price premiums.
Farmers' access to, and engagement with, these different quality networks depend on their ability
and willingness to incorporate the quality specifications into their own crop management practices,
which in turn is critically determined by their access to, and use of, reliable supplies of irrigation
water. Chapter Five demonstrated how these different quality networks impose differential levels
of production and fmancial risk on farmers. It is therefore critical to focus on how farmers respond
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to, and manage, these risks as they develop their produce marketing strategies, and the implications
for their use and management of irrigation water.
Five distinctive marketing approaches were identified among the 45 potato and root vegetable
producers, reflecting differential levels of incorporation and engagement with the quality "projects"
of the down-stream food network. The five marketing strategies include production for the open
market; production under forward contract agreements combined with the open market; production
under forward contract agreements only; resource sub-contracting and finally those who have
disengaged from irrigated production. Access to, and use of, reliable supplies of irrigation water are
vital to the success of these marketing strategies, and farmers are introducing a range of
management practices to reduce their vulnerability to the hazards of drought and low rainfall. The
analysis in this section will concentrate on the detailed scrutiny of the first three marketing
approaches, leaving the analysis of resource sub-contracting to section 6.1.3. The complex and
dynamic processes of interaction are explored through the use of case studies, which are chosen to
represent the range of actor strategies identifiable among the sub-sample of 35 potato and vegetable
producers.
(i) Marketing through the fresh potato network.
Marketing of potatoes on the open market potentially incurs significant levels of fmancial risk and
uncertainty, as farmers have no guaranteed market outlet or price for their produce at the beginning
of the season. Although this strategy pays off in periods of under supply when the prices are high,
farmers also have to absorb the extreme low prices, which accompany periods of over production.
In total 14 farms sell their produce on the open market, either through merchants or co-ops, and are
involved in two distinctive circuits of the fresh potato network. The first group of five farms
produce pre-pack potatoes in line with the supermarket quality specifications, which are then sold
through a co-op; the second group, a total of nine farms, produce early potatoes which are sold
directly through merchants. The quality specifications associated with production for these markets
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are markedly different and impose distinctive production and financial risks on farmers.
Unsurprisingly, access to, and use of, reliable supplies of irrigation water are key factors which
differentiate these two groups, with significant differences in their total licensed quantity of water.
For the first group, quality is the key to the success of their marketing strategy, as they argue that
they will easily fmd an outlet for produce if their produce conforms to the highest quality
specifications; as Mr F outlines
"If you grow a lot of rubbish then nobody will want it. If you grow excellent stuff, the
market is going to want it, it doesn't matter if you are on contract or not, either you are
going to get a small percentage taken out, or none at all and a price which reflects the
market" (lvii F. p3)
Central to this marketing approach is the farmers' interaction with the co-op representatives who, as
demonstrated in Chapter Five, are the gate keepers to the pre-pack quality network. In fact the
farmers closely co-ordinate production in line with this advice and information on the variety and
quality specifications are incorporated into their own management practices. A combination of
Desiree, Cara, Esteema and Mans Piper varieties are grown, which offer variable resistance to
drought and common scab, and are designated to meet the baking potato quality specifications.
The degree to which farmers co-ordinate production in line with the co-op advice is demonstrated in
case study one.
Farm case study one concerns farmer A. who invested in irrigation in the early 1 980s in
order to introduce potatoes into the rotation. Initially, the licence application confmed
irrigation to a small area of the farm and sufficient water to irrigate just the potato crop.
However, the borehole investigations revealed significant quantities of water and in
consequence the farmer extended the licence application to 318 megalitres to cover the
entire farm, enabling irrigation of sugar beet, cereals and grassland and invested
£120,000 in the irrigation system.
The production and marketing of the potato crop are closely inter-twined and the farmer
relies heavily on the advice of the co-op, through which he sells the entire crop. Although
there is no agreement or contract price for produce agreed at the beginning of the season,
the co-op does agree to market the crop, whatever its quality, and the fanner is therefore
not involved in complex negotiations with other off-farm firms. This is a major
advantage as the farmer perceives that he is able to take advantage of the wide set of
market outlets and contacts developed by the co-op staff, and thereby gain access to the
high prices associated with the supermarkets. The farmer closely adheres to the advice of
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the co-op, who suggest the market sector and potato variety which is most suitable for
production on his farm. Thus the farmer produces 33.2 hectares of potatoes designated
for the pre-pack baking potato market. Quality is critical in gaining access to and
maintaining his position in this market. The quality specifications are relayed by the co-
op staff who tailor their production advice in order to ensure the end product conforms to
their specific customer requirements. The production advice relates not only to the potato
variety but also includes detailed information on potato seed type; seed spacing rate;
planting dates; fertiliser and pesticide programmes; irrigation application and harvesting
dates. The farmer closely incorporates this information into management of the crop to
ensure production conforms to the quality specifications. The farmer relies heavily on this
advice and recognises the co-op does 'hold his hand', and although he compromises some
of his own independence he does succeed in insuring produce precisely conforms to what
the market demands.
Central to the success of this approach is irrigation, as the light sand land is highly
susceptible to common scab. Thus, the farmer closely monitors the crop to ensure
irrigation commences as soon as tuber initiation starts. The SMD is maintained at a
constant I 5mm below field capacity for a six week period, across the entire potato area in
order to prevent the onset of common scab problems. Thereafter, the SMD increases so by
the end of the season it has crept up to 4Omil, when irrigation is used to maintain crop
growth, ensure an even pattern of growth and improve tuber size. Once the tubers meet the
size specification. irrigation stops and the crop is burnt off and eventually harvested. The
farmer recognises irrigation is central to the success of this marketing strategy, enabling
him consistently to produce tubers of a unifonn size and shape which are free from
common scab. This farmer has instigated an intensive regime of irrigation, using 4 spray
irrigators to ensure water is applied immediately the crop requires it. In addition up to
30% of the licensed water is used in the 6 week period following tuber initiation, solely
to improve the appearance of the potato and prevent the onset of common scab. The
farmer argues without irrigation water he would not contemplate producing potatoes, as he
would be unable to meet the quality specifications associated with the pre-pack market, as
he explains
"..you must go for a scab control programme, that is the absolute number one priority with
potatoes. If you don't, you might as well throw them away..
Potatoes are not the only irrigated crop and given the size of the licence, Mr A has been
able to utiuise the remaining water on other low value crops, primarily sugar beet, cereals
and grassland in order to increase yields and the stocking rate on the beef herd.
Nevertheless, this system dramatically altered in the drought years of 1989-92, when
abstraction restrictions were imposed. This was the first time Mr A experienced
restrictions on his abstraction and he was forced to radically re-evaluate his water use and
establish a new set of water priority crops. This culminated in the reallocation of water
from the low value cereal and sugar beet crops to the reservation of water solely for the
potato crop. Thus, even when a 50% abstraction restriction is imposed, Mr A ensures he
has sufficient water to operate the intensive irrigation regime on the potato crop, and
thereby ensure they conform to the quality specifications.
By combining production and marketing advice to the farmer, the co-op succeeds in indirectly
manipulating on-farm production decision making, regulating both production and labour time to
control the quality of produce. Although the "independence" of the farmer is to some extent
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undemuned by these processes of indirect market regulation, there are also advantages as
incorporating the advice enables the farmer to reduce uncertainty over production of quality
produce. Farmers adopting this approach, exemplified by farmer A, have been effectively
persuaded of the importance of quality in marketing potatoes, and consequently enrolled into the
quality projects of the down-stream food network through their interaction with co-op staff. In
reality, their wholesale commitment to producing quality pre-pack potatoes is not unsurprising
given the price premiums, and they willingly compromise their "independence" in order to
guarantee these premiums and thereby insulate themselves from the extreme price volatility
associated with the general ware potato market.
The critical dimension of quality for pre-pack potatoes is recognised by the farmers as the skin
finish and appearance of the tubers. In fact the absence of common scab is perceived as essential to
the marketability of the potatoes, as failure to conform to this specification can lead to a major
reduction in the value of the crop. In consequence, all these farmers recognise the vital role of
irrigation and they all operate intensive regimes of irrigation. The case study reveals how carefully
farmers monitor their potato crops, in order to trigger irrigation at the onset of tuber initiation. Up to
30-40% of the total licensed water quantity is used in this six week period without any additional
benefits to the crop, and is the most important factor influencing quality, as farmer G explains
"Well, water is vital. I would not contemplate growing potatoes in today's market without
adequate irrigation.... Potatoes are a high value crop, you spend a lot of money on
potatoes before you harvest a ton. If you don't produce the right tonnes per acre, at the
right quality, you lose a lot of money." (Mr G p38)
The implementation of an intensive irrigation regime is dependent on access to water resources, and
these farmers hold licences for an average of 257.47 megalitres, which is the highest average
licensed quantity in the sample. 100% of the water is reserved solely for the potato crop and no
other crops receive irrigation. This reflects a significant shift in the management and use of
irrigation water which occurred during the drought of 1989-92. The changes introduced by farmer
A in case study one are reflective of a wider reappraisal of irrigation use at the farm level which
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culminated in all five farms ending irrigation of low value cereal, grass and sugar beet crops in the
aftermath of the 1989-92 drought. Water is now reserved solely for the potato crop, to ensure
sufficient water to implement the irrigation regime when 50% abstraction restrictions are imposed.
This reallocation of water from low to high value crops underlines how the increasing emphasis on
produce quality has led to a revaluation of access to water resources. By reserving water solely for
their potato crop these farmers have sufficient water to meet the pre-pack quality specifications.
Surprisingly, given the risk of unreliability of abstraction supply and the associated financial losses
which these farmers could potentially incur, only three farms have invested in on-farm water
storage. Investment in water storage represents an insurance against the financial losses incurred in a
drought period, as reservoirs are a reliable supply of water. The wide variation in reservoir
construction costs exerts a powerful influence, as two of the three fanns are in the Lincolnshire
catchment, and are able to take advantage of the cheap reservoir sites. Despite this, of the three
farms who have constructed reservoirs, two were built in the aftermath of the 1989-92 drought, and
one of these was in the Lark catchment. The financial benefits associated with reservoir construction
clearly over-ride the high construction costs, as farmers trade off the financial losses associated
with poor quality produce. This is revealed in case study two, where the farmer invested in a
reservoir after incurring losses of £100,000 through failing to meet the pre-pack quality
specifications.
The farm second case study involves farmer B, who in the aftermath of the 1989-92
drought constructed a reservoir in order to guarantee irrigation to his potato crop. This 440
hectare farm, which is wholly owned, produces 76 hectares of potatoes which are sold on
the open market through a co-op. A combination of Cara, King Edward and Esteema are
grown specifically for the pre-pack market. Irrigation is vital to the success of this
marketing strategy and the farmer operates an intensive regime of irrigation. Mr B holds a
summer licence to abstract 104 megalitres from groundwater sources, which is sufficient to
meet this demand. However, in 1990 a 100% abstraction restriction was imposed midway
through the season and resulted in Mr B producing a crop of potatoes suffering from low
yields and poor skin finish which failed to meet the pre-pack quality specifications. As a
result Mr B incurred a financial loss of £100,000 as the crop was sold as stock feed for a
markedly lower price. As a direct consequence of this experience Mr B invested £140,000
in the construction of a rubber lined reservoir with a capacity of 68 megalitres. This
provides a guaranteed supply of water which will ensure irrigation of the potato crop if
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abstraction restrictions are imposed. With the two sources of water Mr B has a choice of
using cheap winter water or relatively expensive summer water. These differences in unit
water charges do not impinge on Mr B's actual irrigation decision making, as he uses the
summer water first, until restrictions are imposed and thereafter switches to use the reservoir
water. This strategy ensures Mr B can guarantee irrigation of his potato crop throughout the
season, by reserving reservoir water for the later stages of the season.
Investment in water storage enabled farmer B to reduce uncertainty over the production of quality
pre-pack potatoes, as he is able to guarantee sufficient water to operate the intensive irrigation
regime. Comparison of the annualised cost of this investment (L 16,694) against the actual short
term losses incurred through the withdrawal of irrigation water (L282,807) underlines the significant
financial advantages attached to investment in storage, with the financial benefits far outweighing
the costs.
The cost of investing in storage represents only a fraction of the total capital investment tied up in
irrigation, with the total annualised cost averaging £51,000 across the five farms ranging from a low
of £19,000 to a high ofLII8,000. These figures are high as the farmers have adopted a strategy
whereby the ratio of hectares to irrigators is low, with invesiment in 3-4 irrigators rather than 1-2 to
ensure water is applied immediately the crop needs it. Thus, it is critical for these farmers to make a
return on investment, as under both the £50 and £80 price scenarios in the long term gross margin
analysis 4 and 2 farms respectively incur negative values, and only make a return on investment
under the Li 50 potato price scenario. This underlines the critical financial importance of achieving
the premium potato prices, and represents a major factor shaping not only farmers' irrigation
management but also their potential response to demand management policies.
The overriding objective shaping the management and use of irrigation water on these farms is the
production of potatoes which conform to the pre-pack quality specifications. Through incorporating
the quality projects of the pre-pack fresh potato network so closely into on-farm management
practices, these farmers are attempting to consistently achieve the high premium prices. Although
significant production risks are associated with this approach, farmers have responded by acquiring
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large abstraction licences and investing heavily in irrigation, in order to avoid the risks associated
with unreliable supplies of abstraction water and abstraction restrictions. Access to, and use of,
reliable supplies of irrigation water are central to the success of this marketing approach, and the
farmers have introduced a number of changes in order to reduce their vulnerability to drought, low
rainfall and abstraction restrictions. All the farmers have reallocated water from low value cereal
and sugar beet crops, to ensure sufficient is available for the potato crop if abstraction restrictions
are imposed and three farms have invested in water storage. More far reaching changes, such as the
introduction of drought tolerant potato varieties or movement to incorporation in less exacting
quality networks, have been avoided. These farmers are unwilling to compromise on quality,
whatever the economic or environmental costs.
The second group of farmers to market their produce through the open market are involved in a
markedly different network of quality. These nine farmers, all in the Bain-Witham catchment
study area, produce potatoes for the early market in an attempt to take advantage of the high
premium prices associated with early potatoes. The quality specifications associated with early
potato production are distinctly different from those associated with the pre-pack quality network,
and impose different levels of production risk on farmers. In fact., by focusing production on the
early market these farmers avoid the risks associated with drought as the crop is harvested by the
end of June, early July, before the normal onset of abstraction restrictions. These farmers are not
involved in complex interactions and negotiations with the down-stream food network, as the
potatoes are sold directly to merchants and they receive little specialist advice or information
related to the production or marketing of the crop. Once the crop is harvested, the farmers contact
a number of local merchants to compare prices and the potatoes are sold to the merchant quoting
the best price on the day.
This relatively simple marketing approach means the farmers must take advantage of the high prices
in the early part of the season, as thereafter the value of the early varieties falls off dramatically.
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The area of potato production averages 13 hectares, the smallest area under production among all
producers, and allows the farmers to rely on unpaid family labour and minimal investment in
speciahst equipment to produce and harvest the crop. This is reflected in their investment in
irrigation where they use second hand machinery or equipment which dates from the 1960's. In
consequence, the annualised cost of investment is low with an average figure of £1405; obviously
the economic viability of continued irrigation will be brought into question when these farmers have
to finance equipment replacement or repair.
Access to and use of imgation water is an important element in the production of the early crop,
although it is used to increase the yield in the later growth stages rather than to improve the skin
finish. In fact these farmers have insufficient water to instigate an intensive irrigation regime to
ensure produce conforms to the quality specifications designed for pre-pack potatoes. Even though
the actual area of potatoes is small, the farms have limited water available with the total licensed
quantity of water on these farms averaging 23.5 megalitres, ranging as low as 4.5 megalitres.
Despite this, five farms have constructed winter storage facilities, all of them taking advantage of
gravel company deals. Thus the actual cost of investment is low, and when cross questioned these
farmers admitted that they would not have proceeded if they had to pay the full cost of reservoir
construction themselves.
The fanners involved in the fresh potato network all share a common perception of the financial
risks and uncertainties associated with potato production. They all attempt, in different ways, to
guard against potato price volatility by producing high quality or niche products which attract a
premium price. Despite these broad similarities, the two groups of farmers are incorporated into
distinctly different networks of quality, with one group of farmers involved in the pre-pack fresh
potato network, while the second group produces and markets early new potatoes. Access to, and
use of, reliable supplies of irrigation water is a key factor which differentiates these two groups.
Farmers producing potatoes which conform to the pre-pack quality specifications hold abstraction
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licences in excess of 100 megalitres of water and have invested heavily in irrigation equipment and
storage. This represents a highly capital and water intensive system of production to ensure produce
conforms to the strict pre-pack quality specifications, which in turn guarantees the premium prices.
In marked contrast, the second group of farmers have adopted a less capital intensive system of
production, utilising unpaid family labour and second-hand equipment to produce early new
potatoes, in order to reduce their vulnerability to potato price fluctuations. The development of this
marketing strategy has been influenced by access to water resources, as these farmers have
insufficient water to operate an intensive irrigation regime. Although production for the early
market succeeds in avoiding the fmancial risks associated with unreliability of abstraction supply,
the long term viability of continued potato production on the farm is questionable as the dual
processes of concentration and scale enlargement continually squeeze small potato farmers out of
production (Bates et a! 1996). This is revealed in the gross margin analysis where the losses
incurred in the short term analysis range from £6,288 to £59,423 under the £150 potato price
scenario, but these figures decline markedly in the long term calculations. Consequently, the long
term viability of irrigated potato production on these farms is questionable as they are vulnerable
to increases in the variable and fixed costs of production. The response of these two groups of
farmers to the implementation of demand management policies is potentially markedly different, as
they will be critically influenced by their own perception and assessment of the relative risks and
uncertainties associated with irrigation and the economic value of irrigation use.
(ii) Dual marketing strategy: Incorporation into the fresh and processing potato networks.
The second marketing approach identified in the sample involves a complex, dual marketing
strategy in which nine farmers produce processing potatoes under forward contract agreements as
well as pre-pack potatoes for sale on the open market. This dual marketing approach reflects
farmers assessment of the relative financial risks associated with production for the open market.
The development of this approach is also critically influenced by their access to, and use of,
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reliable supplies of irrigation water. This marketing approach therefore represents an attempt, by the
farmers themselves, to spread the fmancial risks associated with potato production as well as reduce
their vulnerability to drought and unreliability of abstraction supply.
Farmers involved in this dual marketing approach have allocated between 40-60% of their total
potato area to forward contract production of crisp and chip varieties. The total potato area
averages 67.4 hectares, and the remaining area is sold through the fresh potato network with three
farms selling to local, merchants while 6 use a co-op to market their pre-pack baking quality
potatoes. The farmers pursuing this dual marketing approach are involved in distinctly different
quality networks, which impose differential levels of production and financial risk and uncertainty.
The farmers argue that by producing processing potatoes under forward contract agreements they
reduce the level of financial risk and uncertainty associated with production, as the agreements
enable the farmers to ensure a financial return on a set area of production at the beginning of the
season. As Mr I argues
"Because Records (a cnsping potato variety) are a fixed price contract, you know exactly
what price you will get from the onset. Potato prices can fluctuate horrendously, and it is
nice to know that 50% of them are at a fixed price which you are happy with, you know the
return per acre and that is removing uncertainty" (Mr I p5).
By incorporating forward contract agreements into their farm management strategies these fanners
guarantee a return on investment, and ensure against the extreme low prices which can afflict the
open market. Nevertheless, these financial factors are not the sole influence, as the farmers are
critically aware of the implications for the on-fann use and management of irrigation water. The
quality specifications, in particular those related to the appearance and skin finish of the potato,
have played a central role. These farmers are unable to consistently produce pre-pack potatoes on
their entire potato area, as they have insufficient water to control common scab. Although the
licensed quantity of water available to these farms averages 162.12 megalitres and four fanns, all in
the Bain-Witham, have invested in water storage, these farmers are still unable to irrigate on the
entire potato area in line with a strict common scab irrigation programme. Consequently they are
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vulnerable to significant financial losses by marketing produce which fails to conform to the pre-
pack quality specifications. Farmers therefore have to trade off the relative financial, production and
environmental risks and uncertainties associated with involvement with both the fresh and
processing potato networks in order to formulate effective and efficient systems suited to their
particular needs and resources, as revealed in case study three.
The third farm case study involves farmer C who owns a 720 hectare light sandland farm
and grows a combination of pre-pack and processing chip potatoes. Mr C holds 3 irrigation
licences to abstract, from both surface and ground water sources, a total of 87.91 megalitres
in the summer months. He has invested £50,000 in irrigation equipment, installing an
underground mains pipeline which covers the entire farm and 3 hose reel irrigators. A total
of 51 hectares of potatoes are under production and 50% of the area is committed, under
forward contract agreements, to Russet Birbank, a processing chip variety while the
remaining area is under production of Desiree, Esteema and Santae varieties which are all
designated for the pre-pack baking potato market. These varieties are all marketed through
a co-op and Mr C has no direct contact with the processing firm, as all negotiations are
conducted through the co-op staff.
The processing chip variety was introduced as a direct consequence of quality problems
encountered during the drought of 1989-92 when Mr C was unable to consistently conform
to the pre-pack quality specifications. Mr C recognised he was unable to consistently meet
the skin finish quality specifications, as he had insufficient water to operate a strict scab
control programme and ensure sufficient water for the later stages of the season. The
introduction of the processing variety, alleviates the pressure on Mr C's water resources, as
the specifications in relation to skin finish are not so strict. Therefore Mr C is able to
concentrate irrigation in the early stages of the season on the pre-pack varieties. The
development of this dual marketing approach is a direct consequence of Mr C's inability to
consistently conform to the pre-pack quality specifications on the entire potato area and his
unwillingness to incur the associated financial losses. The introduction of the processing
variety succeeds in reducing his vulnerability to the problem of common scab, while at the
same time providing a fixed income from the crop thereby insuring a fixed return on his
investment.
As case study three demonstrates quality is a central factor shaping the development of this produce
marketing strategy as farmers recognise the financial importance of consistently meeting the
specifications laid down by the off- farm finns.
Investment in irrigation is high with the annualised cost averaging £55,088 for all nine farms, but
this average conceals marked differences. In fact, the six farms which combine processing with pre-
pack potatoes average an annualised investment cost of £79,187 compared to £6,890 for the
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remaining three farms. Ensuring a return on investment is therefore a significant factor influencing
decision making on these capital and water intensive farms, as low quality incurs low prices and
potentially significant financial losses. This is revealed under the £50 potato price scenario in the
long term gross margin analysis, where all six farms incur negative values.
Access to, and use of; reliable supplies of irrigation water is a key factor influencing the
development of this marketing approach, and in fact three farms, all in the Thet-Little Ouse
catchment engaged in the production of contract processing potatoes in the aftermath of the 1989-
92 drought. These farmers were unable to guarantee irrigation of their entire area of pre-pack
potatoes and consequently incurred significant financial losses as the produce failed to conform to
the pre-pack quality specifications. The farmers were unwilling to incur these financial losses again,
as individually they lost between £ 10-20,000 on their potato crop. Despite this, they were unwilling
to invest in on-farm water storage, which may be regarded as somewhat surprising as storage is a
reliable supply of water. However, a combination of factors provides an explanation for this
seemingly unexpected response. Firstly, construction of on-farm water storage facilities on the flat
sand land of the Thet-Little Ouse catchrnent is a major capital investment project, costing in excess
offl 50,000. Secondly, uncertainty over the future of the potato market and in particular potato
prices is significant, primarily as a result of Government reform of the PMB. Consequently, these
farmers are unwilling to invest in any major capital project and increase their level of borrowing,
until they have a clearer picture of the future shape of the market. This risk averse strategy reflects
farmers' unwillingness to increase their vulnerability to future price shocks and the attendant
financial losses, and is justified by fanner D in case study four.
The fourth farm case study involves Mr D, a tenant farmer on 259 hectares in the heart
of the Brecklands, who grows a total of 97 hectares of potatoes with the remaining area
taken up by sugar beet and cereal crops. In total Mr D holds abstraction licences for
193.18 megalitres of water from surface and ground water sources and has invested
£150,000 in actual irrigation equipment. Mr D produces a number of different potato
varieties, with 50% of the total area under Russet Birbank a processing chip variety, while
the remaining area is taken up in pre-pack varieties including Esteema and Romano and
the entire crop is sold through a co-op.
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Mr D recognises that the critical dimension of quality is skin finish, followed by the size
and shape of the tubers. The land is highly susceptible to common scab, and the potato
varieties offer low resistance to this disease, so in consequence Mr D has developed an
intensive regime of irrigation which relies on four irrigators and high levels of labour
input. In fact, Mr D acknowledges that the capacity of the irrigators cover an area in
excess of the actual potato acreage, but this is a deliberate strategy in order to ensure he
can apply water immediately the crop needs it. Mr D follows a strict programme of
irrigation on the pre-pack varieties whereby half an inch of water is applied every three to
four days, as opposed to the standard application of an inch of water every seven days, in
order to reduce wastage through run-off and evapo-transpiration. The crop is closely
monitored, with Mr D walking the crop every day and irrigation starts immediately on
tuber initiation for a six week period to prevent the onset of common scab. Mr D is
unwilling to compromise on potato quality and thus the increased labour and capital costs
attached to this irrigation regime are perceived as essential in guaranteeing the high
quality and the associated premium prices.
The introduction of the processing chip varieties in 1992 was a direct consequence of the
drought experience and the threat of abstraction restriction in the 1991 season. Although
Mr D ceased irrigation of all low value cereal and sugar beet crops he was still unable to
guarantee sufficient water to irrigate his entire potato area. In consequence Mr D
switched 50% of the potato acreage to the processing varieties, and relieved the pressure
on his water resources. These varieties do not require irrigation to control the incidence of
common scab and so Mr D is able to guarantee irrigation to the pre-pack varieties in this
early period and ensure that they conform to the skin finish specifications.
The development of this complex marketing approach enables Mr D to reduce the level of
fmancial risk and uncertainty associated with potato production, as the forward contract
ensures a return on his investment. An alternative strategy, would involve investment in
water storage providing a reliable supply of water and enabling continued growth of the
pre-pack potatoes. However, this option was rejected because of the increased risk
exposure and higher capital gearing.
Uncertainty over their ability to consistently meet the pre-pack quality specifications has been a key
factor shaping the development of this marketing approach. Limited water resources, as well as
unreliability of abstraction supply, prevent these farmers from instigating an intensive irrigation
regime on their entire potato area. Thus, without changes these farmers were liable to incur
significant financial losses by producing poor quality potatoes. The introduction of processing
varieties under forward contract agreements offers a number of advantages, as the quality
specifications, although rigorous, do not require a strict irrigation programme to control the
appearance and skin finish of the potatoes. A dual marketing approach ensures sufficient water is
available in the early part of the season for the pre-pack varieties and thereby safeguards the
production of quality potatoes, and the associated premium prices. This approach also succeeds in
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reducing the financial risks and uncertainties associated with potato production by insulating the
farm from the extreme low prices which often afflict the open market. These farmers have adopted
a risk averse strategy in which they trade off the financial and production risks and uncertainties
associated with engagement with different quality networks, against their vulnerability to the
hazards of low rainfall and abstraction restrictions.
(iii) Incorporation into the processing potato network: Forward contract production only.
The final marketing approach identified in the sample involves forward contract agreements for all
potatoes and root vegetables. A total of six farms are involved in the crisp potato network, with
two farms combining this with the production of vegetables under forward contract agreements.
The development of this marketing approach reflects the farmers' assessment of the relative
financial risks and uncertainties associated with potato and root vegetable production. The extreme
fluctuations in potato and root vegetable prices critically influence their perception and assessment
of the range of alternative marketing options, in particular sale on the open market. Despite this,
the farmers have not opted out of production as they are critically influenced by policy changes
emanating from the EU over the reform of the CAP.
At the time of interviews, the future of the CAP was uncertain, with policy reforms potentially
cutting cereal prices dramatically. In consequence, these farmers felt it was important to maintain
their interests in potato and vegetable production, as these crops fall outside of the CAP regime, and
thus insulate them from the impact of major cereal price cuts. By tying production of high value and
high risk crops to forward contract agreements, the farmers succeed in avoiding the financial risks
associated with fluctuating produce prices, while at the same time insulating the farm from the
impact of CAP reforms. The area under potato production averages 68 hectares; however, there are
marked differences, with a total of three farms growing less than 25 hectares, compared to the other
farms where potatoes take up between 100-200 hectares. The financial and production risks
incurred by these farmers are distinctly different given the scale and intensity of production.
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Three farms which all grow less than 25 hectares of potatoes have a long involvement in processing
potato production stretching over a 15 year period and have never ventured into marketing through
the open market. These farmers recognise the advantages of this approach, namely a guaranteed
financial return on their investment, with a clear agreement on the price established at the beginning
of the season. The farmers are critically aware of the importance of consistently conforming to the
quality specifications, with the ever present threat of crop rejection or reductions in price. In
consequence, they closely co-ordinate production in line with the advice provided by the
processing firm in the pre-season contract negotiations and the advice booklets.
These farmers argue that irrigation is a vital element of production and is reserved solely for the
potato crop, with the total licensed quaitity of water averaging 23 megalitres. Investment in
irrigation is low, with the farmers all utilising second-hand machineiy, and consequently the
annualised cost of investment only ranges between £1915 and £719. The replacement or repair of
irrigation equipment could significantly increase the costs of irrigation and render continued potato
production uneconomic over the long term. This is revealed in the long term gross margin analysis,
where under the £50 potato price scenario two of the farmers incur negative values, and under the
£80 scenario all three farms incur losses of less than £7,000 when irrigation water is withdrawn.
Replacing irrigation equipment would significantly increase their costs, as would an increase in the
unit cost of abstraction water and these factors could hasten the shift out of irrigation.
The three other farms are far more complex, as they grow between 100-2 00 hectares of processing
crisp potatoes as well as between 60-190 hectares of vegetables which are all irrigated. With such
large areas of high value crops underproduction, it is vital that these farmers consistently meet the
quality specifications, as minor quality defects can translate into significant reductions in the total
value of the crop. Irrigation is therefore central to the success of this marketing approach, enabling
the farmers to consistently meet the quality specifications and thereby fulfil their contract
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agreements. The financial importance of this is revealed in the long term gross margin analysis
where the losses incurred by switching to the dry farming option under the £80 scenario range from
£177,372 to £371,270. In fact, these farmers have undertaken significant investment programmes
in irrigation, with the aunualised cost of mvestment ranging from a low of £49,000 to a high of
£136,231. Such major capital investment in irrigation represents an important financial risk
management strategy, which enables the farmers to not only ensure the consistent quality of
produce but also allows them to introduce other vegetable crops into the rotation. This succeeds in
reducing the area under cereals and the potential impact of CAP price reform, as case study 5
reveals.
Farm case study five is farmer E who operates a highly sophisticated and capital intensive
system of irrigation which includes centre pivot systems, on his 403 hectare sandland farm.
A total of 454.5 megalitres of water are licensed for irrigation from ground water sources,
which enables Mr E to grow a combination of high value crops including 100 hectares of
potatoes; 20.2 hectares of carrots; 20.2 hectares of parsnips and 40 hectares of onions which
all receive water at various stages through the season. In the past sugar beet and cereal
crops also received irrigation, but this has now stopped as a direct result of the drought of
1989-92. The vegetable crops are either grown under formal forward contract agreements
or informal share crop arrangements, in a deliberate attempt to reduce the level of financial
risk and uncertainty associated with the production and marketing of high value crops.
Forward contract agreements for the production of processing crisp varieties cover the
entire area of potatoes, and Mr E is directly involved in negotiations with the processing
firm. Mr E acknowledges water is vital to the production of this crop, as the contract is for
production of the Saturna variety which is highly intolerant to drought. Irrigation is critical,
to ensure not only the growth of the crop but also to guarantee the quality. Mr E closely co-
ordinates the production of this crop in line with the advice provided by the processing
firm, and uses a specialist off-farm irrigation adviser to guide irrigation application. Mr E
argues it is critical for the crop to consistently conform to the quality specifications, as the
processing finn will reject the crop and the variety is virtually impossible to sell on the
open market. Mr E would therefore incur significant financial losses as the price would fall
from £80/t under the contract agreement to £3 Ott if the crop is sold as stock feed.
The parsnip, carrot and onion crops are all produced under various share crop or partnership
agreements with specialist growers and pre-packers. Under these agreements, Mr E shares
the production costs and all decision making in relation to the crop with other off-farm
firms, who provide specialist planting and harvesting equipment and are entitled to a
percentage of the profits. Once again water is a vital element in the production of these
crops, to ensure they confonn to the quality and size specifications demanded by the
supermarkets.
The farmer's perception of financial risk and uncertainty critically shapes the development
of this marketing strategy. Ensuring a return on investment is a critical factor shaping his
interaction with the down-stream network as Mr E is critically aware of the impact CAP
reforms will have on his cereal crops. The extension of the set aside programmes will
further reduce the level of profits on these cereal crops. Consequently, reducing the level of
230
dependence on these subsidised crops, by increasing the area of high value potato and root
vegetable crops under production, enables Mr E to insulate the farm from futhre changes in
the CAP regime.
The marketing of high value crops through forward contract agreements succeeds in reducing the
level of financial risk and uncertainty associated with production, insulating the farm from the
extreme low prices which can afflict the open market. Despite this, there are still significant
financial and production risks associated with forward contract agreements, as the produce must
consistently conform to the quality standards set out in the agreement. Failure to consistently meet
the standards allows the processing firm to reject the crop or significantly reduce the price, and in
these circumstances, the farmer can incur significant financial losses. Access to, and use of, reliable
supplies of irrigation water are therefore central to the success of the farmers' interaction with the
off-farm finn, ensuring not only the growth of the drought susceptible varieties, but also preventing
the onset of quality problems.
The overriding importance of produce quality is underlined in the analysis of these three marketing
approaches, as farmers are closely integrated into the quality "projects" of the down-stream food
network. The analysis demonstrates the extent to which the off-farm firms succeed in indirectly
regulating on-farm production decision making, controlling both production and labour time on the
farm, while avoiding the risks associated with land ownership and agricultural production.
Nevertheless, farmers are not passive bystanders in this process and the analysis demonstrates how
the close integration of the quality projects into their own management practices enables them to
reduce the risks and uncertainties associated with production and in turn achieve the high and
premium pnces.
Access to, and use of, reliable supplies of irrigation water are central to the success of these three
marketing approaches, as the production of quality potatoes is inextricably inter-twined with
irrigation use. Failure to consistently conform to the quality specifications, through poor irrigation
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management or unreliability of abstraction supply, can result in significant financial losses. In fact,
at the most extreme, unreliability of irrigation water has directly resulted in a total of six farms,
moving out of potato production in the aftermath of the drought of 1989-92. Access to, and use of,
reliable supplies of irrigation water played a central role in this decision, as they were unwilling to
incur the financial losses associated with poor quality produce. These farms, all located in the Bain-
Witham catchment study area, hold a combination of surface and ground water abstraction licences
for an average of 38.8 megalitres ranging from 9 to 69.55 megalitres2 . Nevertheless, these licences
were insufficient to operate an intensive regime of irrigation on the entire potato area, and these
problems were further compounded by unreliability of abstraction supply. Consequently, through
the drought years of 1989-92, these farmers produced poor quality potatoes afflicted with common
scab and poor yields, which failed to meet either the pre-pack or processing potato standards and
were sold off as stock feed. The financial losses were high and the farmers were unwilling to
invest in water storage or new irrigation equipment to alleviate the problems. Instead they cut their
losses by moving out of potato production and irrigation altogether, thereby avoiding further
capital investment and future uncertainty. The shift in emphasis by the fresh potato network to strict
potato quality standards, in particular those related to skin finish, marginalises those farmers who
hold insufficient irrigation licences to instigate the necessary irrigation programme.
Access to, and use of, reliable supplies of irrigation water are central to the success of quality potato
production, and has resulted in the intensification of water use on the farm. The quality
specifications, particularly in relation to skin finish, fuel the demand for irrigation water and leave
farmers vulnerable to drought, low rainfall and abstraction restrictions. Farmers have responded to
these pressures by introducing a number of changes into the management and use of irrigation
water. The analysis reveals how farmers have critically re-evaluated the value in use of irrigation on
their different crops, resulting in the reallocation of water from low value cereal or sugar beet crops
2 Although these farrneTs have all stopped irrigation, they still retain their licences, recognising the value added to their
land.
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to high value potato and vegetable crops. These changes were introduced in response to the physical
scarcity problems encountered through the drought of 1989-92. Some farmers have realigned their
potato marketing approach, introducing processing varieties in order to ensure sufficient water for
an intensive irrigation programme on their pre-pack varieties. Other farmers have invested in water
storage facilities, securing a reliable supply of water, thereby ensuring themselves against future
abstraction restrictions. These changes have been introduced with the primary objective of avoiding
the financial risks and uncertainties associated with producing poor quality produce. As a side
effect, they have also succeeded in reducing the stress which irrigation places on the environment.
Nevertheless, these are unintended benefits and the result of farmers pursuing their own narrowly
defined economic self-interests. Farmers have avoided introducing management changes which
compromise their ability to produce quality potatoes, and they have left unchallenged the key
factors fuelling their demand for water, namely the variety and quality specifications of the down-
stream food network.
Farmers are responding to the financial and production risks and uncertainties which are imposed on
them through their interaction with the down-stream food network. In order to ensure the consistent
quality of produce and thereby the premium prices, they are reallocating their own resources of
land, labour, capital and water, resulting in a highly water and capital intensive system of
production. As farmers are not forced to internalise the full costs, in both economic and
environmental terms, of their irrigation decision making they succeed in reallocating the
environmental risks and uncertainties associated with irrigation use for others to bear.
Consequently, the continual rise in demand for irrigation water, imposes economic and
environmental costs which are borne by the other users and uses of water and is reflected in the
greater stress on water resources and the water environment in the summer months.
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6.1.3: Farmer knowledge and perception of water, water rights and the water environment.
The analysis thus far has demonstrated how farmers' use and management of irrigation water is
critically shaped by their perception and assessment of financial risk and uncertainty. Ensuring
production consistently conforms to the quality standards of the down-stream food network over-
rides all other considerations. Environmental risk and uncertainty rarely impinge on farmers'
irrigation decision making as they are divorced from the impact on down stream river flow levels.
Consequently, policies which have no direct benefits to individual farmers, but are designed to
ensure the protection of specific water environments, may encounter problems as farmers fail to
respond in the prescribed manner. This failure may partially be explained by the predominance of
economic self interests or reflect ignorance or lack of infonnation on the environment. As the
theory of the firm and behaviouralist literature on risk and uncertainty highlight, unequal access to
information within the firm, lack of information on the range of alternative management options,
and information gaps shaping the perception and assessment of risk, prove critical in distorting the
response of individuals and farms to specific environmental policies (Dasgupta 1982; Segersen
1992). In fact, a pre-condition for a rational response to water demand management policies is the
abstractors' awareness of existing water prices, knowledge of their water consumption levels and
understanding of the range of alternative water saving options and associated costs (Rees el a!
1993). Consequently, exploring farmer knowledge and perception of water, water rights and the
water environment is critical in understanding the trade-offs calculated between the relative
financial, production and environmental risks and uncertainties associated with a specific policy
proposal or course of action.
Exploring farmer knowledge and perception of water, water rights and the water environment is not
amenable to simple unequivocal answers, as the farmers themselves give somewhat confusing and
contradictory responses. Farmers are critically aware of the importance of maintaining access to,
and use of, reliable supplies of irrigation water. 74% (48) of the sample claim irrigation is vital to
the success of their farm management strategy, and in fact 100% of potato, root vegetable and
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resource sub-contractors claim that without irrigation they would stop production of these crops.
This perception belies the critical financial benefits associated with irrigation use, and underlines
how protection of their economic self interests will play a central role shaping their response to
alternative water policies. In line with this, 89% (58) of the sample knew the full details of their
abstraction licence and were able to quote the licensed quantity of water, period and location of
abstraction. These farmers were also fully aware they were on Section 63 Agreement, where they
pay for 50% of the water licence at the beginning of the season. Consequently, reforms of the
abstraction licensing system or charging scheme will not be hindered by farmers' lack of knowledge
on the details of their abstraction licence, or unawareness of the current water abstraction charging
scheme. This by no means guarantees a positive response to policy reforms. The ana]ysis reveals
there are a number of misconceptions surrounding not only the division of regulatory
responsibilities between the NRA and Water Companies, but also the response to a number of
demand management policy options is somewhat confused by the negative attitudes towards the
Water Companies. Overcoming these barriers will prove critical in ensuring a positive response to
policies designed to protect the water environment.
Moving beyond these misconceptions and prejudices is vital in order to gain a deeper
understanding of fanner knowledge and perception of water and the water environment. However,
this proved a difficult subject area to explore through the focused interviews. Questioning focused
on comparison of irrigation with other farm management practices and made use of hypothetical
scenarios, in order to indirectly reveal farmers' (inis)understanding of water issues. A number of
critical issues are highlighted. The management and use of irrigation water is perceived as an
uncertain arena of decision making. Compared to the use and management of other farm inputs,
figures compare favourably to results recorded by Rees eta! (1993), where 79% of the sample knew the full details
of their abstraction licence. The higher positive response rate in this study reflccts the nature of the water conflict in the
three study areas, where access to and use of water is an increasingly politicised arena of conflict in the aftermath of the
1989-92 drought.
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namely fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides, 79% (51) of the sample argued that access to, and use
of, irrigation water was subject to greater uncertainty, and this is illustrated by Mr R who argues
"Well fertiliser, pesticide and seed are always readily available in the quantity that you
want, whereas water is more difficult to buy and more difficult to apply and more difficult
to guarantee. It is not the free source which everybody thinks that it is, and you can't get
another million gallons of water when they have switched you off' (Mr R).
Farmers recognise they do not retain full control over irrigation water decision making, as there is
uncertainty over both the availability and reliability of abstraction water when compared to the
management and use of fertilisers and pesticides. This is understandable as there are, at present, few
restrictions on the usage of these inputs, where farmers are able to purchase external advice and
inputs from a wide number of merchants across the county. The level of uncertainty in this arena
of production decision making is therefore almost non-existent over the short term, as farmers are
able to purchase the inputs with no restrictions 4 . These uncertainties have a direct impact on the
development of on-farm water management strategies. 79% (51) of the farmers claimed they are
unable to plan or predict their use of water at the beginning of the season, they are unable to state
"we will start irrigating by the first of May and stop by the second week of August"; the level of
rainfall variability makes this impossible. However, these farmers do expect to use their irrigation at
some stage in the season on the basis of their past experience of weather conditions in the locality.
Farmers' past experience of unreliability of supply will play a central role shaping their willingness
to incorporate new or alternative irrigation practices into their water management plans at the farm
level. In fact, the pace of change may be relatively slow, as farmers' response to demand
management policies will be critically influenced by the incidence of 'extreme' low rainfall events.
Only when they have actually experienced these conditions will they instigate change to water
management strategies designed to cope with 'normal' low rainfall conditions.
4 Nevertheless, there is uncertainty over the long term use of these inputs with the possible introduction of nitrogen
restrictions and the extension of the Nitrate Sensitive Area designations. However, none of the farmers in the sample are
responding to these uncertainties by reducing their use of nitrogen or changing their management practices.
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Farmers' perception and conceptualisation of water abstraction licences provides critical insight
into their understanding of water rights, as well as their attitudes to water regulation and controls. In
fact, two distinctive groups emerge in the sample with one set of farmers arguing land rights
automatically establish water rights, while a second group argue access to water is not a right but a
licence with precise constraints detennining usage. Surprisingly, only two farmers claimed access
to water was a natural right which should not be regulated, allowing the unconstrained use of
water. Despite these two cases, the remainder of the sample argued in favour of regulation and
policing of water use and recognised the importance and higher moral right for all humans to have
access to water for domestic supplies. In fact, farmers are critically aware of the vital role of
regulating water usage to ensure humans are guaranteed water to meet their basic needs. However,
this does not imply that farmers perceive all urban demands for water as equally valid. In
particular, farmers resent the inequitable system of abstraction restrictions whereby irrigation is
banned, while domestic users are still allowed to water gardens and lawns. This system fuels the
perception that the regulatory system places green lawns and lush domestic gardens above the needs
of fanners to grow crops. Although farmers recognise they are competing with domestic users for
new supplies of water they seem unaware that they are also directly competing with the
enviromnent. In fact, farmers' perception and knowledge of the impact of their irrigation
abstraction on the water environment is very limited. Only one farmer recognised his abstraction
had any impact on river flow levels and the in situ water environment. Of the remaining farmers,
37 claimed there was no impact at all, 12 farmers gave confusing and contradictory answers and 12
refused to answer. Unsurprisingly, of those who claimed that abstraction had no impact on the
water environment 13 claimed that Water Company abstraction did more hann to the water
environment than irrigation, as Mr X argues
"I think the impact of our use is minimal. We have four Anglian Water bore holes within
three quarters of a mile of this farm and they are pumping out over a million gallons
each. I think those requirements should be examined more closely to assess the
environmental damage" (Mr X).
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Recognition that Water Company abstraction poses greater threat to the environment - although in
reality true - ignores the fact that irrigation also directly affects the environment. As documented in
Chapter Four, abstraction for irrigation imposes greater stress on the water environment in the
summer months, as the rate of abstraction during the peak period is greater than Water Company
demand. The failure of fanners to recognise the environmental consequences of their abstraction
may reflect their limited knowledge and understanding of the complex intricacies of the water cycle.
The full extent of this gap in farmers' knowledge is unknown, although it is partially reflected in
the number of farmers who gave confusing or contradictory responses. The farmers also attempt
to distance themselves from the impact of abstraction on the environment, by shiffing responsibility
for change to the water companies, thereby succeeding in avoiding any changes to their own
irrigation management practices.
This analysis demonstrates the confusing and contradictory nature of farmers' knowledge and
perception of water, water rights and the water environment and consequently these results must be
interpreted with extreme caution. On one level access to information, reflected in farmers'
knowledge of licence details and water costs is not a problem and will not undermine their
response to demand management policies. Despite this, the analysis also reveals the deep-seated
lack of awareness among farmers of the environmental issues tied up with irrigation use. Only one
farmer recognised the potential impact of his abstraction on the water environment, and this critical
gap in farmers' knowledge may potentially distort their response to policies designed to protect the
water environment. This lack of information will in turn feed into, and shape, the conflict over
access to and use of reliable supplies of water. In light of this, it is therefore not unsurprising that
environmental risk and uncertainty is largely ignored in farmers' irrigation decision making as lack
of information feeds into, and shapes, farmers' poor perception of water as an environmental issue
(Dasgupta 1982; Segersen 1992).
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6.1.4: Irrigating for quality: the implications for demand management policy.
The policy implications which can be drawn from this analysis are far reaching, exposing not only
the key factors influencing irrigation management at the farm level, but also providing critical
insight into the processes likely to shape farmers' response to demand management policies.
Economic incentives are a central plank of water demand management policies, involving both
incentive pricing of abstraction water and tradable permit systems (see sections 4.2 and 4.3 for
discussion of these issues). In theoty, these policy measures should lead to a reallocation of water
from low to high value uses, and a movement towards water conservation. In fact the analysis
reveals how fanners are already responding to the problems of physical water scarcity and the price
differential between summer and winter abstraction, by constructing water storage facilities and
reallocating water from low to high value crops. These processes of change could in theory be
further reinforced through the introduction of demand management policies. Nevertheless, this
analysis will pinpoint a number of critical factors which could potentially distort the response of
farmers and lead to unintended consequences and side effects, undermining the sustainabilily of
inter-dependent economic and environmental systems.
(a) Incentive pricing of abstraction water.
The introduction of incentive pricing of abstraction water will significantly reform the economic
signal relayed to farmers. Although current abstraction charges for irrigation water do differentiate
between summer and winter abstraction, in reality the size of these differentials is relatively small,
with the Ariglian region only charging £22.54/megalitre for summer irrigation water compared to
£2.25/megalitre for winter abstraction. These prices are too low and consequently water costs rarely
impinge on the decision making of farmers through the season (Rees et al 1993). This is revealed
most starkly on those farms which hold both summer and winter abstraction licences. These farms
operate irrigation systems whereby summer abstraction licences are used first, in order to pre-empt
the imposition of abstraction restrictions, and thereafter switch to use winter reservoir water. This is
an important risk management strategy, as winter water is reserved to ensure sufficient water for the
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potato crop in the later stages of the season, and thereby guarantee the produce quality. Thus, the
current price differential is too low to challenge farmers' existing management and use of irrigation
water, leaving unchanged their perception and assessment of the relative environmental and
financial risks and uncertainties tied up in irrigation use.
Despite the limitations of the current abstraction charging scheme, the short and long term gross
margin analysis reveals how irrigation is already only marginally viable on some farms. In the short
term gross margin analysis, a total of 18 farms incur negative values under the £50 potato price
scenario, and would be better off switching to the dry farming option. Of these, 10 are small farms
holding irrigation licences for less than 30 megalitres of water and producing less than 25 hectares
of early or processing potatoes. When the annualised cost of inigation investment is included in the
long term analysis, these farms are deemed uneconomic under both the £50 and £80 potato price
scenarios. Thus, if these farmers are profit maximisers they should already be critically re-
evaluating their irrigation use and shiffing to the dry farming option.
The gross margin analysis demonstrates the wide variation in the values in use of imgation water,
and although irrigation on some farms is not viable, on others the potential losses incurred from
moving out of irrigation to dry fanning are significant. The short-term gross margin analysis
reveals a total of 19 faims will potentially incur losses in excess ofE 100,000 under the £150 potato
price scenario by moving out of irrigation (see table 6.1). In fact the average loss per authorised
megalitre under the £150/t potato price scenario equals £2007.67 per megalitre which is greatly in
excess of the current authorised abstraction charges. Even when the real opportunity cost of capital
invested in irrigation equipment and storage facilities is included in the long term gross margin
analysis, the potential losses incurred by moving out of irrigation are still high, with the average loss
under the £150 potato price scenario amounting to £1432. It should be noted however, that these
average figures mask the wide variation in values, with some farmers incurring losses in excess of
£5000 per authorised megalitre. In addition, the analysis reveals that for a total of 8 farms,
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production is deemed uneconomic under both the £50 and £80 potato price scenarios when their
annualised investment costs, in excess of50,000, are included. Consequently, these farmers are
locked into a highly water and capital intensive system of production, in which they must achieve
the high potato prices of ;€1501t in order to ensure a return on their investment.
The close incorporation of these farmers into the quality projects of the down-stream food network
will critically distort their response to an increase in the unit cost of abstraction water. Financial risk
assessment plays a central role in irrigation decision making for those farmers operating water and
capital intensive systems of production, it is possible that price rises will simply be absorbed and
not trigger the shift in behaviour postulated by neo-classical environmental economics. The critical
question for policy makers therefore, focuses on the magnitude of the price rises necessary to shift
farmer behaviour to encourage the wise use of water.
The increase in prices necessary to ensure water conforms to the principles of long term marginal
cost (LMC) pricing is by no means insignificant. Evidence from Dubourg (1995), Bate and
Dubourg (1995) and Rees (1997) suggests water abstraction charges will have to rise 10, 20 and
100 fold in order to reflect the full costs of water supply. This translates into a dramatic increase in
the unit cost of irrigation abstraction, which in the Anglian Region would rise from the current
charge of £22.54 for summer abstraction to £225, £450 and £2,254 respectively. Incorporating
these figures into the long term gross margin calculations enables the analysis to trace the impact on
the long term viability of irrigated production. Using the range of alternative prices, the analysis
should pinpoint the water price levels which potentially undermine the viability of irrigation on
some farms, and thereby trigger changes to the use and management of irrigation water. This is
demonstrated in table 6.3, where the new water prices levels of225, £450, £696 and £2254 are
added to the annualised equipment costs. These figures exclude the cost of investment in water
storage facilities, and the water costs are calculated on the basis of summer licensed abstraction
only. The new cost figure is then subtracted from the gross margin achieved by irrigation under the
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three potato price scenarios, and the results compared with the gross margins achieved under the dry
farming winter wheat option.
The response to the alternative water price rises is likely to vary dramatically, reflecting farmers'
differential incorporation into the quality projects of the down-sirearn food network and the
associated potato price premiums. This is demonstrated in the analysis where the aggregate figures
reveal the non-viability of irrigation under the £50 potato price scenario for all four water price
levels. The losses incurred under the £150 potato price scenario underline the continued viability of
irrigation under three water price levels, although as expected the size of the losses declines
markedly. These aggregate figures however, mask important differences at the farm level, and
disaggregating the sample farms in line with the three marketing approaches developed in section
6.1.2, reveals a number of critical factors.
Firstly, for those farmers marketing potatoes solely through the fresh potato network the water
price rises have a markedly different impact, as the farmers gear production to the high quality and
high prices associated with pre-pack and early potatoes. At the £225 price level, only two farms
incur negative values under all three potato price scenarios and these are small farms, producing
early potatoes, and heavily reliant on unpaid family labour and old or second-hand machinery.
Nevertheless, the fact that only two farms are rendered uneconomic is somewhat surprising as the
analysis in section 6.1.2 projected that 9 small family farms would be vulnerable to increases in the
variable and fixed costs of production. In fact, if these farms are forced to accept the lower potato
price of £80/t then five of the nine farms incur negative values and would be better off switching
out of irrigation. The annualised cost of irrigation investment on these farms is low, as the farmers
take advantage of second-hand machinery or equipment purchased in the 1960's, and consequently
the decision to replace this machinery may prove sensitive to LMC pricing. An increase in the
annualised cost of investment combined with the £225/megalitres water price would render
irrigation uneconomic.
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£225 Water cost scenario	 £50	 £80	 £150
Irrigated gross margin	 12,633,625	 13,751,734	 15,724,988
Annualised irrigation capital	 1 988 133	 1 988 133	 1 988 133
cost plus £225 water cost	 '	 '	 '
10645492	 11763601	 13736855Difference
Wheat gross margin	 11,058,728	 11,058,728	 11,058,728
Difference	
-413,236	 704,873	 2,678,127
11=35	 _______________ ______________ ______________
£450 water cost scenario
Irrigated gross margin	 12,633,625	 13,751,734	 15,724,988
Annualised irngation capital 	 3 028 333	 3 028 333	 3 028 333
cost plus £450 water cost	 '	 '	 '
9,605,292	 10,723,401	 12,696,555Difference
Wheat gross margin	 11,058,728	 11,058,728	 11,058,728
Difference	
-1,453,436	 -335,327	 1,637,927
n=35	 ______________ ______________ ______________
£696* Water cost scenario
Irrigated gross margin	 12,633,625	 13,751,734	 15,724,988
Annualised irrigation capital	 4 161 603	 4 161 603	 4 161 603
cost plus £696 water cost	 '	 '
8,472,022	 9,590,131	 11,563,385
Difference
Wheat gross margin	 11,058,728	 11,058,728	 11,058,728
Difference	
-2,586,706	 -1,468,597	 504,657
n=35
NB. £2250 price level all
negativevalues	 _________________ _________________ _________________
Table 6.3: The lon2 run gross marm response, incorporatin2 the alternative LMC price of
abstraction water.
*Reflts the cost of mains water in the Anglian region, a 30 fold increase in the cost of abstraction water.
The response of the water and capital intensive producers of pre-pack baking potatoes is markedly
different, as under the £225 water price level none incur negative values and the losses on the five
farms range from £31,687 to £407,095. Only when the price level rises to the £450 level is
production rendered uneconomic and then only one farm is affected. Of the remaining four farms,
three incur losses of less than £50,000 while one farm incurs a loss of306,062. These trends are
broadly replicated at the £696 water price level, with two farms incurring negative values.
Consequently, with such a wide variation in the values in use, the response of these farms to LMC
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pricing will potentially vary widely, with farms incurring losses in excess of £300,000 simply
absorbing the water price rises even at the £696 level. Remaining farms may prove sensitive to
water price increases; in particular the shift in price from £225 to £450/megalitre should lead to
changes, as irrigation is either deemed uneconomic or the economic benefits of continued irrigation
although still viable, decline markedly.
Under the dual marketing approach a total of six out of the nine farms incur negative values when
combining the £225 water price level with the £80/t potato price scenario. This response is partly
explained by the fact that these farmers have invested heavily in irrigation equipment to ensure the
quality of their pre-pack baking potatoes. Consequently, the combination of high annualised capital
costs and higher water prices renders irrigation uneconomic if forced to accept the £80/t potato
price on their entire potato area. In reality, the response of these farmers will prove more complex
as they combine processing and pre-pack quality baking potatoes, and under the £150 potato price
scenario none of these farmers incur negative values at the £225 or £450 water price level. Only
when prices rises to the £696 level is production rendered uneconomic, and then only two farms are
affected. The annualised cost of irrigation plays a central role on the final three farms undertaking
this dual marketing approach, where investment in irrigation is low. Consequently, the increase in
water prices, even to the £696 levels does not render irrigation uneconomic at the £80 or £150
potato price scenario. Nevertheless, the replacement or repair of irrigation equipment could again
prove sensitive to LMC pricing as higher water and annualised investment costs render irrigated
production uneconomic.
Finally, for those six farmers producing potatoes solely under forward contract agreements, the
response to increased water prices varies markedly, reflecting differences in the total area under
potato production. At the £225 water price level only one farm incurs negative values at the £80
potato price scenario. The level of losses incurred by the other five farms are significantly different,
with two fanus incurring losses of under £1500 while three farms achieve losses in excess of
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£500,000. In fact, those fanns incurring negative values and losses below £1500 are all small family
farms, producing potatoes on less than 25 hectares and largely utilising unpaid family labour and
second-hand equipment. Continued irrigation on these farms is not viable at the £225 price level. In
contrast, the three other farms are large estates producing 100-200 hectares of processing crisp
potatoes and other vegetable crops. The rise in water prices, although reducing the size of their
losses, does not in any way render irrigation on these farms uneconomic even at the £696 water
price level.
Incorporating the alternative long run marginal costs of water supply into the analysis demonstrates
the potentially different impact which LMC pricing will have on farmers. The £225 price rise
should prove sufficient to shift the behaviour of small family farmers irrigating relatively small
areas of potatoes. Irrigation on these farms is of marginal viability and they would be better off
switching out of irrigation to the thy farming option. Although this process of change may not be
immediate, these farmers would critically reassess their irrigation use, when faced with a decision
on the replacement or repair of irrigation equipment. Higher annual ised costs of investment,
combined with a water price of £225! megalitre, should trigger movement out of irrigation.
In contrast, the impact of price rises on large, water and capital intensive potato producers is more
complex. The analysis demonstrates how these farmers will still incur significant financial losses
from moving Out of irrigation,, when the alternative water costs are included. Thus, the water price
rise to the £225 level may simply be absorbed, as long as the farmers are still able to consistently
produce the high quality potatoes with the consequent premium prices. Nevertheless, this situation
changes significantly if the farmers are unable to achieve the high premiwn prices. Under the £80
potato price scenario, production on some of these farms is deemed uneconomic when including the
£225 water price level, particularly those with high levels of investment in irrigation. Thus,
farmers' perception and assessment of the relative risks and uncertainties associated with production
and marketing of the crop, will prove critical in shaping their response to water price rises. In fact,
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the option of constructing on-farm water storage facilities may prove more attractive, as the benefits
in terms of a reliable supply of waler, reduced risk of producing potatoes which do not conform to
the quality specification, as well as the not inconsiderable cut in water costs, may outweigh the costs
of reservoir construction, even on the flat sand land of Norfolk and Suffolk. Needless to say, these
assessments will be critically influenced by the farmers' incorporation into the "quality" projects of
the down-stream food network, and will play a pivotal role shaping farmers' response to incentive
pricing schemes.
(b) Tradable permit systems.
The introduction of tradable permit systems should in theoiy lead to a reallocation of water from
low to high value uses. Currently under- or un-utilised licences could be traded, to meet the demand
for water from other users and uses, and put off to some future date investment in new water
sources. The design and implementation of a tradable permit system in the agricultural sector could
release the significant quantities of un-used water tied up in licences of right, which contribute to
the marked differential between licensed and actual abstraction. In theoly, the design and
implementation of a tradable permit system should conform to the principles of economic
efficiency, in reality however, significant social and environmental factors will have to be
addressed, which could distort the efficient operation of the system. Central to this dilemma is
uncertainty over the response of farmers to a tradable permit system, and the unintended
consequences and side effects which may result. Potential problem areas are revealed through
detailed scrutiny of the unofficial water market which has developed in the Lark and Thet-Little
Ouse study areas. Analysis of fanners' response to the revaluation of water resources should
provide critical insights into the key factors which will potentially shape fanner behaviour in a
tradable permit system and the unintended environmental consequences and side effects which
result.
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Resource sub-contracting represents a markedly different approach compared to the others
identified so far in this analysis. Farmers' inter-relationship and negotiations with the down-stream
food network revolve around the question of land and water rights, rather than the marketing of
actual produce. In fact, these farmers have no involvement in the actual production of potatoes and
root vegetables, and instead sub-contract their land and water rights to a third party, who grows the
high value crops. In total 10 farms, all located in the Lark and Thet-Little Ouse catchinents, sub-
contract land and all, or part, of their water licence, to third parties, who are specialist growers and
pre-packers of root vegetables operating in the Breckland area (see section 5.2.3, Chapter Five for
discussion of these firms). These firms pay a fixed acreage payment for the rental of the sand land
with the water rights attached, which amounts to £200-300 per acre for the land and an additional
payment of £20-25 per acre inch for the actual quantity of water used.
Access to irrigation water is vital to these firms, and they will only rent land if there is sufficient
water to irrigate the crop. The actual owner of the land and licence holder has no involvement in the
production of the crop, and the commercial grower retains direct control over all production
decision making. This represents a complex form of tradable permit system, as access to irrigation
water is re-valued and commodified by off-farm interests who create an unofficial market for water
plus land rights. Obviously, the constraints imposed by the licensing system, in which irrigation
water rights are confined to certain areas of land, are by-passed as the farmer rents out both the
water and land rights, and receives payment for water greatly in excess of the unit water charges
imposed by the official abstraction charging scheme. In addition, the rental value of the land is also
higher because of the attached water rights and therefore the farmer gets a double benefit. These
farmers sub-contract an average area of 49 hectares, which is used primarily to produce carrots,
parsnips and onions, which represents between 6% and 47% of their total utiuised area. Critically,
the water resources licensed to these farms average 210.89 megalitres ranging between 63 and 465
megalitres, and between 25-100% of this water is available for use by the off-farm firm. Without
the option of resource sub-contracting, this water would be largely un- or under- utilised and
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demonstrates the potential surplus water available for reallocation through an official tradable
permit system.
Sub-contracting land and water rights to an off-farm firm offers a number of advantages to the
farmer and reflects their perception of financial and production risk and uncertainty. Firstly, and
most importantly, the income which the fanner receives under this agreement represents a risk free
source of finance, as the farmer is not liable for any of the capital or variable costs associated with
production. They are guaranteed a fixed return from the land at the beginning of the season and
face none of the financial risks and uncertainties associated with the production or marketing of the
crop. Secondly, by introducing sub-contracting into their rotation, the farmers succeed in reducing
the area under cereal production and the CAP regime. This is an important influence shaping the
development of farm management strategies, as the farmers respond to the uncertainty over the
future of the CAP and the potential cuts in cereal prices and subsidies. By switching land into sub-
contracting the farmers reduce the area of subsidised crops and thereby reduce the impact of reform.
Finally, the introduction of sub-contracting, particularly where it represents in excess of 30% of the
total utilised area, enables farmers to restructure their labour and capital resources to reduce costs.
This has been a critical influence on four farms, where the introduction of sub-contracting has been
accompanied by redundancies and the sale of heavy farm equipment and machinery, enabling the
farmers to realise some of their assets. These financial risks and uncertainties play a central role
shaping farmers' involvement in the sub-contracting relationships. The re-valuation of water rights
by off-farm firms, and the emergence of a market for land with water rights forced these farmers to
re-evaluate their own use and management of irrigation water.
Of the ten farms undertaking resource sub-contracting, seven farmers had already invested in
irrigation, and the water was largely under- or un- utilised as it was used solely for the sugar beet
crop. Although the annualised cost of this investment averages £15,148, the real cost to the farmers
was significantly lower, as they all obtained Government grants under the old FHDS schemes.
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Consequently, the tax payer subsidised investment which was only ever used in a drought year to
ensure sugar beet production fulfilled the quota tonnage. This represents a risk reduction strategy,
which guarantees a fixed income from the sugar beet crop even in a dry year. The emergence of the
unofficial market in water encouraged these farmers to reallocate their water away from the sugar
beet crop, as the financial return from sub-contracting is higher than the marginal improvement in
yield achieved by irrigating the sugar beet crop. With capital already committed to irrigation, and in
part subsidised by the taxpayer, these farmers are taking advantage of new market opportunities.
This stands in marked contrast to the fmal three farms which have actually invested in obtaining an
abstraction licence and irrigation equipment with the sole intention of sub-contracting land and
water rights to off-farm firms. These farmers recognised the financial opportunities attached to the
emerging market in water and land rights and decided to obtain water abstraction licences in the
late 1980's to enable them to switch between 30-47% of their total utilised area into sub-
contracting. These family owned fanns of between 100-200 hectares all utilise summer and
groundwater abstraction licences. The farmers recognise the value of water and have capitalised on
their position as land owners to obtain abstraction licences, which in turn enables them to
participate in the unofficial water market, diversifying production and securing a guaranteed, risk
free source of income.
The operation of this unofficial water market identifies a number of problem areas which will
potentially lead to unintended consequences and side effects if a tradable permit system is
introduced. The unofficial water market developed in response to the demands of off-farm firms to
acquire land with water rights attached. These firms are specialist growers and pre-packers who
have access to significant reserves of non-agricultural capital. The involvement of these specialist
commercial growers-prepackers in an official tradable permit system would raise significant
questions of social equity and distributive justice. These firms, capitalising on their economic
power, could outbid all other participants in the trading system and consequently water rights
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would become concentrated in the hands of the few. Even if strict rules of entry are defined which
prevent these firms from directly participating, it would be impossible to prevent farmers from
acquiring water rights and subsequently leasing them out with the land to the commercial growers
and pre-packers.
A tradable permit system would free water rights from land rights, and also increase the actual
price of water. Although this would conform to the principles of economic efficiency it is by no
means certain to ensure the protection of the in situ water enviromnent, wildlife habitat or landscape
features. In fact the rise in water prices would perpetuate a highly intensive system of agricultural
production, in which farmers attempt to ensure a return on investment. Consequently, the area of
land under highly intensive production could be extended, as land currently excluded from
participation in the unofficial market, because of access to water, is converted to production of high
value irrigated crops. This poses a number of critical environmental problems in inter-dependent
economic and environmental systems, as problems are displaced from the water to the agricultural
sector. Firstly, the reallocation of water rights will enable the conversion of land previously under
grass or cereals to production of high value potato, carrot, onion and parsnip crops. This will have
a marked impact on the landscape, particularly in an area such as the Brecklands which is a
Government designated Environmentally Sensitive Area (ESA), where agencies such as English
Nature, MAFF and local environmental groups are attempting to not only protect but also restore
specific landscape features. Their ability to encourage farmer participation in these schemes will be
severely undermined as they are unable to compete with the economic incentives associated with
irrigated production. Secondly, the production of high value crops such as potatoes and root
vegetables is also reliant on high levels of fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides in what is a highly
intensive system of production. Thus, the risk of nitrate leaching and pollution of ground and
surface water sources is high, particularly in the Lark and Thet-Little Ouse catchments, as the free
draining sand land overlies chalk aquifers.
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The introduction of an official trading system could also create additional problems for the in situ
water environment within the catchment. In particular, the trading of sleeper licences could further
exacerbate scarcity problems as unused licences of right maintain flow levels within the catchment.
If these licences are traded and consequently brought into use, the down-stream river flow regime
may alter dramatically and thereby undermine specific in situ water environments. There are also
additional costs incurred through moving water, and these may discourage inter-catchment
transfers. It is vital that the design and implementation of official tradable permit systems takes
account of these displacement problems.
The analysis of farmers' irrigation decision making provides key insights into the processes likely
to influence their response to a tradable permit system. Theoretically, trading should release the
under- or un-used portions of farmers' licences for reallocation to other users and uses.
Nevertheless, this process will be critically influenced by the risk insurance strategies developed by
farmers in order to avoid the threat of drought and abstraction restrictions. The analysis in section
6.1.2 demonstrates how farmers attempt to insulate themselves from the financial risks of producing
poor quality produce, by reallocating water previously used on low value crops to their high value
potato crops, even though the crop would never use all the water. hi fact a total of 26 farmers claim
that their total licence quantity incorporates a margin to enable them to irrigate their priority crops
when 50% abstraction restrictions are imposed. Thus, the under-utilisation of water reflects the
farmers' attempts to avoid the threat of unreliable supplies of irrigation water, and it is therefore
unlikely that they would participate in the trading system as sellers of water rights.
The response of farmers to a hypothetical scenario involving a tradable permit system underlines
this. Although 30 potato and vegetable farmers claim they would participate in the system, only 12
would actually sell all or part of their licence, while the remaining farmers would participate as
buyers of water. In fact these 12 sellers of water include the 6 farms who stopped irrigation in the
aftermath of the 19 89-92 drought, and those 6 farms holding irrigation licence who don't, or never
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have, irrigated. In consequence, the tradable permit system would only succeed in reallocating a
small proportion of the unutilised water held by current licence holders, as there is a discrepancy
between the large number of buyers and only a few sellers. However, an increase in the unit cost of
abstraction water could change the whole equation as farmers are forced to critically re-evaluate
their on-farm water use and risk insurance strategies, and consequently they may release surplus
water for trading.
Mapping out the location of these potential buyers and sellers, as well as the untraceable and unused
licences identified in table 4.4, within the catchments, provides a picture of the impact of trading on
in-stream flow regimes, dependent flora and fauna and the potential for problem displacement. In
the Bain-Witham catchment study areas, unused licences of right in the upper reaches of the
catebments pose particular problems. These seven licences have either never been used, or irrigation
has stopped in the last 5-10 years. Consequently, these licence allocations contribute to and
maintain flow levels further down-stream, which is particularly important in the summer months to
protect the in situ environment. The reallocation of this water through trading would have
particularly negative impact, especially if the water is abstracted and used in the upper reaches of
the catchment, thereby altering the flow regime further down-stream. Obviously, if the water is used
in the lower reaches of the river this would not prove a problem, although the farmer would incur
significantly higher water transfer costs.
Within both the Bain and Witham catchment study areas the transfer of water to potential buyers
should prove relatively simple and cost effective, if the existing network of fenland drains and
dykes is used to transfer the water. In contrast, the practicalities of setting up trading systems in the
Lark and Thet-Little Ouse catchments could prove more difficult, as there is no extensive network
of drains and dykes. This is further compounded by the fact that irrigation abstraction in these
catchments largely utilise ground water sources. Consequently, there are two trading options, either
the trading system would have to be confined to existing groundwater abstractors who have already
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invested in borehole systems; or the water would have to be abstracted at the existing licensed bore
hole site and subsequently transferred via an over ground pipeline or the river system. Obviously,
the economic cost of transferring the water under these different options would be markedly
different, and consequently may encourage only limited trading between neighbours where the costs
would be lower. There would also be potential environmental problems associated with trading in
ground water. In particular, if trading allows abstraction of under-utilised water from alternative
bore hole sites in the catchment, this could indirectly affect in-stream river flow levels and wetland
sites. Obviously, in the Thet-Little Ouse catchment this could pose particular problems for the
protection of the Mere's environment. Tracing the impact of trading on the rate of aquifer
recharge, river flow levels and wetland sites is an essential pre-condition to the implementation of a
trading system.
The evidence suggests that farmers will fail to respond to the introduction of economic incentive
measures in line with the postulates of rational economic person. A number of key processes
critically shape their on-farm use and management of irrigation water and reflect the close inter-
dependence between produce quality and irrigation. The analysis demonstrates how the perception
and assessment of fmancial risk and uncertainty plays a pivotal role and over rides all other
considerations in irrigation decision making. Consequently, farmers' response to demand
management policies will appear somewhat confusing and contradictory, as a range of responses
emerge. The analysis reveals how different groups of farmers, reflecting their differential
incorporation into the quality projects of the down-stream food network, will respond differently to
both incentive pricing of abstraction water and tradable permit systems.
Although both tradable permit and incentive pricing schemes may prove successful when measured
against narrowly defmed criteria of economic efficiency, and may conform to the postulates of
economic sustainability, this analysis identifies a number of unintended consequences and side
effects which will undermine the sustainability of inter-dependent economic and environmental
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systems. In fact both incentive pricing of abstraction water and tradable permit systems may
displace problems from the water sector to the agricultural sector, perpetuating a highly intensive
system of production. The underlying premise of both forms of economic incentive measures, is
the reallocation of water from low to high value crops, which by implication are more intensive
systems of production. These systems of production are characterised by dependency on high levels
of capital and labour inputs as well as high levels of nitrate, pesticide and herbicide usage. The
increase in water price resulting under these schemes further contributes to the intensification of
production, as farmers must recoup their increased costs. The analysis of the unofficial water market
demonstrates this, with water reallocated for use on high value carrot, parsnip and potato crops,
with the associated high usage of fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides. Consequently, the system
contributes indirectly to the diffuse pollution of ground and surface water sources which poses
particular problems on the flat sand land of the Lark and Thet-Little Ouse catchments, as the soil is
particularly prone to leaching. The analysis also demonstrates how the unofficial water market
contributes to the process of landscape change, loss of wildlife habitat and changes to catchment
flow regimes. Hence, the implementation of economic incentive measures must proceed with
extreme caution, as there is a real danger that these systems, while conforming to the principles of
economic efficiency, will simply displace problems, creating far more complex environmental
problems in inter-dependent economic and environmental systems for future peoples to deal with.
6.2: Neotiatin2 access to reliable su pplies of irrigation water: farmers' individual and
collective response.
Chapter Four documents the limited role agricultural interests have played, shaping the direction of
Water policy, with Water Company interests dominating the allocation and regulation of water
resources in the UK. Consequently, the drought of 1989-92 marks an important turning point, as
policy makers and agricultural representative organisations came together to explicitly discuss
irrigation issues for the first time. In fact, negotiations and representations emerge as the central
mechanism through which farmers attempt to reduce their vulnerability to drought and abstraction
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restrictions, and avoid the financial risks associated with producing poor quality produce. The
ensuing negotiations and representations therefore provide critical insight into agriculture-state
relations in the post-productivist era, revealing how the NFU, CLA and farmers themselves, respond
to new and emerging environmental issues. Do these representative organisations revert to their
traditional style of corporatist relations with the NRA, or are they forced to forge new relationships?
6.2.1: Conflict and change: The drought of 1989-92
The analysis in the previous sections of this chapter reveals the overriding importance of irrigation
in the production of quality produce, and the management changes introduced by farmers in order
to reduce their vulnerability to drought and abstraction restrictions. These adjustments in reality are
only minor and do not in any way detract from the production of quality produce. The central
mechanism through which farmers attempt to reallocate the risks associated with low rainfall and
abstraction restrictions, is negotiation with the NRA to secure a reliable supply of irrigation water.
This ensures that they avoid the financial risks of producing poor quality produce, as well as the
financial costs associated with investment in water storage facilities or more efficient irrigation
systems.
At the national and regional levels, there had been minimal contact between NFU, CLA and NRA
representatives prior to the drought of 1989-92, with NFU officials recogmsing that water
abstraction and irrigation policy had been a neglected area in the past (see section 4.1.3 for
discussion of these issues). Consequently, this complicated the development of links and
negotiations with the NRA regions during the drought years, with the NFU and CLA officials
forced to establish new contacts and relationships. The reorganisation which was occurring in both
the NFU regions and the water industry, with the establishment of the NRA, further compounded
these problems. At the regional offices, the NFU designated one staff member responsibility for
all liaison with the NRA over access to, and use of, water for spray irrigation. In addition to
working on behalf of individual farmers in dispute with the NRA over spray irrigation, the official
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was also responsible for putting forward the NFU policy line. Formal negotiations with the NRA
were conducted at the regional level in 1991 after the imposition of abstraction bans under Section
45 of the 1963 Water Resources Act.
The absence of an established structure of communication between the NFU and NRA in part
contributed to the conflictual response of farmers in the early years of the drought. The
development of policy by the NFU at this time was largely reactive, as they failed to seize the
initiative and put forward a coherent alternative to guide the implementation of abstraction
restrictions at the local level. In fact, local initiatives resulting from direct negotiations between the
NRA and farmers, played a key role during the drought years, and have critically shaped the
development of NFU policy in the aftermath of the drought. This is revealed in the three catchment
study areas, where three different styles of negotiation with the NRA are identifiable, reflecting the
differential incorporation, of not only NFU and CLA personnel but also representatives from the
vegetable pre-pack and co-op sectors, mto negotiations and representations over access to, and use
of, reliable supplies of imgation water. These local initiatives attempted to ensure access to
irrigation water, to prevent farmers incurring financial losses by producing crops of low quality and
yield. In all cases the farmers attempted to ensure irrigation decision making remained under their
direct control, and thus self-regulation through vol untary restrictions was favoured rather than the
imposition of abstraction bans under Section 73 of the 1991 Water Resources Act.
1. The Bain - Witham Catchment
Negotiation with the NRA over access to, and use of, water in the drought of 1989-92 was
primarily organised and managed by the local NW branch secretary. In 1990 100% abstraction
bans were imposed in the Bain - Witham with little or no warning,. Consequently the NFU
secretary organised a meeting between farmers and representatives from the NRA Anglian Region
head office, in order to ensure warnings were issued prior to the imposition of future abstraction
bans. The primary objective of this initiative was to reduce uncertainty over the imposition of
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abstraction restrictions, and thereby enable farmers to plan their use of remaining water supplies in
order to maximise its benefit. This initiative laid the ground work for subsequent meetings in the
1991 season when the NRA, NFU and farmers in the catchment came together again early in the
season. The probability of restrictions being necessaiy was high, and consequently the NRA, in
conjunction with the local NFU secretary, developed a voluntary scheme whereby farmers were
only allowed to irrigate one day in seven. These voluntary restrictions cut the fanners' total licensed
quantity of water by 85%, but left their daily abstraction rate the same, enabling continued
irrigation for a further 6 - 7 weeks before a 100% abstraction ban was imposed. This meeting also
discussed the practicalities of policing the voluntary restrictions. Initially the NRA insisted all night
time irrigation should stop, so they could police the voluntary restrictions effectively. However
these proposals were heavily criticised by farmers as day time irrigation is deemed highly
inefficient with water lost through both evapotranspiration and wind blow. The meeting finally
persuaded the NRA to stop all day time irrigation, reducing the level of wastage as well as making
enforcement of the system easier, as farmers found irrigating in daytime would automatically be
fined.
The principal negotiations with the NRA were conducted by the NFIJ branch secretary with no
individual farmer involvement. Representation by individuals with specific problems was made to
the NFU branch secretary, who then talked with the NRA on their behalf. This total reliance on
local NFU representations to the NRA stands in stark contrast to the other two catchment study
areas where NFU officials had limited involvement in negotiations. This approach owes much to
the local NFU secretary, who had developed close contacts with the RWA personnel over the
previous 5 years. In fact, individual farmers relied on the NFU secretary to process all licence
applications and renewals, and he also played a major role establishing negotiations with the RWA
to address the high unmet demand for irrigation water in the western and eastern fen system.
Protracted negotiations over a five year period involving the NRA (and its predecessor), the
Internal Drainage Board (1DB) and the NFU culminated in the "Water Transfer Scheme", whereby
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water is transferred from the river Trent, via the river Witham for abstraction in the western and
eastern fen system. The NFU secretary played a critical role in these negotiations acting as the
secretary for the scheme and, consequently this experience is perceived by the fanners as
invaluable, in that it provided key insight into NRA administrative procedures and contact with
key NRA officials in the area.
The NFU secretary was already established as the principal negotiator between fanners and the
NRA over water abstraction in this area prior to the drought of 1989-92. There was an established
channel of communication between fanners and the NRA over irrigation in which the NFU played
a central role. This succeeded in dissipating the potential crisis over access to reliable supplies of
irrigation water, as the NFU representative was able to quickly establish negotiations with the NRA.
Although this did not prevent the imposition of restrictions in 1990, the NFU representative was
able to capitalise on his position and use his influence to shape the design and implementation of
subsequent abstraction restrictions. This proved critical as it re-established the principle of self-
regulation, whereby farmers agreed to voluntary restrictions in order to ensure access to a
proportion of their licensed water, and thereby reduce uncertainty over the imposition of future
abstraction controls.
2. The Lark Valley
The sunmier of 1991 heralded the imposition of abstraction bans on irrigators using both surface
and ground water sources as 50% and then 100% bans were imposed by the NRA. Hitherto,
restrictions on ground water abstraction were limited, with surface water abstractors bearing the
brunt of controls, as they were subject to 100% bans in the summer of 1990. Nevertheless, this
experience did not provoke a response from farmers and it was not until ground water abstractors
were also subject to limitations, that direct action was undertaken by farmers. In August 1991 all
borehole abstractions within 2km of the river Lark were subject to 100% restrictions on irrigation
use, and all other groundwater abstractors were restricted to 50% of their licence entitlement. In
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direct response to the imposition of these restrictions, a meeting of all irrigators in the catchment
was convened by the farmers themselves. The NFl] and CLA were not involved in convening this
meeting and all spray irrigation licence holders were included; thus orchards, garden centres and
flower growers were represented as well as potato and vegetable farmers.
The agenda for this first meeting focused on developing a plan of action for negotiations and
discussions with the NRA. Three key points were up for discussion: firstly, the procedures for
implementing the ban by the NRA were a point of conflict and a number of fanners strongly
argued in favour of legal action to claim compensation for loss of crop and income. The second key
area of discussion revolved around the role of the NRA in granting licences to Cambridge Water
Company to abstract water for transfer and use in Cambridge. This situation was perceived as
inequitable, with farmers bearing the brunt of restrictions while industry and domestic consumers
were unaffected. The continued use of water for low value "luxury" consumption such as garden
watering and car washing was an important point of conflict, underlining the perception that the
NRA had no understanding of on-farm irrigation use and the economic value of water to farmers.
Finally, alternative procedures for allocating water in 1992 were considered vital if the drought
continued, as it was deemed essential to ensure supplies to irrigators, to prevent further economic
losses at the farm level and to protect dependent employment in the vegetable pre-pack and
processing industries. The initial meeting met with a high response from abstractors and an official
committee was sanctioned to negotiate with the NRA.
Although a number of the farmers argued strongly in favour of legal action against the NRA, the
committee decided suing for compensation would be against their long term interests. The
committee perceived that, on balance, they could not guarantee the positive outcome of any legal
action, and possibly would only succeed in antagonising the NRA, creating difficulties for future
licence applications and renewals. The approach that the committee adopted was therefore
conciliatory, primarily focusing on re-educating the NRA on the role and significance of access to,
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and use of, reliable supplies of water for irrigated agriculture in the catchment. The principal
point of contact with the NRA were meetings held with the head of Anglian Region water resources
section. A series of meetings at the end of the 1991 irrigation season sought to establish a simpler
and more equitable procedure for the allocation of scarce water, if the drought continued into 1992.
The critical issue for the committee was to ensure fanners knew, at the beginning of the season, if
they would retain full use of their licensed water quantity over the subsequent growing season or if
abstraction bans were likely. This enabled farmers to establish their priority crops at the outset of
the season and thereby allocate water accordingly. The committee did not want the NRA
determining water crop priorities and intervening directly in farmer decision making, as they
strongly favoured farmers retaining full control over their irrigation decision making. In reality
however this approach fails to recognise the difficulties encountered by the NRA in predicting with
any certainty, the likelihood of restrictions, and therefore encourages them to adopt a very
conservative approach.
After the initial meetings with the NRA, the committee accepted there was a water problem,
affecting both river flow and water quality levels and consequently a set of proposals were put
forward which accepted the principle of voluntary restrictions. The committee agreed a voluntary
reduction of 40% of the farmers' total licensed quantity, so long as the NRA guaranteed the
remaining 60% would be available for abstraction through the season. These calculations were
calculated on the basis of national figures, which indicated only 60% of the total licensed quantity
of irrigation water was actually used. Thus, in reality under these voluntary restrictions farmers
would lose nothing. The NRA, although in agreement with the principle of voluntary restrictions,
were unable to guarantee the water supply for the 1992 season or accept the 40% voluntary
restriction figure, and consequently forced the committee to accept a 50% restriction.
These negotiations established a clear structure of communication between the NRA and spray
irrigators in the catchment, and played a key role in diffusing the water/irrigation crisis.
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Remarkably, the level of support for the abstractor committee was vety high across all farmers
interviewed in this catchment, with few dissenting voices against the committee line. The specialist
flower, fruit and plant growers were closely involved in the group in order to ensure their interests
were also represented in negotiations with the NRA, and the interests of the potato and root
vegetable producers did not predominate. In the aftermath of the drought the committee still
maintains links with the NRA, holding meetings at the beginning and end of the season to discuss
the likelihood of future restrictions on water use. The committee recognises the importance of
maintaining the momentum built up over the drought years, to ensure access to reliable supplies of
water for agriculture remains a priority. Nevertheless, at the time of interview the committee had not
commented on the Anglian Region's nor the National Water Resources' Strategies both published
in 1994 (a + b) and had limited knowledge of the catelunent management planning and catchnient
panel process.
The initial conflict between farmers and the NRA was clearly exacerbated by the absence of an
established structure of communication between the NFU, CLA and NRA over the issue of water
abstraction policy in the Lark Valley catchment. The failure of their official representatives to
establish a channel of communication with the NRA resulted in the farmers themselves developing
an independent water Committee to negotiate collectively with the NRA. This grouping, with the full
support of all irrigators in the catchment, became the principal forum for negotiations with the
NRA. The initial response of farmers betrayed their ignorance and lack of understanding of water
and the water regulators, as they adopted an adversarial stance. Nevertheless, initial discussions
with the NRA succeeded in addressing these issues and underlined the critical water problem facing
the catchment. Once convinced of the serious nature of the water problem, the farmers shifted their
negotiating stance and adopted a conciliatory approach. The central factor shaping their approach
was reducing uncertainty as well as preventing further fmancial losses through the unexpected
imposition of abstraction restrictions and interruption of water supplies. Thus, the water committee
drew on the principles of self-regulation and put forward voluntary restrictions and self-policing
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measures in order to avoid greater intervention by the NRA in on-farm water management decision
making.
3. The Thet - Little Ouse
Negotiation with and representation to the NRA over access to water for spray irrigation has
proceeded on two principle issues in this catchment. Firstly, farmers entered into negotiations with
the NRA over the implementation of abstraction bans during the drought years of 1989-92. The
second, on- going area of discussion has emerged in the aftermath of the drought and revolves
around NRA attempts to reduce the negative impact of drought on the Meres 5
 environment, through
introducing cessation clauses into renewable licences.
The principal forum for discussions with the NRA during the drought period was the Peddars Way
Group which is a former pea growers group made up of between 15 and 20 farmers in the
Breckland area. Its primary role is to act as a collective forum for discussions with external
agencies such as MAFF, ADAS and the PMB; 1991 was the first time discussions were held with
the NRA over the issue of water for irrigation. The NFU and CLA were not directly involved in
convening the group, but they were invited to attend the meetings with the NRA, where
representatives from the four main vegetable and potato pre-packers in the area were present, and
the meetings were chaired by the local M.P. Gillian Shepard, then Secretary of State for
Employment. The first meeting was held in the summer of 1990, with the primary aim of ensuring
100% abstraction bans on spray irrigation were not imposed, or if bans had to be imposed
,sufficient warnings were extended. Although at that stage there was no immediate threat of
restrictions, the group was uncertain of NRA drought policy, and wanted to underline the vital
importance of access to irrigation water not only to individual farmers but also to the local economy
and dependent employment in the vegetable pre-pack sector. The group argued that they needed at
5 Meres are wetlands which occur when dips in the landscape intercept the water table. The Breckland Meres are SSSIs
which occasionally dry out naturally; however under Section 57 of the 1991 Water Resources Act, the NRA is unable to
use its statutory powers to impose restrictions on abstraction to protect this unique landscape feature.
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least 2 weeks warning of an imminent abstraction ban, to enable them to plan their use of
remaining water. In fact they suggested a blanket 50% cut in the daily abstraction rate was
inequitable, as those with large licences would see little change in their actual daily usage and
consequently argued strongly in favour of voluntary restrictions.
The vegetable pre-pack representatives played a central role in these discussions, underlining the
importance of spray irrigation to their procurement of quality potatoes and root vegetables, and
their customers the four main UK supermarkets. The key argument put forward by these vegetable
pre-pack representatives concerned the impact of abstraction restrictions on the quality of produce
and the knock-on effects for employment. Company representatives also argued their inability to
guarantee a continual supply of quality vegetables would lead their main customers, the
superniarkets, to switch their procurement strategy to overseas suppliers, and contribute to the on
going balance of payments deficit. These negotiations culminated in the agreement of voluntary
restrictions whereby farmers within a Skin radius of the Meres accepted a 50% reduction in their
licensed abstraction.
In the post-drought period the NRA has been in discussions with farmers, within a 5km radius of
the Meres, over the introduction of cessation clauses 6
 into renewable licences. Eight farmers are
directly affected by these proposals and have held group meetings with the NRA to discuss them,
with no NFU or CLA involvement. Their principal argument against the imposition of cessation
levels is the increased uncertainty introduced into farm irrigation decision making. Restructuring
crop management strategies would be forced onto these farmers and all of them argued that their
potato and root vegetable acreages would have to be cut, as they are unwilling to incur the financial
losses resulting from poor quality produce. The approach adopted by these farmers is conciliatory,
as they argue for the introduction of voluntary restrictions rather than cessation levels. Cessation
6 The cessation clauses are calculated by the NRA and once river flow levels drop below a certain defmed point all
abstraction will have to stop. There would be no warning and no scope for negotiation, simply a 100% cut in water
abstraction.
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levels are perceived in wholly negative terms, allowing no room for negotiation or discussion with
the NRA. Although the farmers recognise the advantages of entering into discussions with the
NRA, if they fail they are quite prepared to legally challenge the licence renewal, resulting in a
Public Enquiiy.
These negotiations are further complicated in the farmers' minds, by the fact that discussions over
cessation levels are not conducted solely with the NRA but involve English Nature and other
environmental bodies. These groups are perceived in wholly negative terms and as a greater threat
to on-farm water management strategies than the NRA. The farmers perceive the attitude of the
NRA as conciliatoty and are wrongly convinced that if cessation clauses are introduced they would
not police them rigorously. Environmental groups, however, are perceived as the wreckers of such
a relationship, forcing the NRA to rigorously police the cessation levels by threatening legal action.
The negotiating strategy of these farmers focuses exclusively on discussions with the NRA, and at
the time of interview no talks had been held with English Nature or other environmental gro ups
active in the area.
Although the NFU and CLA were not directly involved in negotiations with the NRA in the pre- or
post- drought period, the farmers succeeded in presenting a strong case, by involving not only their
local. MP, but also local specialist growers and pre-packers. By not presenting the issue solely in
terms of the impact on individual farmers, but in terms of the knock-on effects for employment and
the rural economy, they were able to broaden the scope and incorporate other actors into their
collective negotiations. This is in marked contrast to the approaches adopted in the other two
catchments, where actors from the down-stream food network were not invited, let alone
incorporated into collective negotiations with the NRA. In part this reflects the vital role of these
growers-prepackers in the catchment, where they also irrigate their own and others land, and thus
have a direct interest in retaining access to reliable supplies of water. Self-regulation and voluntary
restrictions were once again the key principles shaping the collective negotiations, as the group
264
attempted to prevent the unexpected imposition of restrictions. They were also in the fortunate
position of the NRA being unable to use its statutory powers to impose restrictions to protect
damage to the Meres environment, thus they were forced to negotiate, to minimise the damage on
these specific environmental sites.
Despite differences in the actual structure and organisation of negotiations with the NRA, the
approaches adopted by the farmers in the three catchnient study areas were remarkably similar. The
three groups all asserted the principles of self-regulation, through voluntary restrictions in order to
stop the NRA from imposing further official restrictions. Their overriding objective was to reduce
uncertainty over access to irrigation water and thereby prevent further financial losses. Although
these negotiations all culminated in the same outcome, the actual processes of negotiation were
markedly different, and reflect tensions within the traditional corporatist relationships which
dominate agriculture-state relations.
The analysis reveals how the failure of both the NFU and CLA to establish a clear network of
communication with the NRA, at both the local catchment and regional level, over the issue of
irrigation use, culminated in the crisis response to the drought of 1989-92. This in part reflects their
ignorance of water abstraction issues, and the importance to farmers of retaining access to and use
of reliable supplies of irrigation water. This had not been a "traditional" area of lobbying by the
NFU and it was therefore marginalised in negotiations with the NRA (and its predecessor) as flood
defence and latterly pollution control took precedence. The misperception that irrigation water is an
agricultural issue reflects their failure to respond positively to new and emerging environmental
issues. This left a critical gap, and in the drought of 1989-92 local farmer groups developed to fill
the policy vacuum. Consequently, the NFU and CLA were by-passed, as local initiatives were
developed to negotiate directly with the NRA. The ensuing negotiations reflect, not on]y the
ignorance and misconceptions surrounding water issues found among farmers and their
representative groups, but also the failure of the NRA to recognise the importance to farmers of
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access to and use of reliable supplies of irrigation water, and their ignorance of the practicalities of
irrigating on the farm. The fact that farmers in the Bain-Witham catchment had already established
a structure of communication with the NRA was a key factor preventing the "crisis" response which
predominated in the Lark and Thet-Little Ouse. Despite this initial response, farmers in these two
catchnients subsequently established negotiations with the NRA to secure reliable supplies of
irrigation water. Actors from off the farm were also incorporated into these negotiations, as finns
from the down-stream food network became involved in discussions in the Thet-Little Ouse
catchment. However, there was no close involvement from the supermarkets and processors, as their
arms length control of production enabled them to distance themselves from local environmental
conflicts. The success of these groups is attributable to their command over their constituencies, as
they were able to ensure all farmers complied with the voluntary restrictions. Thus, the principles of
self-regulation were of central importance, as groups drew on them in their negotiations with the
NRA, even though the NFU and CLA were not involved.
hi the aftermath of the drought, the NFU and CLA have reasserted control at the national and
regional policy levels, and have played a key role, directly and indirectly influencing both the
design and implementation of Government and NRA policy on water regulation. Their success is
reflected in the concessions to agricultural interests included in the 1995 Environment Act noted in
Chapter Four, and the formation in 1995 of the National Water and Agriculture Forum in which
representatives from MAFF, EN, NFIJ and CLA discuss irrigation issues. These organisations are
also taking the lead in the debate on demand management policies in the agricultural sector, with
the NFU, in particular, publishing a number of policy discussion documents (Naish 1994; Smyth
1995; NFU 1996). Thus, having established a clear structure of communication with the NRA, the
NFU and CLA will undoubtedly exert a powerful influence in the future policy debate over the
design and implementation of demand management policies.
266
The initial response of farmers and their representative organisations to the drought of 1989-92,
reveals the problems encountered when confronted with new and emerging environmental issues.
The analysis demonstrates the central importance of social forces of regulation in influencing not
only the design and implementation of abstraction restrictions, but also ensuring compliance with
the restrictions amongst irrigators themselves. The role of the NFU and CLA in these discussions
however, was minimal, as new independent groups emerged to negotiate directly with the NRA.
The breakdown of the traditional form of negotiation between agriculture and the state reflects the
failure of the NFU and CLA to recognise the importance of irrigation issues to agriculture and they
were therefore slow in reacting to local level problems. This, however, should not imply the
emergence of new forms of corporatism in the agricultural sector, as the NFU and CLA have
subsequently reasserted their influence and are playing a central role in the policy debate on demand
management policies.
6.3: Conclusion.
Farmers enmeshed in the agriculture-water interface are subject to a plethora of competing and
conflicting signals emanating from the NRA, now the Environment Agency, and the down-stream
food network. There is little integration or engagement between these two networks of state and
market regulation, with farmers at the local level, the focal point for these divergent forces, forced
to negotiate between, and reconcile these conflicting and contradictoiy signals in order to formulate
effective farm management strategies. Nevertheless, these are not separate or discrete areas of farm
decision making and are in fact closely inter-twined. Access to, and use of, reliable supplies of
irrigation water are central to farmers' engagement with the quality projects of the down-stream
food network and this process of interaction, in turn, critically shapes and reshapes their
negotiations and representations with the Enviromnent Agency. This analysis demonstrates how a
combination of regulatory forces together shape the on-farm use and management of irrigation
water. The sustainability of the agriculture-water interface can only be assured if a new, alternative
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approach to environmental regulation is adopted which promotes synergy between the plethora of
regulatory signals shaping the production and consumption of food.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
REGULATING THE AGRICULTURE-WATER INTERFACE: THE WAY AHEAD
Realigning development at the agriculture-water interface along a sustainable pathway will not be
amenable to simple or unequivocal solutions. Policy integration will have to overcome the complex
economic and environmental inter-dependencies which displace problems from one media, time or
place to another. This final chapter will draw together the various strands of analysis, and attempt
to pin point the critical implications not only for the theoretical debate on nature and society, but
also the key issues for environmental policy. The discussion will be presented in two sections; the
first section will concentrate on the theoretical debate and will re-examine the six theoretical
postulates identified in Chapter Two. The analysis will evaluate the explanatory value and
significance of these postulates to understanding the complex processes underpinning the inter-
sectoral transfer of environmental problems. The second section will focus on the implications for
both the design and implementation of environmental policy in general, and the introduction of
demand management policies in the agricultural sector in particular, drawing out the specific policy
recommendations for the Environment Agency.
7.1: The aicu1ture-water interface: the theoretical contribution.
The multiple and conditional hypotheses identified in Chapter Two address the complex processes
which together contribute to the dynamic displacement of environmental problems at the
agriculture-water interface. The postulates address different dimensions of the complex interplay
between market, state and social forces of regulation in order to trace the implications for irrigation
use and the water environment. Although no one theoretical postulate provides a holistic
framework of analysis, it is possible to distinguish specific theoretical postulates which are central
to understanding specific dimensions of the dynamic displacement process. Firstly, it is critical to
recognise that environmental problems are characterised by both market and state failures, with the
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current abstraction charging and licensing systems conforming to classic market failures (Tietenberg
1992; Pearce et a! 1989) while the problems of low flow rivers and over- abstracted catchments
confirm the central role of inappropriate state intervention in creating many of the world's
environmental problems (Janicke 1990; Andersen 1994). Inappropriate Government intervention
perpetuates the dynamic displacement of environmental problems by focusing policy solely on
technocratic policy prescriptions, which do not address the underlying causes of the problem.
Consequently, policies focusing solely on redefining property rights to the environment or
designing the optimal pricing schemes in line with the postulates of neo-classical environmental
economics, will perpetuate the dynamic displacement of environmental problems if they fail to
address the political and institutional context within which the regulated are situated.
The limitations of the purely sectoral approach to policy are revealed by drawing on the political
economy tradition which exposes the complex network of social relations within which the
regulated are situated. The analysis reveals the relations of power and dependence which link
farmers at the local level with the regional, national and international market, state and social forces
of direct and indirect regulation. Tracing the forces of regulation which directly and indirectly
control and manipulate decision making at the individual level is central to understanding the key
forces which undermine and distort the response of the regulated to specific environmental policies
and the unintended consequences and side effects which result. This approach reveals the central
importance of market forces of regulation in shaping the use and management of irrigation water at
the farm level.
This is complemented by the theory of the firm, which is central to understanding the form and
function of market regulation. Although interaction between firms is underpinned by complex
relations of power and dependence, this only partially explains the combination of processes at
work, as the analysis demonstrates how firms successflully regulate each other's behaviour.
Contrary to the profit maximisation thesis of traditional neo-classical economics, the analysis
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reveals the central role of risk rnininiisation goals in shaping interaction not only between finns, but
also between firms and farmers. As postulated in the behaviouralist theory of the firm (Crew 1975)
and in recent studies in economic geography (Ekinsmyth et a! 1995), promoting certainty and
stability within the finn is of paramount importance. Finns in the fresh and processing food
networks are responding to the financial, production and legal risks and uncertainties associated
with the production and consumption of food. The analysis documents how supermarkets are re-
defining the form and function of their inter-relationship with subordinate firms in order to avoid
the legal and financial risks associated with non-compliance with BS5 750. In line with the
postulates of Batch and Wu (1974) and Crew (1975), the analysis demonstrates how firms, reducing
the risks and uncertainties attendant on their own production environments, succeed in reallocating
risk to subordinate firms and farmers. By controlling production at a distance, the supennarkets and
processors avoid incurring any of the financial or production risks and uncertainties associated with
land ownership, and are divorced from the impact of their decision making on the environment.
The analysis traces the specific consequences of the strict produce variety and quality criteria for the
use and management of irrigation water and the water environment, revealing how these forces of
indirect market regulation fuel the demand for irrigation water. Despite this close inter-linkage,
none of the firms in the downstream food network conceptualise water as an environmental issue,
and fail to recognise the impact of their quality specifications on irrigation use at the farm level. The
analysis confirms the postulate of the behaviouralist work on risk and uncertainty, by underlining
the central role of information in shaping the perception and assessment of environmental risk and
uncertainty (Dasgupta 1982; Segersen 1992). Complete ignorance of water issues at all levels of the
fresh and processing networks explains the poor perception of water as an environmental issue. In
fact, the analysis refutes the contention of Casson (1982) that unequal access to information within
the firm shapes the response to environmental issues, by revealing that no other individual or
department is accorded responsibility for water issues. Consequently, lack of information is a
critical barrier to change.
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The theory of the firm, and behaviouralist literature on risk and uncertainty, are essential to
understanding the form and function of market forces of regulation and the nature of interaction
between firms. These literatures are also drawn onto expose the black box of farmer decision
making processes, in order to understand the complex trade-off's calculated as they negotiate
between, and reconcile, the competing demands of state and market forces of regulation. The
analysis identifies the critical gaps in farmer knowledge and understanding of water, water rights
and the water environment. Confirming the postulate of the behaviouralist work on risk and
uncertainty, the analysis reveals the central role of individual knowledge and experience in shaping
farmer perception of water as an environmental issue. Although this may in part explain the failure
of farmers to respond to environmental risks and uncertainties associated with irrigation use, the
analysis demonstrates the overriding importance of financial risk and uncertainty in shaping on-farm
irrigation decision making.
Irrigation use is inextricably inter-twined with the production and marketing of quality produce, and
the analysis demonstrates the significant financial losses incurred through failure to meet the quality
specifications. Farmers, therefore, attempt to minimise these risks by instigating intensive irrigation
programmes at the farm level. Economic self-interests predominate, and the analysis reveals how
the introduction of changes in the management and use of irrigation water, have been
implemented with the primary objective of insulating the farm from the impact of drought and
abstraction restrictions. Farmers are responding to the forces of market regulation and co-ordinating
production, in order to ensure the quality of produce. Consequently, farmers' irrigation decision
making in response to demand management policies, cannot be dismissed as irrational if they fail to
respond to water price rises in line with the postulates of "rational economic person". In fact, in the
context of their interaction with the downstream food network and risk minimisation goals, farmers'
behaviour must be seen as perfectly rational.
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The dynamic displacement of environmental problems from one media, time or place to another is
not a simple, uni-dimensional process and it is impossible to pinpoint one specific mechanisms
which is the sole contributing factor. In reality, a combination of processes together underpin the
perpetual transfer of environmental problems, although the specific configuration of processes is
unlikely to be the same in all areas of environmental conflict. This analysis of the agriculture-water
interface reveals that the dynamic displacement of environmental problems from the water to the
agricultural sector and vica versa, does not result solely from inappropriate Government
intervention or market failures. The reality is far more complex, and reflects the contradictory
interplay between economic, social, political, institutional and environmental processes which
together perpetuate the cross-media transfer of environmental problems.
7.2: The aiculture-water interface: implications for environmental policy and practice.
Radical reappraisal of the form and function of environmental policy is a vital prerequisite to ensure
the sustainable development of the agriculture-water interface. Rectiijing the dynamic displacement
of environmental problems is of paramount importance, in order to break the perpetual cycle which
transfers problems from one media, time or place to another. A number of key policy
recommendations emanate from the analysis which address this issue, and suggest an alternative
agenda of action for the Environment Agency. Although these relate specifically to the
implementation of demand management policies in the agricultural sector, the principles which
underpin these recommendations are also more widely applicable to the debate on environmental
policy and management. This does not imply a return to the sterile debate on the relative costs and
benefits of alternative tools of environmental regulation, encompassing direct command and
control, or economic incentive measures. The discussion transcends these issues, as the
implementation of any of these alternative tools of environmental regulation will, in fact,
perpetuate the displacement of environmental problems, without more radical reform of the actual
policy process. In order to ensure the integration of the environment and economy, intervention
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must be redirected away from a purely sectoral approach, to ensure the combination of regulatoty
forces impinging on resource decision making work in synergy rather than dissonance.
7.2.1: An inter-sectoral policy approach.
The first step in this alternative approach is the recognition that environmental policy does not exist
in a vacuum; a plethora of other state, market and social forces of regulation directly and indirectly
shape and influence the decision making of the target population. In consequence, their response to
specific environmental policy initiatives cannot simply be read off, as they will be critically
influenced by the other forces of regulation which directly and indirectly impinge on their decision
making. In reality these other forces of regulation conifict with or contradict, the environmental
policy signal and distort the response of the regulated, leading to unintended consequences and side
effects. Given this regulatory dissonance, it is both inefficient and ineffective to confine state
environmental policies solely to redirecting the behaviour of individuals at the local level. Their
power to effect change is severely circumscribed, as they are locked into a complex network of
social relations which directly and indirectly controls and manipulates their production and
consumption decision making. It is therefore, vital to realign these forces to ensure they work in
synergy and relay a co-ordinated message to individuals at the local level.
This does not imply the simple redirection of state policy intervention or the targeting of policies to
other sectors of the economy. Harnessing the power and influence of market and social forces of
regulation, necessitates an alternative, proactive approach. The environmental regulator must work
with both trade associations and individual firms to realign the forces of market and social
regulation. Recognising firms are locked into a complex network of inter-relations, in which some
firms exploit their positions of economic power to control and manipulate the flow of information
and capital to subordinate firms, it is possible to focus attention on these dominant firms and build
upon their existing framework of inter-firm regulation. Thus, the environmental regulator could
concentrate advice to specific firms on the principles of eco-labeling or environmental auditing.
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These schemes would be implemented and policed by the firms themselves as they incorporate eco-
labels or environmental audits into supplier contracts. The scope of this alternative approach is
clearly elaborated through the analysis of the agriculture-water interface.
7.2.2: An alternative agenda of action for the Environment Agency.
A combination of regulatory forces are pushing and pulling farmers in competing and conflicting
directions critically distorting their use and management of irrigation water and leading to
unintended envirom-nental consequences and side effects. The analysis documents the cential role
played by market forces of regulation, as supermarkets, food manufacturers and processors directly
and indirectly manipulate on-farm production decision making, through the specification of strict
produce quality criteria. Tracking farmers' incorporation into these quality projects, reveals how the
strict produce quality criteria for potatoes, coupled with the susceptibility of the preferred varieties
to both drought and common scab, force farmers to instigate an intensive regime of irrigation. The
overriding importance of produce quality and the limited power of farmers to resist the quality
dictates of the downstream food network, distort the impact of other forces of state, market and
social regulation. The implications for demand management policy and the environment are
exposed in this analysis.
The application of the principles of demand management in the agricultural sector, focuses on five
key areas of change encompassing economic incentives, changing irrigation teclmology, switching
production to drought tolerant crops or varieties, changes to the actual land tillage methods to
reduce nm off and wastage, and the construction of water storage facilities. These changes are
principally targeted at farmers, and fail to recognise the complex web of interdependencies which
critically influence and shape their use and management of irrigation water. In reality, fanners will
fail to respond to these policy measures in the theoretically optimal manner, as the analysis clearly
reveals their limited power and influence over production decision making. The willingness and
ability of farmers to switch to drought tolerant crop varieties is severely circumscribed, as they are
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tied to the production of the preferred potato varieties designated by the supermarkets, crisp and
chip processors. The power of farmers to resist the quality and variety specifications of the
downstream food network is limited, as these firms dominate the UK potato market and there are
only a restricted number of alternative outlets for produce.
Focusing on the response to economic incentive measures, principally incentive pricing of
abstraction water and tradable permit schemes, the analysis reveals how even under the current
abstraction charging scheme, irrigation on some farms is already uneconomic, and these farmers
would be better off switching to the dry farming option. The short and long term gross margin
analysis demonstrates that the response to LMC pricing is likely to vary dramatically, reflecting
farmers' differential incorporation into the quality projects of the downstream food network. The
rise in water abstraction prices to the £225 level should prove sufficient to shift the behaviour of
small, family farmers irrigating relatively small areas of potatoes. Although this process of change
may not be immediate, these farmers would be forced to critically reassess their irrigation use when
faced with a decision on the replacement or repair of irrigation equipment. Higher annualised costs
of investment, combined with a water price of £225 per megalitre, should trigger movement out of
irrigation. In contrast, the impact of water price rises on large, water and capital intensive potato
producers will prove more complex. The analysis demonstrates how these farmers still incur
significant financial losses from moving out of irrigation, when the alternative water costs are
included. Thus, price increases to the £225 level may simply be absorbed, so long as farmers are
still able to consistently produce the high quality potatoes with the attached price premiums.
However, this situation changes markedly if farmers are forced to accept lower potato prices
because of quality problems. Hence, farmers' perception and assessment of financial risk and
uncertainty will play a central role shaping their response, and the rise in water price to the £225
level may encourage the construction of water storage facilities, even on the flat sand lands of
Norfolk and Suffolk.
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The response of farmers to a tradable permit system is no less complicated. Although the analysis
identifies the potential for reallocating wider- or un-used licensed water in the three catchment study
areas, it also reveals how these schemes will perpetuate an unsustainable system of agricultural
production. Detailed analysis of the informal water market in the Breckland study area identifies
the potential problem areas. Under- or un-utilised portions of abstraction licences are leased with
land rights for use on a short-term basis by commercial growers and pack houses, for the production
of high value carrot, parsnip and potato crops. Short-term leasing of land and water rights has
enabled these firms to extend production; however this is a highly intensive system of production
which is dependent on high levels of chemical inputs, and there is a high risk of pollution of ground
and surface water sources. The conversion of land to these high value crops contributes to the
process of landscape change and habitat loss. In an Environmentally Sensitive Area (ESA) such as
the Brecklands, the informal water market conflicts with the attempts of MAFF and English Nature
to protect this unique landscape and environment.
Detailed scrutiny of the informal water market demonstrates the willingness of farmers to reassess
their irrigation use in response to higher water prices, as they reallocate under- or un-used water
from low to higher value crops, thus confuinirig the predictions of economic theory. Nevertheless,
wider participation in formal trading schemes will be critically influenced by the risk insurance
strategies designed by farmers to avoid the threat of drought and abstraction restrictions. The
analysis demonstrates how fanners' total licensed quantity of water incorporates a margin, to enable
them to irrigate priority water crops when 50% abstraction restrictions are imposed. Consequently,
these farmers are unlikely to release their under-utilised water and participate in a trading system as
sellers of water rights. In fact, the response to the hypothetical tradable permit scenario reveals the
discrepancy between the large number of buyers and only a few sellers. Over coming these risk
insurance strategies will prove critical in ensuring the efficiency and efficacy of trading schemes.
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Although the farmers' response to tradable permit systems would conform to the principles of
economic efficiency and ensure the reallocation of water from low to high value uses, it is clear that
it will also succeed in transferring problems to the agricultural sector. Both forms of economic
mcentive measures will perpetuate and allow the extension of a highly mtensive system of
agricultural production. This contributes to the loss of both landscape and wildlife habitat, the
diffuse pollution of ground and surface water sources, alteration of the flow regime within
catchments and thereby undermines the sustainability of the in situ water environment. These
policy tools will create far more complex environmental problems, which are displaced from the
water to the agricultural sector.
Focusing on the interaction and interplay between the combination of state, market and social forces
of regulation, exposes the conflicting and contradictory processes which influence farmers'
response to specific demand management policies. These responses, or non responses, cannot
simply be dismissed as irrational, as the analysis reveals how, in the context of their interaction with
market forces of regulation, farmer's irrigation decision making is in fact rational. The forces of
direct and indirect market regulation successfully penetrate on-farm production decision making
and in consequence dominate irrigation decision maldng, resulting in an intensification of water use
at the farm level. The efficacy of demand management policies focused solely on farmers is
therefore brought into question, as these policy measures fail to nullify the signals emanating from
the downstream food network. Only through realigning these forces of market regulation will the
sustainable development of irrigation water and the environment be assured.
Redirecting state policy intervention away from just farmers and targeting key players in the
downstream food network will remove the key source of dissonance which undermines and distorts
the work of the Environment Agency. Harnessing the power of the downstream food network will
ensure the different forces of regulation work in synergy, and thereby promote a co-ordinated
approach to farmers at the local level. The analysis in Chapter Five identifies three key areas of
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change which harness the existing resources of finns in the downstream food network and focus on
their research and development programmes, investment in water storage and alternative irrigation
technology and the reform of the produce quality specifications.
The processors and major potato pack house companies already have well established research and
development programmes into alternative potato varieties and techniques of potato production.
Harnessing these resources to direct research into alternative potato varieties which are tolerant to
both thought and common scab would, over the long term, have a major impact on the demand for
irrigation water at the farm level. Secondly, although the downstream food network has traditionally
resisted direct investment in agriculture, firms which issue forward production contracts to farmers
could provide finance for investment in water storage facilities, particularly where contract farmers
are concentrated in relatively small geographic areas. This would encourage the construction of
collective reservoirs, thus reducing the cost for individual farmers, alleviate the pressure on water
resources in the summer months and insure the protection of particularly sensitive water
environments. The off-farm firm would also benefit through reduced uncertainty over the
Consistent supply of quality potatoes, as the farmers would have a guaranteed supply of water to
apply throughout the season. The off-farm firms could partially fmance the investment and act as a
financial guarantor or co-ordmator so that groups of farmers could finance investment themselves.
This would clearly have a major impact primarily in areas where the cost of reservoir construction is
high, such as the Lark or Thet-Little Ouse catchments where the flat sand land provides few cheap,
natural reservoir sites.
The third key change involves the relaxation of the produce quality specifications particularly in
relation to potato skin finish, which would have a major impact on the use of irrigation at the farm
level. The supermarkets, by increasing their tolerance to the incidence of common scab, would
enable farmers to relieve the intensive programme of irrigation in the early stages of the season.
This would bring to an end the wasteful use of water, which merely ensures the appearance of the
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potato and does not in any way contribute to improvement in the size or taste. Finally the
downstream food network could play a central role reinforcing the Environment Agency's message
on the wise use of water. The principles of demand management and water conservation could
easily be incorporated into the information booklets and advice provided to farmers by these firms.
In combination, these initiatives would have a profound influence on the on-farm use and
management of irrigation water and would contribute to the de-intensification of irrigation use.
Action to protect the environment by the downstream food network is not unprecedented, as
supermarkets and processors are already responding to the agricultural pollution problem, through
the Integrated Crop Management (1CM) scheme and research into alternative potato varieties.
Nevertheless, a major impediment to this proactive approach is the significant level of ignorance
among managers in the downstream food network of water resource management issues. The
analysis reveals the critical gaps in their knowledge of water, irrigation and the environment, and
their complete failure to conceptualise water as an environmental issue.
The Environment Agency must therefore adopt an alternative role to ensuring the sustainable
development of water resources in the agricultural sector. Rather than simply directing policy solely
to farmers at the local level, the Environment Agency must instigate a wider programme of action
directed to all levels of the food network, including supermarkets, processors, trade associations and
the consumer. The first step of this alternative approach should focus on a programme of education
underlining the problems confronting the Agency as it attempts to reconcile the competing demands
for water from industry, agriculture and domestic users while at the same time ensuring the
protection of the in situ environment. Having firmly established the nature of the resource problem,
the Environment Agency, in tandem with the NFU and CLA, should explicitly identify the
implications of drought and abstraction restrictions for farmers and their production of fresh fruit
and vegetables. The role of the quality projects in fuelling the demand for irrigation water should
also be examined. Having clearly addressed the information gap which underpins the poor
perception of water as an environmental issue, firms in the downstream food network should be
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receptive to a more pro-active role. Changes implemented by these firms will prove critical as the
sustainable development of water resources and the environment will only be assured if the signals
emanating from State, market and social forces of regulation work in synergy rather than
dissonance.
This analysis has explored the central dimensions of the agriculture-water interface, exposing the
conflict of interests and values which underpin the allocation and regulation of water in the
agricultural sector. These conflicts and contradictions will become more sharply drawn as the
debate on demand management shifts, to consider the actual design and implementation of policies.
Additional research, to input into this debate, is essential to ensure the transparency ofthe
economic, social, political, institutional and environmental costs and benefits associated with the
range of alternative policy options. Prior to the introduction of economic incentive measures, pilot
schemes should be implemented, to critically assess their feasibility and potential impact. Careful
consideration should be given to the role of "sleeper" licences, and the potential impact of trading
them on the environment. The resources allocated in these licences may currently be supporting in-
stream flow levels and pollution dilution processes, and trading may exacerbate these problems.
Research on farmer knowledge and understanding of water, water rights and the environment
should also be extended, to include those currently not irrigating. The behaviour of this group of
farmers, as potential buyers of water rights, may critically distort the efficiency and efficacy of
tradable permit schemes, raising questions of social equity and distributive justice. As this analysis
demonstrates, the sustainabilily of inter-dependent economic and environmental systems should
form the corner stone of environmental policy assessment, to ensure policy intervention does not
result in the development of more intractable environmental problems.
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Topic headin2s and introductory questions.
1. Details of on-farm irrigation use.
What quantity of water are you licensed to abstract?
What quantity of water do you actually abstract?
What types of irrigators do you use? (number, cost, date, grant)
Do you have any form of winter water storage? (number, cost, date, grant)
2. Details of the Irrigated crops.
Turning now to the farm itself, what is the total utilised area of the farm? (owned/rented)
Can you give me some idea of the predominant soil type on the farm?
What rotation do you follow?
What potato varieties do you grow?
Can you outline the acreage of each?
Can you outline which crops are irrigated, and the yield?
3. Details of the farmer.
Are you the principal decision maker on the farm?
When did you take on this farm?
When you are no longer involved farming here, do you expect any of your family to succeed you
actively farming this land?
How many people are employed on the farm full/part time?
4. Change in the structure of the farm.
Can you outline the major changes which have occurred on the farm since 1992?
What have been the key changes in relation to the management of irrigation water over this period?
5. Irrigation decision making.
Which are the priority water crops on the farm?
Can you outline the criteria which you use to decide which crops or varieties receive water?
Do you receive any advice from off the farm on when to apply the water?
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6. Water history
What have been the key water events on the farm?
How did you cope with the thought of 1989-92?
Has your demand for water changed since the drought?
7. Marketing links.
How do you market the irrigated crops?
What are the key criteria set down by the off farm firms?
How do you ensure through farm management that these criteria are actually met?
How important is water application in ensuring this?
8. Marketing futures.
Looking to the future, and the possible winding down of the PMB how will you then market your
potato crop?
9. NRA links and negotiation
Have you applied to the NRA to have your abstraction licence changed?
During a drought period do you keep in contact with the NRA personnel to gauge the possibility of
an abstraction ban being imposed?
If an abstraction ban is imposed, and you feel that the conditions are unfair, have you negotiated
with the NRA to persuade them to change?
Did you negotiate as a collective group of fanners or individually?
10. Understanding of water issues.
How important is water as an input for use on the farm?
Does access to water affect the production or crop choices on the farm?
How is water different to other production inputs?
How important is access to water for the development of the farm?
Do you think that your use of water has any implications for the environment?
If a river passes through your farm, should you automatically be allowed to use that water?
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11. Scenarios.
In a hypothetical situation how would you react if:
(I) your water licence was cut by half permanently?
(ii) the cost of the abstracted water you used was increased by 25%?
(iii) a new company up stream of your farm decided to apply for a large licence to abstract water
from the same river, and this abstraction could potentially reduce the flow level of the river and
therefore cause problems for your abstraction?
(iv) a rare water plant was found in a pool down stream from your abstraction point, and the NRA
wanting to protect it, decided that you could only abstract water in the winter into a reservoir?
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VALUE IN USE: GROSS MARGIN ANALYSIS
Gross margin analysis allows estimates to be made of the value of the productivity gains generated
by water use and the productivity losses from restricted water availability. The valuation procedure
involves several steps:
1. Under current irrigation and land allocation practices, estimates are made of the gross margins
(total output minus variable input costs) achieved by the farm enterprises.
2. It is then assumed that no irrigation water is available and that farmers change their crop mix to
that which yields the highest net returns under dry farming. This produces a new, without irrigation,
set of gross margin estimates.
3. By comparing the difference between the gross margins calculated under (1) and (2) above, an
estimate can be made of the short run value in use of the irrigation water. Such short run values are
important since they will be critical to the farmers' response to any unit water price rise, once they
have undertaken investment in water storage and irrigation equipment.
4. To obtain longer term value in use measures and to estimate the demand for new abstraction
authorisations it is necessary to take account of the costs incurred in water storage and irrigation.
Thus, for irrigation to be financially viable, total gross margins with irrigation less the discounted
annual irrigation costs (capital and operating) must be greater than the margins achieved without
irrigation (those calculated under step 2).
From the farm survey data on the current land allocations, irrigated acreage, yields, and water
application were obtained for the 1993-94 season. Nevertheless it was not feasible to obtain the
highly detailed information on achieved crop sale prices and the general variable costs associated
with the production of individual crops or livestock enterprises. Therefore, gross margin data for
the first step in the valuation procedure was obtained from secondary sources. The main source was
the Farm Business Survey of' the Eastern Counties of 1993 (Cambridge 1995), and this was
supplemented by data from Nix (1994). Use of the Cambridge survey as the primary information
source necessitated disaggregation of the surveyed farms into two groups based on the soil type,
namely Breckland farms ( for farms in the Thet-Little Ouse and Lark catchments) and upland farms
under 400 hectares (for farms in the Bain-Witham catchment). The gross margin values for the
potato crop were varied in line with the significant price variations associated with the different
market outlets. Hence, in accordance with Morris (1993) values varied from £50/t for general ware
potatoes; £80/t for processing potatoes and £150/t for pre-pack standard potatoes.
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Information for step two of the valuation procedure was obtained from the farm interviews. It
was assumed that the shift to dry land farming, would lead to the reallocation of previously
irrigated land into winter wheat production.
EXPENDITIJRE ON WATER STORAGE AND IRRIGATION EQUIPMENT.
To undertake the cost analysis a number of simplifying assumptions are necessary. First, since
investment in irrigation equipment and storage took place in different time periods, it is necessary
to convert the expenditure to a single time value, to ensure that the figures are comparable. In effect,
the investment was treated as if it had taken place in 1992, immediately prior to the harvest season
in which the farm survey occurred. All the irrigation investment costs were converted to 1992
values using the national retail price index (RPI) as published in Economic Trends (CSO Annual).
Second, a set of assumptions were made, associated with the notion that capital goods represent
stock variables whereas the services they render are flow variables. In consequence, it is necessary
to convert the stock valuations into a stream of annual expenditures. The cost of irrigation
equipment investment comprises two elements: depreciation and the opportunity cost of funds
employed. Using standard farm management procedures, depreciation was calculated on a linear
basis and related to years of expected life of the relevant facility. Reservoirs were assumed to have a
life of 30 years with an annual depreciation rate of 1/30 implied; other source works, pumps and
power units, portable field applicators and miscellaneous equipment were assumed to have a life of
15 years with an implied depreciation rate of 1 / 15 per annum. The opportunity cost of capital was
calculated at 7%, in line with current public sector guidelines. Investments made prior to 1960 were
assumed to have been fully depreciated and have a zero opportunity cost of funds employed. The
opportunity costs of all funds employed and the physical depreciation of the actual facilities are
associated with the initial outlay and maintenance of the capital stock. It is also necessary to
consider the recurrent or operating costs. In the case of storage facilities, operating costs are
assumed to be negligible and a zero cost imputed. The operating costs for irrigation equipment, in
contrast are likely to be quite significant, including the labour, fuel and actual water costs (Hinton
and Varrarigos 1990; Weatherhead eta! 1994). However, the estimates presented here exclude
these costs as attempts to elicit this information directly from the farmers proves problematic.
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